795.00/4–951: Circular telegram
The Secretary of State to Certain Diplomatic Offices 1
601. Fol is report on briefing meeting of reps of countries with troops in Korea, April 6:
In reply to inquiry on massing of non-Chinese forces in Manchuria, Rusk indicated that while he does not of course know what Rayburn had in mind,2 Rusk supposed that he spoke about reported build-up of Soviet air power in the area. There are also some reports, of unknown reliability, that the Russians had increased their forces in Port Arthur and on the Siberian-Manchurian frontier. Also, there have been occasional reports of unknown reliability concerning European volunteers in the Chinese armies massing on the Manchurian border, including allegedly former Japanese prisoners, nationals of Soviet satellite countries, et al. Rayburn was apparently referring also to these rumors, about which we are trying to get some more definite information. Rusk indicated that Rayburn was undoubtedly referring to these reports to emphasize the continuing danger, in an effort to prevent the Congress from relaxing into complacency.
Rusk then reported on the status of proposed statement which had been given to the other Govts for comment. He indicated that a number of questions had been raised:
- A.
- Some governments, and also the GOC, had queried whether the 14 nations shld speak for the UN. Alternatives were suggested—for [Page 318] example, that the statement might be issued by the GOC, although it was realized that if the GOC issued such a statement it might make its task of bringing about a settlement a little more difficult. Some thought that the GA or the First Comite were the only ones with authority to speak for the UN. Another suggestion made by several Govts represented was that the US alone shld issue the statement in its capacity as Unified Command.
- B.
- A second group of comments referred to the language. A number of Govts felt that the language might be modified so as to make it less unpalatable to the Chinese Communists and increase the chances that the statement might persuade Peiping to agree to a peaceful settlement, without any issues of “honor” or “face-saving”. We thought these comments were constructive and were prepared to meet them.
- C.
- The replies also underscored the difficulty of making any statement which wld properly differentiate between the military and long-term political objectives of the UN. The UN went into Korea to meet aggression and to restore peace in the area. The political question of unification had been troubling the UN for years before June 25, but there was never any suggestion that the UN shld seek to achieve the unification by force. In any statement, therefore we are faced with the difficult question as to how to indicate that the UN maintains the political objectives without converting them into military objectives. If we indicated only that we were prepared for peaceful settlement along the 38th parallel, the other side wld get a political advantage and it wld seem that the UN had given up its political objectives. Also we must recognize that the South Koreans are passionately devoted to the principle of unification. A statement which formally abandons unification wld create real trouble with the South Koreans. In the present situation, even from the military aspect alone, it wld be highly unfortunate to endanger the morale and the wholehearted fighting support of the ROK forces by any formal abandonment of unification.
- D.
- Finally the comments from other Govts underscored the difficulty of writing a statement which wld both assert our readiness for a peaceful settlement, and our determination to continue fighting if the enemy does not agree to peaceful settlement. The expression of such determination is itself likely to make the acceptance of peace by the enemy that much more unlikely.
Rusk summed up by saying that since we first discussed the project a number of things had happened. We have not really decided ourselves what is the best approach in the light of these events and the comments. Tentatively we are now thinking that the US, as the Unified Command might itself put out a brief statement as to what the Unified Command considers to be its responsibilities.3 We wld issue this statement through the SYG to all the Members of the UN. This statement wld be sort of a lowest common denominator of gen agreement, and we wld circulate this statement to the countries participating in Korea before it was issued to give them a chance to raise any questions that [Page 319] they might have. Later, we might for our own people, as other countries have done or might wish to do, make a further statement or speech expressing the Amer attitude, a fighting speech on why we are in Korea, etc.
Rusk indicated that both at this stage and if any such statement is circulated we wld welcome suggestions both official and personal. However, at present the idea is still tentative and it may be the middle of next week before we have any definite views on it. Since, however, we had stirred up the whole matter with our original proposal we thought it only proper that we keep the other countries informed as to the developments.
The Greek Ambassador, addressing himself to some of the questions to which Rusk had referred expressed himself rather forcibly to the effect that this group is entitled to speak for the UN, that they have a mandate from the UN because they are the ones who sent troops.
The Dutch Ambassador indicated that his Govt wld welcome a statement by the UC alone. In his personal opinion it was desirable that it be a very brief statement to clear away uncertainties which had developed recently. There may be some delay involved in the plan which Rusk outlined, which is unfortunate but inevitable. Of course if the US Govt reserves the right to make future public comments to its own people, other govts will also wish to reserve this right.
Berendsen (New Zealand) stated that the hope had been to issue a statement right away, before any Chinese attack occurred, since if it had any use its chief design is to prevent such attack. Rusk stated that if this were the only approach to Peiping for peaceful settlement what Sir Carl said wld be very forceful. However, there were other approaches being made to the Peiping Govt, both through the GOC and through diplomatic channels. The proposed statement was not motivated exclusively by the hope that it might bring peaceful settlement. There are no indications whatsoever that the Chinese Communists are even considering peaceful settlement; they seem to be in a state of political suspense.
The Dutch Ambassador intervened again to state that the statement as originally contemplated had had several purposes. One of these, of course, as Sir Carl suggests, was to try to bring about peaceful settlement, and preferably to try to do that before the Chinese Communists launched another major attack. However, the statement also had the purpose of clarifying the position of the UN and of the Govts fighting in Korea and remove doubts and uncertainties, and he hoped the proposed UC statement wld achieve that.