795.00/4–351: Telegram
The Secretary of State to the United States Mission at the United Nations
top secret
Washington, April 3,
1951—7 p. m.
827. At briefing meeting reps of nations with troops in Korea, Apr 3, Rusk stated:
- 1.
- By Fri, Apr 6, we hope to have further observations to make on contemplated UC statement.1 By then, we expect all govt comments will be in and we will see where we stand. We are not at all frozen to proposition that such statement shld in fact be issued. Observations to date indicate general agreement on content but some questions have been raised as to whether statement is worth going ahead with. It may be that if certain govts have particular problems vis-à-vis their own public, these might best be handled by separate statements designed primarily for domestic consumption. We hope to be able discuss this entire question too on Fri.
- 2.
- As we have indicated, build up of enemy forces points to possibility of strong enemy offensive, and we are anticipating such an offensive. We are increasingly concerned that in connection with such an offensive there may be heavy enemy air attack. We do not have any firm indications, but there has been increased air activity reported and intelligence sources indicate build up of air strength in Manchuria including 2-engine bombers. While we may be out of range of MIGs based in Manchuria, heavy 2-engine bombers from bases north of Yalu cld endanger our troops, our ships at sea, as well as our bases in Japan. We are vulnerable to heavy air attacks especially since our troops have gotten used to fighting without fear of enemy air opposition. Our ports are generally unprotected except for friendly aircraft. If in the opening phase of an enemy attack, there shld be heavy air offensive, enemy cld do us considerable damage.
- US has always been anxious to keep fighting localized in Korea. Even from a military point of view, it is perhaps to our advantage to fight battle in Korea without having to face attacks on our troops and ships from Chinese and Russian planes. Other side presumably was equally content not to have their bases and installations on Chinese territory attacked by our bombers. We have always made clear however, [See Deptel 642, Jan 12[20]]2 our concern about security of our forces in event that enemy shld decide to launch massive air attacks. And if such attacks shld come, we wld have to meet in any way we cld.
Rusk stressed that we have no firm info but that we were concerned with matter and wanted to inform in preliminary way other nations fighting in Korea.
Acheson