Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, Korea and China, Volume VII, Part 1

357.AK/3–651: Telegram

The United States Deputy Representative at the United Nations (Gross) to the Secretary of State

top secret

New York, March 6, 1951—7:30 p. m.

1236. Review of activity of GOC. Ross and I called on Grafstrom and Padilla Nervo this morning at Swedish Del headquarters and arranged yesterday (mytel 1226, March 5).

Grafstrom opened discussion by reviewing activity of GOC to date as follows:

On February 14 Entezam in his capacity as President of GA sent telegram through Swedish channels as follows to Chinese Communists:

(1) Message assumed Chinese Communists desire find peaceful settlement Korean issue.

(2) Stated view that peaceful settlement could not be achieved through exchange telegrams and public discussion in committees.

(3) Personal contact was necessary.

(4) Reference was made to GOC as a team, but it was stated that Chinese Communists were not being asked to recognize legitimacy of GOC or deal with GOC as such.

(5) Message questioned which of following methods would be acceptable to Chinese Communists:

(a) Designate representative to meet with Entezam in NY.

(b) Designate representative to meet Entezam at some place outside of China or US.

(c) Receive someone designated by Entezam in Peiping.

This message was communicated to Chinese Communist Ambassador in Stockholm on February 15. He indicated not much chance favorable response in view of well known views expressed by Chou En Lai, etc. On February 17 message was delivered by Swedish Ambassador Peiping to Vice Commissar Foreign Affairs.

Latter had no comment, but questioned in what capacity Entezam had sent communication; Swedish Ambassador replied as President of GA.

On February 21 Entezam sent reminder in form of suggestion that Peiping answer be sent through same channel. Dispatch of this message from Stockholm was crossed by receipt on February 22 of telegram from Swedish Ambassador Peiping to effect merely that no reply had been received. On February 26 Stockholm received reply from Swedish Ambassador Peiping to message of 21st indicating that he had delivered new message to Vice Commissar on 23rd. He was unable to find out whether any reply could be expected. He got nothing except impression that question was under consideration.

On 26th Swedish FO was requested inform Chinese Communist Ambassador Stockholm that President of GA would like to know when a reply could be expected; this action was taken in Stockholm on 27th.

Yesterday (March 5) GOC received in NY message transmitted through Stockholm from Swedish Ambassador Peiping reporting conversation on 3rd with head Political Department. Swedish Ambassador had strong impression that no answer was to be expected. GOC decided yesterday to request Swedish FO to ask Chinese Communist Ambassador Stockholm if a reply was to be expected.

On conclusion this review of GOC activity I indicated that as matter purely of speculation Department saw no political significance in delay of Chinese Communist reply; delay might be associated with purely dilatory tactics to gain time in preparation for new offensive which conceivably might take place any time.

Grafstrom said that prospects seemed to be gloomy. He went on to say that government viewed its task as being limited to preparatory work necessary to pave way for conference on Korea and other FE problems. They had in mind preparing agenda. He likened their task to that of FonMin Deputies now meeting in Paris. He then said GOC had certain questions they wanted to put to US as follows:

(1) GOC wanted to know if we considered conditions for ceasefire were same as set forth in report of cease-fire group of January 2 (A/C.1/643). GOC assumed they were.

I confirmed this was the case. I stressed that conditions set forth were military and basic in character although points required filling in. I stressed that they were not a basis for compromise or negotiation.

(2) Grafstrom, assuming that as far as they went eight points were “water tight”, asked what compromise would be acceptable to the UN (he consistently avoided confusing US and UN) between alternatives, (a) cease-fire first with negotiations afterwards, or (b) negotiations followed by cease-fire. I replied that USG had always attached greatest importance to establishment of cease-fire prior to discussion of Korea or, thereafter, other FE questions since we felt strongly that security of UN forces could not otherwise be assured.

We then had lengthy discussion cease-fire question along following lines.

Grafstrom said GOC had in mind possibility getting together with Chinese Communists to discuss agenda for possible conference. At end of such discussion GOC had in mind possibility of proposing provisional cease-fire. If Chinese Communists agreed process of peaceful settlement could get under way.

