Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, Korea and China, Volume VII, Part 1

795.00/3–3051

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Director of the Office of Northeast Asian Affairs (Johnson)

secret

[Washington,] March 30, 1951.

Subject: President’s Statement on Korea

Participants:	Mr. F. S. Tomlinson, Counselor, British Embassy
	Mr. Dean Rusk, Assistant Secretary, FE
	Mr. U. Alexis Johnson, Director, NA

Mr. Tomlinson called at his request this afternoon and handed us a copy of the attached telegram from the Foreign Office to the Embassy.

Mr. Rusk commented to Mr. Tomlinson on the telegram as follows:

1. With respect to the first paragraph, we agree that every opportunity should be explored to avoid further military operations, but we doubt that such operations can be avoided or that the Chinese will be prepared to enter into any discussions whatever, at least until after they have undertaken and failed in another major offensive.

2. We agree that it is not likely that the Chinese Government will cooperate with the Good Offices Committee. We have no objection in principle to the inclusion of additional countries in a statement of policy, but must note that as the number of countries is increased the difficulty of obtaining agreement is also increased and the statement tends to assume the level of the lowest common denominator. Mr. Rusk pointed out that in addition to India, Sweden and Denmark, who have contributed medical and ambulance units, one could well include such countries as Norway who have contributed shipping facilities. Mr. Tomlinson commented that it appeared that the Foreign Office was seeking a formula under which particularly India and possibly Sweden could be included.

3. With regard to paragraph 3a of the telegram, in so far as it goes we agree with it as a statement of policy attitude. However, it appeared to us that one of the problems was how one maintained this policy attitude without confusing it with the war aims. In reply to Mr. Rusk’s questions, Mr. Tomlinson indicated that the Embassy had no indication whatever as to how the Foreign Office thought that such a declaration might read, nor whether the declaration which the Foreign Office had in mind meant the same as the draft statement which we had submitted to them for comment.

4. With respect to paragraph 3b of the telegram, we could perceive some merit in separating the joint declaration from the military declaration. However, any military declaration would have to take into account the military necessities of the situation and our ideas with regard to the conditions under which hostilities could be terminated in general remained about the same as those included in the January 2, 1951, report of the Cease-Fire Committee.

5. With respect to paragraph 3c there seemed to us to be danger in inviting the Chinese and Soviets to express their views as to the best method of terminating hostilities as this gave them a very advantageous negotiating position and a further opportunity to exploit differences in the UN on this subject. We felt that it was much preferable to determine the principles upon which hostilities could be terminated and then submit those principles to the Communists.

6. Paragraph 4 of the telegram gave us no difficulty and we were inclined to agree. Mr. Rusk asked Mr. Tomlinson whether there was any indication that the United Kingdom channel to Peking was available and that Peking would be responsive. Mr. Tomlinson replied that they had no such indications except that Peking accepted written communications from them.

7. Paragraph 5 of the telegram did not present any particular difficulty to us.

8. It is difficult for us to comment on paragraph 6 in the absence of any UK comments on our proposed statement and a clear indication of the type of declaration that the UK had in mind under paragraph 3a of the telegram.

9. With respect to paragraph 7, if the implication was that the Government of the Republic of Korea had to be wiped out and a fresh start made in South Korea, we were unable to accept this view. Mr. Tomlinson replied that he was certain that this was not the implication of the paragraph, but that it related to the question of the authority of the Republic of Korea over territory north of the 38th parallel.

Mr. Tomlinson stated that the attached message was also being transmitted to the participating Commonwealth Governments and to France for their comments as well as to the UK Delegation at New York. Mr. Rusk raised the question as to whether there would be any objection in London to the UK’s discussing with the remaining members of the 13-nation group what the UK had in mind. However, after some discussion, Mr. Tomlinson agreed that it might be preferable to obtain further clarification before undertaking any additional conversations.

Mr. Tomlinson indicated that the Embassy would immediately transmit a message to London along the lines of the foregoing discussion and Mr. Rusk indicated that as they were working on the text of the declaration mentioned in paragraph 3a of the telegram we would be studying the possibility of a statement in accordance with paragraph 3b.

[Annex]

Telegram by the British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (Morrison)¹ to the British Ambassador in Washington (Franks)

secret

[undated.]

I wish you to discuss with the State Department the possibility of a new approach to a negotiated settlement in Korea. We must not miss the chance, now that we are near the parallel, to examine whether further military operations can be avoided.

2. It is, however, now almost certain that the Chinese Government will not cooperate with the Good Offices Committee and it is for consideration whether the objectives of the Good Offices Committee might not be attained by other means. If, for example, we could secure a clear statement of policy in regard to Korea, agreed to by all the countries with forces in Korea (I should hope that India, Sweden and Denmark who have contributed medical and ambulance services might also be associated) and specifically endorsed, as regards its military implications, by the unified command, then I think that we would have a basis for an approach to Peking both direct and perhaps through Moscow in order to explore Chinese readiness to come to a negotiated settlement by some procedure other than through the Good Offices Committee.

