795.00/3–2251
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Officer in Charge of Korean Affairs (Emmons)
Subject: Various Aspects of Current Policy in Relation to Korea.
| Participants: | Colonel Ben C. Limb, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Korea |
| Mr. Sae Sun Kim, Counselor of Korean Embassy | |
| Mr. Pyo Wook Han, First Secretary, Korean Embassy | |
| Mr. Dean Rusk, Assistant Secretary for Far Eastern Affairs | |
| Mr. Arthur B. Emmons, 3rd, Officer in Charge of Korean Affairs |
The Foreign Minister called on Mr. Rusk at 4:00 this afternoon upon instructions from his Government to discuss with the Department certain aspects of current policy in relation to the Korean situation. He opened the conversation by saying that President Rhee had instructed him to discuss with United Nations officials the possibility of having a time limit put on the present activities of the Good Offices Committee in order to free the Additional Measures Committee from any inhibitions towards more aggressive action in the field of obtaining sanctions against Communist China. He stated that the President had instructed him to discuss this matter with the United States Government before proceeding further with it. He explained that the views of the ROK were that if a time limit were placed upon the GOC, and no concrete results were produced within that time, the way would be cleared for the Additional Measures Committee to proceed with its own program.
Mr. Rusk replied that if the present terms of reference of the GOC were to be changed, this would involve a parliamentary procedure which would have to be taken up in the General Assembly. Furthermore, he wished to point out that the Additional Measures Committee was not, in fact, being held back by the activities of the GOC to the extent which the Minister may have intended to indicate, since the two Committees were working concurrently and without mutual interference, and since the fact of the matter was that many members of the United Nations were not basically enthusiastic about implementing [Page 260] the program for sanctions upon which the Additional Measures Committee was working and were using the GOC as a pretext. These states, he believed, were holding back not so much through any lack of sympathy with the general objective of curtailing Communist aggressive power as they were influenced by a fear of any spread of the present conflict and a desire to avoid it at all costs. Mr. Rusk pointed out that many of the nations involved have individual relationships with Communist China “which undoubtedly influence their views toward the question of sanctions. He also recalled that the United States has consistently pressed for action by the Additional Measures Committee concurrently, and without reference to, the work of the GOC.
Mr. Rusk suggested to the Foreign Minister that an appropriate means of bringing the views of the ROK on this point to the attention of the UN would be in a personal and informal manner with the members of the GOC itself, and that any publicity concerning this approach in his opinion, should be carefully avoided in order that the ROK should not, in any sense, be made to appear as opposed to a peaceful settlement in Korea. The Minister agreed and said that he would confine his approach to the line suggested by Mr. Rusk. In further explanation of what was meant by a time limit on the GOC, the Minister later stated that his Government contemplated merely that the GOC should be asked, by a specific date, to submit a report to the United Nations on the status of its efforts to find a peaceful solution in Korea and that of course the ROK was in agreement that the GOC should continue such efforts into the future. The Minister added that he was sending the Department a letter concerning the position of the ROK on this question, merely for the sake of the record.
The Minister next took up the question of a crossing of the 38th Parallel by UN forces. He stated that it was the opinion of the ROK on this delicate question that UN forces should tactically cross the Parallel and that they had the full authority of the United Nations to do. He understood that we were consulting with the other participating nations on this question. Mr. Rusk said that we were consulting and he agreed that the U.S. Government also considered that the UN Resolutions provided authority to cross the Parallel but that the question was principally one of military expediency to the extent that the factors inherent in the present military situation would have great influence upon our course of action. He pointed out that General Ridgway was extremely short of reserves in manpower and that, having crossed the Han and with this river at his back and with his troops spread out thinly across Korea, his present position was not necessarily very secure.
At this point the Foreign Minister interjected that the ROK was [Page 261] anxious for the United States to give full consideration to the possibility of effectively utilizing the Korean manpower reserves, stating that there were approximately 1,000,000 men which potentially could be used effectively to form such a reserve, if given proper shelter, clothing, and arms, and that of these, approximately 500,000 had had some training and that over 200,000 of this number, in turn, had been given intensive training.
Mr. Rusk replied that we had given very careful consideration to this whole question, that our military authorities were making the maximum use of these potential reserves in expanding and strengthening Korean military units already in being and that one of the problems which still had to be solved in connection with any major overall increase in the use of Korean military manpower was the lack of trained officers, particularly at the battalion command level. He pointed out that the training of such personnel would require many months to accomplish. Mr. Rusk mentioned that we were now working on a statement of general principles, which the President would make shortly.
