795.00/4–1751

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Officer in Charge of Korean Affairs (Emmons)

secret

Subject: Questions relating to Far Eastern Policy

Participants: Mr. F. S. Tomlinson, Counselor, British Embassy
Mr. Dean Rusk, Assistant Secretary for Far Eastern Affairs
Mr. Arthur B. Emmons, 3rd, Officer in Charge, Korean Affairs

Mr. Tomlinson called on Mr. Rusk at 10:30 this morning by prior appointment. He stated that the Embassy had received a request from the British Foreign Office to determine whether the U.S. Government had the documentary evidence alluded to in a story by Stewart Alsop in his column of March 11, 1951 to the effect that Mao Tse-tung had been planning with the USSR as early as December 1949 an invasion of South Korea. Mr. Rusk replied that he knew of no particular documentary evidence which might back up this statement, that he felt sure that the Department had not given Mr. Alsop such information, but that we would be glad to look into the matter further to see what we might have on it.

Mr. Tomlinson then referred to an exchange of cables with his Foreign Office concerning a proposed statement of policy on a negotiated settlement with the Chinese Communists which the 14 nations might find it desirable to make. He left with Mr. Rusk a summary of the latest cable received from Mr. Morrison expressing his view as to how such a statement might be handled.1 Mr. Tomlinson remarked that Mr. Morrison felt under some considerable pressure to make a statement before Parliament on this general question. Mr. Rusk pointed out that for the moment we, ourselves, had no further immediate step in this direction in mind, but he thought the decision as to whether any such statement should be made publicly or whether the approach should be private was both delicate and of considerable importance; under certain conditions a public statement might only serve to strengthen the communist determination to reject a peaceful approach.

Mr. Rusk mentioned that he and the Secretary felt that a reply was owing to Mr. Morrison on several points which he had recently raised with us on the matter of a declaration and that today he was going to devote considerable time to working out a message from the Secretary to Mr. Morrison which would cover a great deal of ground relating to Far Eastern questions; among these would be a discussion of the subject covered by this latest message from the Foreign Office. Mr. Rusk [Page 350] added that in this message we might also take up such topics as the course of action to be followed in the event of a massive intervention in Korea by communist aircraft, and the problem of additional measures against Communist China.

Mr. Tomlinson inquired whether the contemplated message would also include a reference to the problem of Hong Kong. Mr. Rusk replied that we did not plan to do so except perhaps in relation to its connection with the general question of the control of trade with China. Mr. Tomlinson remarked that this was a delicate and difficult problem and had been especially touchy in the recent case of the tanker, which had been kept from Chinese Communist hands only with the greatest difficulty.2

There then followed a general discussion of policy towards Communist China. Mr. Rusk pointed out that there were two possibilities in handling the Communist China problem; on the one hand, a building up of outside pressure against the Peking regime could take place, which would at first perhaps cause a consolidation of the regime inside the country as well as with the Communist orbit, but which ultimately might lead to its fragmentation; the other approach might be to attempt to establish an attractive force from the West which would tend to loosen the ties which China might have with the USSR. The second course he felt involved the danger that, in the process of attempting to win China away from communism, we might, in fact, end up by strengthening communist power in China. He pointed out that the first course, on the other hand, had the advantage that, if it did not succeed, we would at least ultimately be in a stronger position to continue pressure and would not have sacrificed our general strategic advantage. As an illustration he stated that Communist China was apparently beginning to feel the pressure of the Korean affair on its internal structure, a point, however, with which Mr. Tomlinson did not entirely agree.

Mr. Tomlinson stated that the British point of view had generally been, in dealing with China, to counter Chinese pressure where necessary with British pressure, as for instance in Korea, and that they would undoubtedly do so if the Chinese intervened in Indochina, but where the Chinese Communists indicated an inclination to be reasonable, the British Government in its turn felt that reasonableness was the best policy.

Mr. Tomlinson wondered whether the U.S. Government had yet perfected plans for a program of increased aid to Formosa. Mr. Rusk replied that the Bureau of the Budget had not yet passed upon such [Page 351] a program but that it was our plan to increase this aid within the next year.

In summing up the conversation Mr. Rusk reiterated that many of the points which had been discussed would be incorporated in the message which the Secretary planned to send to Mr. Morrison within the next few days.

  1. Infra.
  2. For documentation on control of trade with mainland China and economic sanctions against the People’s Republic of China, see pp. 1874 ff.