795.00/4–251
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Rusk)
Subject: Proposed Statement on Korea: Conversation With the Australian Ambassador
| Participants: | Australian Ambassador, Mr. Makin |
| Mr. David W. McNichol, Second Secretary of the Australian Embassy | |
| FE—Mr. Rusk | |
| BNA—Mr. Shullaw1 |
Ambassador Makin called on me today at his request to ask for our comments on the aide-mémoire which he had left with Mr. Johnson [Page 289] last week. The aide-mémoire dealt with the question of the 38th parallel.2 Before discussing the aide-mémoire, however, the Ambassador asked whether it was still our intention to have the President issue a statement on political objectives in Korea.
I told the Ambassador that we had had replies from all of the countries contributing armed forces for the Korean operations to whom we had circulated copies of the proposed statement. These replies, with the exception of that from the United Kingdom, appear to be close enough together to permit agreement on a statement. The United Kingdom, however, in its reply made three points, the implications of which are not entirely clear to us. These points were: 1) The nations on whose behalf the statement was to be issued should be expanded to include those countries sending hospital units and those which intended to supply armed forces at a later date. I remarked that this obviously would make it more difficult to reach agreement on the text of the statement. 2) There should be a second statement affirming that the countries issuing the statement on political objectives accepted the military implications. I remarked that we did not know precisely what was meant by this suggestion. 3) There should be an additional appeal to Moscow and Peiping reiterating our desire for peaceful settlement and inquiring whether the Soviet Union or Communist China had any suggestions to offer. I pointed out that acceptance of this suggestion would place us in a bad tactical position.
The Ambassador said that he had been instructed by his government to say that Australia considered General MacArthur’s recent statement as exceeding his authority. Mr. Makin asked whether we were in a position to give any assurance that such statements would not be made in the future. I told the Ambassador that General MacArthur’s statement was unauthorized and unexpected and that steps have been taken at the highest level of the United States government to insure that this does not happen again.
Ambassador Makin said that his government is of the opinion that if and when the proposed statement by the President is issued, it might be desirable to indicate that discussions had been in progress with the interested governments since March 16 thus indicating that it was not a reaction to the MacArthur statement.
The Ambassador inquired whether we had had any indication of a willingness on the part of the Peiping regime to negotiate a settlement in Korea. I told him that we had received no indication that the Chinese Communists had abandoned their announced intention of driving [Page 290] the United Nations forces from Korea. I remarked that on the contrary the recent heavy buildup of the Chinese forces north of the parallel appeared to indicate that another attack was contemplated within the next few weeks or possibly days.
The Ambassador asked what progress had been made with the proposed Pacific pact3 and whether we were firmly committed to inclusion in it of the Philippines. I told him that we were still awaiting a reply from the British and hoped that we would receive it within the next few days. I said that so far as the Philippines were concerned this did constitute a problem for us, but that it might be possible to handle the matter in some other way than by including them in a pact with Australia and New Zealand. In any case, however, our minds were not closed on the subject.
In concluding the conversation I told the Ambassador that we were in general agreement with the points made in his aide-mémoire of March 28 on the subject of the 38th parallel and our political and military objectives in Korea.
- J. Harold Shullaw, Acting Assistant Chief, Division of British Commonwealth Affairs.↩
- The Australian aide-mémoire of March 28 expressed the view that tactical crossing of the 38th parallel should be permitted the U.N. Commander but urged that there be no general offensive north of the line other than to secure the best defensive position possible in proximity to the parallel. The long term objective of peaceful unification of Korea was not to be abandoned, but was obviously not practically achievable at the present time by military means. (795.00/3–2851)↩
- For related documentation, see vol. vi, Part 1, pp. 132 ff.↩