The Foreign Minister then took up the question of the bombing of Chinese bases, which he stated was a course favored by the ROK. Mr. Rusk emphasized that there were of course very serious considerations involved in any such step. Among these considerations, he pointed out that whereas UN forces now enjoyed virtual domination on the air space in Korea south of the Yalu River, the Soviet Union had very powerful reserves of air strength in the Far East and that we had received indications that this air force might be thrown in against us if we were to attack China. Should this occur, we would lose the very important advantage we now enjoy in the air and that an outright attack on China would very probably involve the spread of warfare to the point where a general war might ensue. If this were to happen, Mr. Rusk stressed that the Korean people would by no means benefit because the UN forces in Korea might well have to be withdrawn to other areas; this consideration was one of the utmost of importance to the Korean nation. Mr. Rusk further explained that a kind of tacit equilibrium with the Communists had been reached in relation to the use of airpower whereby neither side apparently wished to change the present state of affairs.
The Foreign Minister mentioned that in the view of his Government it was not necessarily a foregone conclusion that if Chinese bases were attacked the USSR would intervene, since it considered that the USSR would precipitate a general war only under conditions which were essentially favorable to its prospects for victory and only at such time as these prospects were considered sufficiently bright. [Page 262] Mr. Rusk replied that, while this might be essentially true, a spread of the Korean conflict into China would certainly materially increase the danger of overt Soviet intervention and that one could not be sure at what point the balance might be tipped in favor of a decision by the Kremlin to go to war. As an example he cited the instance of Chinese Communist intervention in Korea which had occurred at the last moment, despite our estimate that conditions favoring such intervention had passed by that time. He pointed out that in the Chinese case our estimates had been badly off base and that it was therefore dangerous to make broad assumptions as to the intentions of the potential foe.
Mr. Rusk asked the Minister, on a purely personal and off the record basis, whether in his opinion the Korean people might not be tiring of the war and losing determination to continue. At the same time he described our great admiration for the magnificent courage and fortitude of the people of Korea and of their armed forces in the splendid performance which they had thus far rendered, even under the most adverse of circumstances. The Minister replied that he had been in Korea up through September 1950 during the difficult days of the retreat southward toward Pusan, that the Korean people had suffered tremendously under the Communists and were so sure that their only salvation lay in fighting for their independence and democracy that they would never relent or weaken in their determination. He pointed out that the Koreans, as a nation, when once persuaded were very tenacious of their ideas and that they were thoroughly opposed to Communist domination. He had, therefore, no fear whatsoever as to the weakening of their resolve and stated that all they ask for are the weapons with which to fight. He hoped that the United States would ensure that these weapons would be forthcoming and that the Korean Army would be so strengthened that it could assume an increasing role in the defense of the country, thus relieving to an increasing extent the necessity for the indefinite presence in Korea of large United Nations forces. He added, however, that his Government hoped that the United States and the United Nations would continue to keep some forces in Korea even after the termination of hostilities in order to preserve order and to strengthen the defenses of the country.
The Minister indicated that the desire of Korea for a strengthened Korean military establishment also stemmed from a basic distrust of the Japanese, He emphasized that while Japan was at the moment peacefully inclined, with the coming of a treaty the Japanese would necessarily have to be rearmed and, that while the Koreans desired to live in peace with Japan, they feared the inherent tendencies of the Japanese toward a militaristic imperialism which had been a demonstrated Japanese characteristic throughout history. He therefore [Page 263] hoped that the Koreans could at least keep pace with the arming of Japan, so that the two countries would, in a sense, be neutralized with respect to each other with the advantage that, if necessary, they could combine their resources in the face of Communist expansionism. Beyond that, however, the Minister emphasized that Korea must be prepared for a possible resurgence of Japanese expansionist tendencies toward the mainland of Asia across the bridgehead of Korea, and that the Koreans wanted a basic defense for their independence in order to live at peace with all of their neighbors.
The Minister also asked Mr. Rusk what progress was being made on a Pacific Pact, upon which he stated that his Government placed great importance for the future stability of Asia and he hoped that such a Pact could soon be developed. Mr. Rusk replied that while we were definitely interested in such a Pact, progress toward it at the moment was slow because of the disparity of interests among the Pacific nations and that the Pact might not become a reality until these various nations had drawn more closely together.
The Foreign Minister thanked Mr. Rusk for the frank exchange of views on these important subjects and stated that he would be coming to Washington from time to time in the future and hoped to have further conversations. He said that he was in general agreement with the suggestions and point of view expressed by Mr. Rusk and would so inform his Government.