795.00/1–151: Telegram

The Ambassador in Korea (Muccio) to the Secretary of State

secret

637. Deptel 496, December 27.1 Precise figures refugee movements impossible obtain; those following are estimates.

UNCURK figure half million on move southwards following fall Pyongyang2 considered probable, but civil assistance teams successfully diverted large portion westward direction Haeju. Since majority blocked battle lines, number actually crossing into ROK possibly only 200,000 in west, plus about 130,000 from Hungnam-Wonsan area in east. Noteworthy, neither ROK officials nor public opinion differentiates between acceptance refugees from north 38th Parallel and those from ROK territory proper.

Large percentage military age males believed due determination most such persons not serve in Communist Army, as well as their greater mobility. Also ROK agencies encouraged young men to come south. Undoubtedly there are enemy agents among them, for whom [Page 3] security agencies searching, but is believed vast majority are sincerely seeking escape from Communist regime even if such escape includes induction into ROK Army.

Related subject is heavy departures from Seoul and environs, which now estimated number between 800,000 and one million. Motivation appears be combination determination not live again under Communist regime with its terror and oppression, fear of being caught in midst battle, and fear of Chinese Communist soldiers. Which is predominant in given individual is open speculation. Refugees from north appear to have same motivations.

While majority refugees from north probably middle class persons from cities and towns, substantial numbers of farmers have come down with families and in some cases whole villages have come down. Bullock, Australian UNCURK alternate, interrogated about 60 refugee farmers from North Korea who were being cared for in Seoul. Concensus was that under Communists they did not own land, hence no property to defend, and that Communist rents and taxes were so high they actually had been paying higher percentage farm returns than under Japanese. Seems possible farmers in ROK would stand by farms more determinedly than those in Communist territory because of individual proprietorship.

Undoubtedly is great fear of CCF, which does not come solely from historical Korean attitude towards Chinese. Traditionally, especially under Li Dynasty, there were good relations between two nations, but Korean tends be contemptuous of individual Chinese since his sole contact likely be with poorer class Chinese residing in Korea. There are widespread rumors of devilish nature CCF troops, such as their pleasure in killing with knife as opposed to rifle, looting, murder and the like. Perhaps general knowledge success CCF in defeating Chinese Nationalist Army adds to this fear. Additionally, is abstract fear of alien invader, but in this case directly connected with widespread horror stories.

Muccio
  1. The substantive portion of this telegram read as follows: “… Dept. interested in details on nr, character, and motives of refugees from north. Extremely high estimates carried in press citing UNCURK figures appear excessive in light of gen tendency farmers to remain on land. Reports of great preponderance males suggest possibility many may be camouflaged soldiers, infiltrators, stragglers from ROK forces, or entrants into north since Oct. Of interest re motives are relative strength of fear of advancing army, antipathy toward northern regime, hostility toward Chi, and forcible ejection by CCF. Is antipathy toward CCF fear of excesses of conquering army, historical or social animosity toward Chi, polit opposition to Commie Chi, or opposition to control by alien forces. Realize present conditions Seoul may render acquisition this info difficult, but Dept wld appreciate any info along foregoing which mission may be able supply since propaganda potential this type info great.” (795.00/12–850)
  2. Pyongyang had been evacuated by U.N. forces on December 5, 1950.