Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, Korea and China, Volume VII, Part 1

795.00/3–1051

The United States Deputy Representative at the United Nations (Gross) to the Assistant Secretary of State for United Nations Affairs (Hickerson)

top secret

New York, March 10, 1951.

Dear Jack: Welcome back. Sandy,¹ if I may say so, did a magnificent job and we deeply appreciate his helpfulness and patience with us.

The purpose of this letter is to transmit to you the enclosed draft of a letter to Phil Jessup which was prepared by Trygve Lie, who handed it to me yesterday afternoon. He has not (repeat not) sent the letter and does not intend to do so, although that was his original idea. He gave the draft to me, and asked me to send it to you for a consideration of its contents rather than a request for comment as to whether he should send it to Phil, which he definitely does not intend to do.

In discussing the substance of the draft letter with me, Lie made the following additional points.

He says he has been advised by “his people” in Hong Kong and Shanghai that the Chinese Reds have made repeated unsuccessful appeals to the Soviet Government for heavy artillery and planes. He thinks there may be sufficient stress and strain between at least some elements of the Peiping regime and Moscow to justify consideration of an approach to the North Korean authorities, which is of course the central suggestion in his draft letter. Moreover, he thinks that if by any chance the Soviet Union should be looking for a way to liquidate the Korean war, which is causing a drain upon them, they might seize upon the dodge of using the North Koreans as a means for achieving a peaceful solution. On the other hand, if the Chinese Communists are looking for a way out, they might seize upon this device, placing reliance upon the fiction of the Chinese “volunteers” which they could agree to withdraw on the basis that they had been advised by the North Korean authorities that their assistance was no longer required.

In fairness to Lie, I should point out that he does not place much reliance upon his suggestion. He says he realizes that it would only be a useful device in any event if the situation were ripe, that is if the Chinese Communists and/or Russia wanted to cut their losses and liquidate the affair.

He told me in confidence that on Thursday, March 8, he spent two-and-a-half hours with Entezam and Padilla Nervo. A great deal of their discussion apparently centered upon Lie’s suggestion of a possible approach to the North Koreans. He said Padilla “was very interested.” Entezam took the position that the resolution of February 1 did not authorize the Good Offices Committee to deal with anyone but the Peiping regime. Both Entezam and Padilla Nervo, however, suggested to Lie that he take the matter up with me.

In connection with the four points listed by Lie as a “basis of discussion”, I said that it was important for Lie to remember that the Unified Command had formulated minimum conditions for a satisfactory cease-fire, and that these conditions had been reported to the Cease-Fire Group. I emphasized the dangers from the standpoint of military security in tampering with these points.

With regard to his basic suggestion of an approach to the North Koreans, I was completely non-committal, merely undertaking to transmit his draft letter to you and agreeing to discuss it further with Lie on the basis of such instructions or guidance as you saw fit to give me.

Sincerely yours,

Ernie

[Enclosure]

Draft Letter by the United Nations Secretary-General (Lie) to the Ambassador at Large (Jessup)

private & confidential

[New York,] March 9, 1951.

Dear Phil: I am writing you quite informally in order to suggest to you some of my thoughts regarding the Korean war.

In December and January the United Nations forces in Korea were in retreat and the Chinese definitely had the initiative. At this time the question of the settlement in Korea became involved with the larger demands of the Chinese Communist regime regarding Formosa and representation in the United Nations. The initiative has now passed to the United Nations forces and we seem to have reached a situation of stalemate in the neighborhood of the 38th parallel. In the meantime, President Entezam and his Good Offices Committee have been unable to get any reaction from Peiping for a reopening of negotiations to end the conflict.

I have come to feel that the time is perhaps right for a new approach which would bypass Peiping and seek to bring an end to the fighting in Korea, leaving all other Far-Eastern questions for a later time. What I am now thinking about is an approach by the United Nations, either through the Good Offices Committee or otherwise, to the North Korean authorities.

If negotiations with these authorities could be started, the basis of discussion might be these four points:

(a) a ceasefire with a possible demilitarized zone along the 38th parallel;

(b) a supervised withdrawal of all non-Korean troops;

(c) elections for all of Korea to be held within a stipulated time period under United Nations supervision;

(d) access for United Nations relief personnel and supplies throughout all of Korea.²

I have had two experiences during December which led me to believe that there may be some chance that a direct approach to the North Koreans might hold some possibilities of success. On 14 December I spoke to Ambassador Wu and the other members of the delegation of Peiping about a United Kingdom request regarding prisoners of war held in North Korea. Ambassador Wu took the position that his Government had no responsibility for prisoners of war in North Korea and that Chinese prisoners of war in the hands of the Unified Command were the concern of the North Korean Government and not of his. He also said that he could offer no help to me in contacting the authorities of North Korea. In short, his position was that the war was the affair of the North Korean authorities and that his Government had nothing to do with it.

On 4 December I had a conversation with Mr. Siroky, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Czechoslovakia. He said that the Korea conflict could be solved by re-establishing the status quo of last June. More specifically he referred to the establishment of the line of demarcation at the 38th parallel, the removal of foreign troops and leaving the future of Korea to be decided by the Korean people themselves.

If these two conversations correctly reflect the attitude of the Soviet bloc, they would point in the direction of a direct approach to the North Koreans.

I realize that the one disadvantage of this approach is that it would tend to confirm the de facto position of the North Koreans. On the other hand, it would have the advantage of removing from the Korean question the idea of a horse-trade with the Chinese over their own demands.

It can be assumed that the success of any such approach would depend very largely on whether the Peiping regime has had enough of the Korean war. I consider this a distinct possibility, if not at the moment, at any rate within the next couple of months.

The reason why I have set out these thoughts of mine at some length to you is because I think that some consideration should be given to an informal approach by you to Gromyko during your meetings in Paris.³ He might be asked whether the Soviet Government would have any views on a settlement of the Korean conflict through negotiation between the United Nations and the North Korean authorities, and that if they did not care for this idea, what other approach they might have in mind.

I have sent copy of this letter to Jack Hickerson through Ernie Gross. I should be much interested in hearing your reaction.

Sincerely,

1. During Mr. Hickerson’s absence, Durward V. Sandifer had been Acting Assistant Secretary of State for United Nations Affairs.
2. A typewritten marginal note on the Department of State file copy read thus: “(Following notation in ink on original) It is unlikely that all these four points will be accepted, but they are issues which have to be discussed in any negotiation”.
3. Ambassador Jessup was in Paris as head of the U.S. Delegation to the meetings of the Deputies of the Foreign Ministers of the United States, France, the United Kingdom, and the Soviet Union working on the preparation of an agenda for a proposed Council of Foreign Ministers meeting. The Deputies meetings lasted from March 5 to June 21. Deputy Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko led the Soviet Delegation.