3. A possible programme might be

(a) A joint declaration by all the nations with forces in Korea, expressing their desire to see an independent unified Korea and the withdrawal of all foreign troops; and their readiness to achieve these objectives by negotiation rather than by military means

(b) A simultaneous additional declaration by President Truman in his capacity as Chief executive of the state providing the unified command to make it plain that the military implications of the policy outlined in the Declaration were fully accepted by the Unified Command;

(c) After publication of these two statements of policy, an approach to the Chinese and perhaps to the Soviet Government drawing their attention to the joint declaration, expressing desire for a peaceful settlement in Korea and inviting the Chinese and Soviet Governments to express their views as to the best means of bringing this about.

4. The approach to the Soviet Government would be on somewhat different lines from the approach to Peking and might be made by France, the United States and the United Kingdom. The approach to Peking might be by India and ourselves. The Swedish Government might also consent to transmit a message.

5. Strictly speaking, the powers providing forces etc. in Korea are not ipso facto entitled to speak for the United Nations. They are, however, entitled to make a collective pronouncement about the aims for which their forces, etc. are being used, and in any case these aims coincide with the expressed objectives of the United Nations. Such a pronouncement, coupled with a specific endorsement of its military implications by the unified command, should carry weight with the Chinese and Russians and may prove useful as a lever to open the way to negotiations.

6. I would like you to put these ideas to the State Department as soon as possible. In these circumstances it is not necessary for me to comment in detail on the draft statement to be issued by the unified command contained in your telegram No. 838 as amended by your telegram No. 845.² I note that in any case the United States Government intended to delay issuing this declaration on account of General MacArthur’s latest statement. His statement is indeed an additional reason for considering some entirely new procedure as it is now unlikely that any further statement by the Unified Command alone would be taken seriously by the Chinese.

7. I am repeating this telegram to the UKDel New York for comment as it is important to avoid confusion with the efforts of the Good Offices Committee. I hope however that the Committee would welcome the procedure outlined above. If this new approach were generally approved by the Governments concerned and finally resulted in negotiations, it would of course be important to associate the United Nations at a later stage with whatever settlement was agreed upon. We must try to ensure, if it is humanly possible that a negotiated settlement and withdrawal of United Nations forces do not result in the spread of Communism throughout Korea. The United Nations would therefore have to be brought into the picture for the purposes of supervision of elections, rehabilitation etc. These are not immediate issues, but we must not lose sight of them.

8. It is difficult to assess Chinese readiness to talk or the chances of their responding to a new approach but at the risk of a rebuff I think that we would be well advised to make the effort.³

1. Herbert Morrison succeeded Ernest Bevin following the latter’s resignation on March 9, due to illness. Mr. Bevin died on April 14, 1951.
2. For the text of the draft Presidential statement of March 23, see p. 263.

3. At 6 p. m. in the evening of March 30, Messrs. Acheson and Rusk met with French Foreign Minister Robert Schuman who was in Washington in connection with the visit of French President Auriol, March 28–April 2. Most of their discussion on Korea dealt with the British proposal contained in Morrison’s telegram to Franks. The U.S. minutes of the meeting read in part as follows:

   “Mr. Schuman said that the proposal sounded interesting and deserving of consideration. It would, of course, have to be studied. Mr. Rusk said that we had asked the British for further-clarification of their proposal. The Secretary added that he hoped that if Peiping and Moscow were approached they would come up with different answers. Mr. Schuman said that perhaps three different statements might be too many. Mr. Rusk stated that this might all be academic since the Chinese seemed determined to proceed with their military offensive and not take any political action before that. Mr. Schuman inquired whether London was aware of the military situation. Mr. Rusk replied that they perhaps were not completely briefed on the developments of the past three days. The Secretary added that this posed a very difficult problem for President Truman. General MacArthur’s unexpected statement had added to the confusion. President Truman had withheld comment until he had time for consultation with the other powers. Once the various points of view had been coordinated a concerted effort for a peaceful settlement could be made. Mr. Rusk added that keeping in touch with 14 governments is a difficult method of forming policy and does not represent an easy technique. This brought up the question of whether all 14 countries should have to define the policy to be followed. It must be borne in mind, however, that the general policy remains unchanged as it was defined by the UN but due to the fact that the General Assembly is not in session and that the Security Council is paralyzed by the Soviet Union, the 14 governments in question appear to be the group best suited for defining any international action which may be necessitated by the circumstances of the moment. Mr. Schuman asked whether the British did not want to add to the 14 countries. Mr. Rusk replied that they did. Mr. Schuman asked whether the 14 governments should take a position on the basis of the British proposal. The Secretary clarified that in his last remarks. Mr. Rusk referred to the US proposed statement and that it was not suggested that the 14 governments should define a new policy but stated that President Truman as the Chief of State of the country designated as the Unified Command could consult with the 14 countries in order to determine how the policy laid down by the UN could be best complied with and how a specific solution could be best reached. However, in principle, the policy determined by the UN was still being followed.

   “Mr. Schuman asked whether there was any indication of a disposition on the part of the Chinese to negotiate. The Secretary answered that there was none whatever. Mr. Rusk said that the basic Chinese condition had remained the same for months, namely, withdrawal from Korea and Formosa and a seat in the UN. Their policy was to force the UN troops to evacuate Korea. Mr. Schuman said that this had indeed been announced by Stalin himself.” (795.00/3–3051)

   Full documentation on the visits of Prime Minister Pleven and President Auriol to Washington, January 29–30, and March 28–April 2, is contained in volume iv.