320/1–651: Telegram

The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Secretary of State

secret   priority

Delga 490. Re Korea. Following reports Ross conversations Jamali, Charles Malik, Padilla Nervo,1 Fawzi Bey yesterday afternoon.

[Page 29]

Jamali was given copy of our memo. He expressed very strong discontent with delay occasioned by Rau, cease-fire group, British Commonwealth meeting. He said they were supposed to have a 12-power Asian group. This in turn was tried through Rau to cease-fire group which was not getting anything done because of Rau. The Asian group was also tried through Rau and Nehru to the Commonwealth group. The Commonwealth, after all, represented only 8 members of UN and in effect, Jamali summarized, he was getting fed up with the paralysis which for these reasons had overtaken the Asian group and the UN. He said he had expressed the foregoing views at an Asian group meeting Friday morning2 and had been supported by Pakistan and Iranian representatives and by most of the Arabs. He said he thought we should not delay beyond Monday filing of some intermediate step. He thought, however, that agreement between US and UK on a program of action was very important.

The speech made by Eban in the First Committee outlining points as basis for GA action3 seemed mildly to have gotten under Jamali’s skin. He said there is nothing new in these points; that they had all been encompassed in the thinking of Asian group. He did not say so, but he seemed to feel that the Israelis were stealing a march by moving into vacuum left by Asian group inactivity.

Jamali said that in Asian group meeting Friday morning, he had asked Rau whether India would be able to go along with a resolution condemning the aggression in Korea if a further intermediate step proved a failure. He said Rau had replied that India would not even in those circumstances be able to go along with a condemnatory resolution.

Charles Malik, with whom Ross had brief conversation after Committee One meeting giving him copy of our memo, is full of beans and more and more irritated over delay on the one hand and viciousness Malik’s4 and Soviet satellites speeches on the other.

Fawzi Bey was given copy of our memo. He is maintaining a rug-dealer attitude not being nearly as forthright in his comments as Charles Malik or Jamali.

Padilla Nervo said that he understood Pearson to say at Canadian luncheon yesterday that Nehru was holding up authority to Rau to go along with cease-fire statement of principles until Indian Government had found out from Chinese Communists whether such statement would be acceptable. As Padilla understood it Nehru would not authorize Rau to associate himself with such principles if Chinese [Page 30] Communists would not go along. Asked concerning this, Riddell said he did not think situation was that Nehru was waiting for Chinese Communists concurrence, although he said he knew statement of principles had been sent to Pannikar.

Padilla observed that he thought that in present situation the votes of the LA delegates, which were pretty well assured for a condemnatory resolution, were not nearly as important as getting the votes of India in particular, as well as other countries which recognize Peiping regime. If we did not get these votes, he said a condemnatory resolution would lack political force. He expressed himself very strongly in favor of an intermediate step.

  1. Mohammed Fadhil Jamali, Charles Malik, and Luis Padilla Nervo were Representatives at the United Nations of Iraq, Lebanon, and Mexico, respectively.
  2. January 5.
  3. See the editorial note, p. 26.
  4. Reference here is to Yakov Malik, Soviet Representative at the United Nations.