357.AK/4–2351: Telegram

The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Secretary of State

top secret
niact

1435. Hickerson from Ross. Message from Pannikar re Chinese Communist reaction to North Korean peace feeler. Grafstrom telephoned this morning and referring to conversation with Gross last Friday (Usun 1433, April 21) said Rau had called on him this morning with message from Pannikar which Rau requested be treated as top secret, Grafstrom asking us so to consider it. Message from Pannikar, as follows, was theoretically response to request that Pannikar find out Chinese Communist reaction to so-called North Korea peace feeler.

Pannikar indicated that North Korean communication had not been made public nor commented upon in Peiping (this has been confirmed to Grafstrom from Swedish sources). Pannikar went on that full resolution of World Peace Council1 contained, of course, specific references to other Far Eastern questions. It was not strange, therefore, that [Page 377] North Korean communication omitted reference to these since presumably North Koreans were concerned only with Korea. Object of move would seem to be to expose UN as unconcerned with constructive suggestions of World Peace Council, and possibly intended to get this Council to take more definite steps against UN and US. Pannikar indicated he had no reason to think North Korean communication represented serious effort to start negotiations. Pannikar’s message concluded with his observation suggesting that North Korean communication be treated with great reserve.

Grafstrom said he indicated to Rau that message seemed to express Pannikar’s own views rather than reflecting Chinese Communist views; Rau agreed and said he was sending further message requesting Pannikar get Chinese Communist views.

Grafstrom commented to me that he found Pannikar’s message “extremely interesting.” He said he had doubted whether any approach to North Koreans such as he suggested to Gross on Friday would be worthwhile but that Pannikar’s message caused him to wonder whether his doubt was well-founded. Pannikar’s message, Grafstrom said, might indicate that Chinese Communists had nothing to do with North Korean communication, that there might be what Grafstrom termed “a bad connection” between Chinese Communists and that approach such as he indicated to Gross might therefore be useful. Grafstrom said that Rau had agreed that Pannikar’s message was very interesting but perhaps not exactly the way Pannikar intended.

I told Grafstrom that Gross’ conversation with him had been reported to Department and that I would let him know any views Department might have as soon as possible. Grafstrom said he was meeting with Entezam and Padilla Nervo this afternoon. [Ross.]

Austin
  1. In addition to the resolution on Korea, other resolutions of the World Peace Council relating to Asia dealt with “Japan” and “the U.N. and China”; texts in Documents on International Affairs, 1951, pp. 304–306.