795.00/4–651: Telegram

The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Secretary of State

secret   priority

1374. From Gross. Korea: During course of conversation on another subject today. Gross asked Bebler (Yugo) about current Yugo estimate Korean situation.

Bebler replied that Belgrade estimate is that USSR may well be almost ready for negotiated settlement. He pointed to Stalin’s self-interview of Feb 16 which, he said, offered political and moral support to North Koreans and Chi Communists but carefully avoided mention of military support. He said Belgrade thought that interview contained some promise of Soviet readiness to negotiate. He also said that Stalin statement, which was more editorial than Stalin’s usual deliberate style, still seemed to him somewhat “panicky” or nervous, thus revealing worry over Korea situation in high Soviet circles. He said Belgrade thought this tied in with current rumors and reports about build-up of Soviet air and mechanized strength north of Yalu and Tumen Rivers, which, he suggested, may be encouraged by USSR not only to improve negotiating position re Korea, but also in CFM.

According to him, Belgrade also thought that USSR and Communist China must be having some very serious and complex disagreements over hegemony in Korea, glory for military successes, economic agreement in Manchuria and so forth. Belgrade did not believe USSR will be contented to leave to Communist China the leading revolutionary role in East Asia.

Bebler therefore thought time is near when some such Soviet figure as Gromyko or Malik may approach some American official with some sort of proposal for settlement. He thought that to save Soviet face it might be easier for US to approach some Soviet official first someplace. Bebler claimed that Soviets use UN for propaganda purposes, but that for matters such as this, they prefer to negotiate secretly. [Page 316] He also thought Soviets and Chi Communists are rather committed not to use any UN body as channel for approach to US. He believed US approach to USSR would be better than approach to Communist China because Soviets are more desirous of settlement and more free to negotiate than are Chi Communists. [Gross.]

Austin