795.00/4–1351
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Director of the Policy Planning Staff (Nitze)
Subject: Korea
| Participants: | Sir Oliver Franks |
| Mr. Paul H. Nitze |
I told Sir Oliver that I wanted to be perfectly frank and open with him so that he would be in a position to inform his government appropriately.
I recalled that at our initial meeting General Bradley had left early to go to another meeting and that Admiral Sherman had continued in his stead.1 At the meeting to which General Bradley had gone, the question came up for discussion of what procedure the U.S. Government, in its exercise of its responsibilities as Unified Command, should follow in the event of a major attack on U.N. forces from bases outside of Korea. I recalled that this was at a time when [Page 344] the newspapers were carrying stories that General MacArthur was authorized to initiate a counterattack in the event of such a contingency, and that it was essential that a clear-cut determination be made by the U.S. Government as to what procedure should be followed in the event of such a contingency. I went on to say that when the issue had first come up some days before, I had suggested that General Bradley and I sit down with him and Lord Tedder so that the U.S.-U.K. relationships in this problem could be clarified with the least possible delay. However, our desire to discuss this matter with the U.K. did not remove from us as Unified Command the responsibility for action one way or another in the event such a contingency took place. I had gathered from him that the U.K.’s position was that the contingency was unlikely in the near future and, therefore, we had considerable time for a further exploration of views between us.
Sir Oliver said that he was disturbed that a final decision was taken by the U.S. Government while the matter was under discussion with his government. I replied that I found difficulty with the word “final”. In the event the U.K.’s estimate that the danger of the contingency was slight proved to be wrong, we would have to act one way or another. Lack of action was as much a decision as a decision to act and might be just as serious. In the absence of agreement between the U.S. and the U.K. as to the procedure to be followed, the responsibility fell upon us as Unified Command for acting in one way or another. It seemed to be perfectly clear that the decision as to the magnitude of the attack should be taken in Washington and not in the field. We would, however, feel strongly that under certain circumstances it might be far more dangerous to delay action than to take the time for widespread consultation. If the U.K.’s estimate was right, we had plenty of time for further clarification of the U.S.–U.K. relationship in the event of such a contingency.
Sir Oliver said that he now understood our viewpoint and he felt he was in a position to write his cable in a more understanding and helpful way.