Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, Korea and China, Volume VII, Part 1

795.00/3–2151

Memorandum of Conversations, by Ward P. Allen of the Bureau of European Affairs

secret

[Washington,] March 21, 1951.

Subject: Proposed Statement by Unified Command on Korea

Participants:	Mr. David W. McNichol, Australian Embassy
	Mr. Frank Corner, New Zealand Embassy
	Mr. B. J. Jarvie, Un. of S. African Embassy
	Mr. Raynor—BNA1
	Mr. Johnson—NA
	Ward P. Allen—EUR
	(Separate Conversation)
	Mr. Roger Taymans, Belgium Embassy
	Mr. Edmund P. Callebaut, Belgium Embassy
	Dr. J. G. de Beus, Minister, Netherlands Embassy
	Mr. Raynor—BNA
	Mr. Winfree—WE
	Ward P. Allen—EUR

Mr. Raynor gave each of the above representatives, who had called at our request, a copy of the draft statement prepared for possible issuance by the President as the Unified Command on behalf of the countries participating militarily in the Korean action.² Mr. Raynor emphasized that it was tentative and informal and that the President had not seen it. He stated that we desire the observations and comments of their governments preferably by Friday³ and certainly by this week-end if at all possible in order that, if agreed upon, the statement might be issued on short notice.

He explained the purpose of the statement was merely to restate our basic objectives and to reaffirm both the willingness of the Unified Command and the participating nations to terminate hostilities on reasonable grounds and their determination to continue to resist the aggression if the other side should make cessation of hostilities impossible. He pointed out that although the statement designedly omits specific reference to the 38th parallel it is not intended to change our present policy in that regard. We still plan no major crossing for the purpose of capturing extensive territory without full consultation with other participating nations, and that therefore their concurrence in this statement is without prejudice to such consultations.

He indicated that the statement was also being given to the representatives of the other countries with military forces in Korea and that in addition the Members of the Good Offices Committee would be consulted. In response to questions we indicated that the US did not intend to issue the present statement as on behalf of the fourteen participating countries until we received their reaction, and we would hope that no statement at all would have to be made by the US alone.

After reading the statement Mr. Callebaut’s initial response was that it seemed to foreclose any possibility of a cease fire on or near the parallel because of the emphasis on unification. We stated that this was not the intention and pointed out that the reference to unification is merely a restatement of the UN political objective which it has steadfastly maintained for the last four years, but that the previous paragraphs referring to cessation of hostilities contained conditions which conceivably could be satisfied by a cease fire in the general proximity of the parallel.

The only other representative who indicated any significant reaction was Dr. de Beus (Netherlands) who pointed out that the statement contains some seven references to “aggressors” or “aggression” and he thought his government might feel that if the statement were intended to open the way for negotiations it might be unwise to make such extensive use of the label. We expressed doubt as to whether any reaction of the Peiping Government would be in fact dependent upon the number of times the word was used. Dr. de Beus stated that he had just received some general views of the Netherlands Government as to the possibility of a public statement which he summarized as follows: (1) it might be useful to restate the aim of the UN of repelling the aggression and its determination to do so; (2) the statement should stress the political aim of the unification of Korea; (3) without committing the UN for any specific future period, the Unified Command should state that in order to open up the possibility for peaceful settlement UN land forces would temporarily make a halt on the 38th parallel but action by sea and air forces north of the parallel would continue. He recognized that the first two points were contained in the draft statement and therefore the question remained as to whether it would be desirable to include the third point. We replied that it seemed to us undesirable to do so. Mr. Allen mentioned the military considerations brought out at previous meetings of the Ambassadors which showed how undesirable it would be to lose contact with the enemy or disclose our intentions to him. Contact would probably be lost should we be required, pursuant to any public declaration to halt at the parallel. He also suggested that any such public statement would create difficulties if and when it subsequently became necessary to resume military operations. Such action would then either be regarded as a breach of our promise or be misinterpreted as an indication that the final door was closed to any settlement and it was a fight to the finish for the military unification of all Korea. So long as we make no declaration if there should be no substantial advance beyond the proximity of the parallel, this could be interpreted as being dictated by military necessity only.

All representatives indicated they would communicate the statement as soon as possible to their governments and Mr. Raynor again stressed the urgency of obtaining reactions since the sooner comments were received the greater the consideration it would be possible to give them.⁴

Ward P. Allen

1. G. Hayden Raynor, Director of the Office of British Commonwealth and Northern European Affairs.
2. See the annex to the memorandum from Marshall to Acheson, p. 253.
3. March 23.

4. Within the next several days, responses were received from most of the countries consulted on the draft statement. Belgium, Greece, New Zealand, the Philippines, and Turkey registered approval. Australia, Canada, France, and South Africa put forth changes, principally relating to less frequent use of the terms “aggressor” and “aggression” in regard to Communist China. France and South Africa proposed deleting the reference to the October 7, 1950 General Assembly resolution, with Canada making the additional suggestion that the Peking Government be given advance notice concerning the issuance of the statement. (Memoranda on talks with the various foreign officials may be found in files 795.00/3–2151 et seq.)

   For the text of the proposed Presidential statement as forwarded to President Truman on March 23, see p. 263.