795.00/3–1951
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Officer in Charge of Korean Affairs (Emmons)
Subject: Problems Relating to the 38th Parallel in Korea.
| Participants: | Mr. Jean Daridan, Minister Counselor, French Embassy |
| Mr. Albert Fequant, Second Secretary, French Embassy | |
| Mr. Dean Rusk, Assistant Secretary for Far Eastern Affairs | |
| Mr. Arthur B. Emmons, 3rd, Officer in Charge of Korean Affairs, NA |
Mr. Daridan called on Mr. Rusk at 5:15 this afternoon at the former’s request. Mr. Rusk opened the conversation by asking Mr. [Page 249] Daridan if he had yet received a reaction from his Government on the Department’s proposal that a Presidential statement should be made concerning our objectives in Korea at the time when United Nations forces reached the 38th Parallel. Mr. Daridan replied that Paris liked the idea and thought that such a declaration should set forth a reasonable solution to the Korean problem which the Chinese Communists could accept, and should include a reiteration of the general objectives of the United Nations in Korea. Mr. Daridan also indicated that his Government believed that the Good Offices Committee should be kept informed and consulted on further moves.
Mr. Daridan stated that the question of the 38th Parallel was a very complex one indeed, since the Parallel, as a formal dividing line in Korea, really had no standing, and the only time that the Parallel had represented any real significance was when Ambassador Panikkar of India had received a warning last fall from the Chinese Communists that United Nations forces should not cross it into North Korea. Mr. Rusk agreed the Parallel had really no basic validity in the formal sense and pointed out that ever since 1945, the United States and later the United Nations had bent their efforts toward doing away with it. Mr. Rusk also stressed that the Parallel involved two questions which should be carefully distinguished: One involved the principle of close-in military operations at or near the Parallel itself and the mere setting foot across it, the other being the much larger and more significant question of how far north between the Parallel and the Yalu River frontier operations should be continued. He pointed out that in the former case, the crossing of the Parallel was largely a matter of tactical maneuver to keep contact with the enemy, while the second question had much broader and more serious implications for all concerned.
Mr. Rusk discussed the difficulties inherent in any stalemate which might develop, referring to the serious problem involved in disengaging large and powerful forces locked in battle and pointing out that in World War II the solution to this problem was found only in the unconditional surrender of the enemy; in his opinion it would be difficult to find a satisfactory formula for terminating hostilities and withdrawing forces in a situation where neither side could gain a clear victory, and he noted that thus far there was no indication that the Good Offices Committee had made any headway with the Chinese Communists in finding such a formula.
From the military point of view, Mr. Rusk stated that it was important that United Nations forces not lose physical contact with the enemy and that were the Communists in a position to break all such contact, either because of the Parallel or for other reasons, our forces in Korea might be subjected to counter-attacks of unforeseeable size [Page 250] and scope which would endanger them. He believed, therefore, that we must be in a position to continue probing action against the enemy.
Mr. Rusk asked Mr. Daridan what, in his opinion would happen if the Chinese Communists were to reject or refuse to respond to the proposed declaration by the President. Mr. Daridan replied that he could see no clear solution in that case but that perhaps a stalemate near the 38th Parallel would result. He said that this would not necessarily lead to a termination of hostilities and that a stalemate might be disastrous to the morale of the United Nations troops.
Mr. Rusk asked Mr. Daridan whether he believed that French opinion, taking into account all of the factors represented in the present situation, would favor halting the fighting in Korea and a general disengagement at this point. Both Mr. Daridan and Mr. Fequant agreed that in their opinion the French people would like to see such a termination of hostilities, and the sooner the better. Mr. Rusk then read excerpts from a draft declaration for the President, indicating that it was a tentative draft upon which more work had still to be done. He hoped that he might have a final version available by sometime tomorrow. In commenting upon this draft, Mr. Daridan seemed to agree that it was generally in accord with French ideas as to what such a declaration should contain.
There then followed a general discussion of certain military aspects of the present situation in Korea. Mr. Rusk thought it possible that the present apparent withdrawal of the Communists with only light contact with United Nations forces might be designed to cover up plans for a new offensive and that it also might represent an effort to render the situation for the United Nations more complex and to introduce a further political element into the 38th Parallel question. Mr. Daridan agreed that this might be a deliberate move on the part of the Communists and wondered what the situation would be if the Communists were to break contact, pull back, and demand a cessation of United Nations sea and air attacks but without a definite agreement to terminate hostilities. Mr. Rusk stated that this would create a perplexing situation which would be even more complex if, at that point, the Communists were to demand that the United Nations stop all hostilities but without offering to negotiate a settlement. He believed that such a situation would place additional strain upon United Nations relationships and might be very difficult to handle.
Mr. Daridan wondered if, after all, the United Nations should continue its insistence upon a unification of Korea under the ultimate jurisdiction of the ROK, since the ROK was evidently even less popular with the Koreans than was the North Korean Communist regime. He based this statement on the premise that the ROK soldiers had shown a lack of will to fight as distinguished from the performance of the North Koreans. Mr. Rusk took strong exception to this analysis, [Page 251] saying that the ROK clearly had the strong support of the majority of the Koreans, many of whom had fled from the North to escape the Communist authorities, and that the ROK had fought equally well or better than the North Koreans and had surrendered in markedly fewer numbers. He pointed out that the United Nations could not abandon the Korean people nor renounce their great ambition for a unification of their country and remarked that the Liberal West was frequently too impatient with the shortcomings of oriental leaders such as President Rhee and Bao Dai.1
In concluding the conversation, Mr. Daridan said that he would inform Paris that we were proceeding with the idea of a Presidential declaration and added that the French felt that some solution to the Korean question was needed to bring hostilities to an end in Korea as soon as possible. He hoped that there would not have to be a general crossing of the Parallel.
- Chief of State of Viet-Nam.↩