357.AK/4–2651: Telegram
The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Secretary of State
1453. For Hickerson from Ross. Re possible GOC approach to North Koreans. On Grafstrom’s initiative I saw him yesterday afternoon at Lake Success. He asked if I had any comment from the Dept on the information and views he had expressed in conversations with Gross on April 21 (Usun 1433) and with me on April 23 (Usun 1435). I told Grafstrom (Deptel 870, April 23) that I thought there was very little, if anything, I could add to what Gross had already said to him. I said that we felt that the NK communication was a scurrilous document which we did not ourselves consider in any sense to be a “peace feeler”. Grafstrom said that the GOC did not wish to proceed with any attempt to communicate with the NK’s if we had strong objection to their doing so. I commented that he knew we had loyally supported UN bodies, including the GOC, which had been established with the object of achieving a peaceful settlement in Korea. I said I thought the question of whether the GOC should approach the NK authorities was one which the GOC would have to decide for itself and I would not consider it appropriate for us to be associated in any way with their decision. Grafstrom said he understood this and assured me that we would not be associated with any decision they might make.
Grafstrom still seemed to be somewhat intrigued with the possibility that the NK communication which had on it “Soviet hall mark” and indications that Chi Corns had given no publicity whatever to it might reveal divergence between NK’s and Soviets, on the one hand, and Chi Corns, on the other. I made no comment.
Grafstrom also indicated Rau seemed to feel there might be something in point he had just mentioned. I thought it wise to indicate in strictest confidence that according to information received from our Embassy in New Delhi, Indian Govt appeared to feel Panikkar’s estimate valid.
Grafstrom seemed also to continue to be intrigued by idea of using Soviets for channel of communications to NK’s. I said I had had personal question in my mind whether this might lead to rebuff, and asked whether they have considered possibility of direct approach to NK’s, giving copy to Russians. Grafstrom observed that he did not know how they would communicate directly with NK’s. He said they wanted to avoid any communication which might be interpreted as formal response by GA President to NK communication. [Ross.]