I pointed out and reiterated that USG saw gravest dangers in any provisional cease-fire in nature of mere lull in hostilities without adequate safeguards for security of UN forces such as, for example, provision of supervisory machinery as provided for in fourth cease-fire point. An arrangement which required, for example, suspension of US air activity behind Chinese Communist lines only to permit them to develop supplies and bring up forces could not be considered satisfactory. I pointed out with reference to phrase “lull in hostilities” in point two of the five principles contained in supplementary report of cease-fire group (A/C.1/645) that we had repeatedly made clear to Pearson that we did not interpret this phrase as meaning a provisional cease-fire except on basis of acceptance of conditions Crittenberger and I had previously given cease-fire group.¹

Grafstrom asked whether my compromise on principle that ceasefire must come first before negotiations.² I replied in affirmative.

Grafstrom then shifting from term provisional wondered whether preliminary (or temporary) cease-fire would not necessarily be first step leading to discussion of real or permanent cease-fire! He wondered whether if Chinese Communists accepted preliminary cease-fire in this sense it would not be very difficult for them to resume fighting. I replied that in a sense eight conditions contained in January 2 report of cease-fire group were themselves temporary in that they required implementation.

Grafstrom asked what our view would be if it were possible to clarify with Chinese Communist point that there must be permanent ceasefire before discussions re Korea or other FE matters could take place. I reserved our position but said we would consider any Chinese Communist proposal.

Grafstrom said that it might be bad to work with concept of temporary cease-fire based on eight conditions, since they were quite elaborate, but he thought this was nevertheless a negotiating point.

I reminded Grafstrom that the eighth of these points established permanent character of cease-fire since it required approval of ceasefire arrangements by GA, which arrangements would continue in effect until superseded by UN.

Grafstrom then moved on to question that if permanent cease-fire were achieved and followed by negotiations on other matters, what would be the position if such negotiations failed. I indicated view that onus would then be on the party, if any, reopening hostilities. I pointed out this was basic to our concern about Chinese Communist talk of temporary cease-fire which inevitably, it seemed to us, tied the ceasefire to their political objectives. I questioned whether Chinese Communists did not have in mind in their concept of temporary cease-fire one that could be repudiated by them with impunity. Grafstrom indicated acceptance in principle of view that it was essential before any negotiations could start that cease-fire be effectuated. I referred in this connection to point one of five principles of January 11. Grafstrom wondered whether it was possible to think of any modification of approach in event Chinese Communists would not accept cease-fire first.

Padilla intervened at this point to assume, first, establishment of permanent cease-fire followed then by discussions on Korea, such discussions resulting in failure in sense that UN objectives concerning unification, etc., could not be achieved. He questioned in this event how permanent would cease-fire be. He explained his question as follows. If objective of unified Korea could not be achieved by negotiation following cease-fire and assuming Chinese Communists wanted cease-fire to continue, Chinese Communists would remain in North Korea and Korea would remain divided. What then, he asked, would be position of UN? He said it never had been a UN position that its objectives in Korea should be achieved by force of arms. In circumstances he envisaged would UN then feel it necessary to attempt to unify Korea by force? I replied that Padilla’s questions imposed a dilemma but expressed view that UN forces would not be free under a permanent cease-fire to attempt to unify Korea by force. I said I felt there was no commitment or duty requiring such an attempt by UN. I said I felt neither side would be free to breach a permanent cease-fire.

Padilla pursued this line somewhat further in following sense. He said that permanent cease-fire having been achieved GA would have no choice but to approve conditions for cease-fire. Would there, however, remain in light of UN political objectives the possibility of GA attacking cease-fire if cease-fire were thwarting achievement of UN political objectives? Conversely by accepting permanent ceasefire would UN morally and legally be tieing its hands against effort to achieve UN objectives in Korea by force? If this were case, would we not be in same position as we were before? I agreed we would be in same position politically, but said meanwhile we would have achieved objective of halting aggression in Korea, but without prejudice to achievement of UN objectives by appropriate political means.

Padilla then raised question of possibility of temporary cease-fire as first step in process of putting into effect basic conditions of permanent cease-fire as set forth in January 2 report. Conceiving these eight points as an integrated plan each of steps within this plan would require working out in detail. Grafstrom commented that in his thinking he contemplated a gap of perhaps only three or four days between a temporary cease-fire and implementation of remaining conditions for permanent cease-fire. He said he was trying to work out a political-psychological approach which would get Chinese Communists started on cease-fire path. I indicated there might conceivably be some room for such an approach; I reiterated on other hand that questions involved seemed to me primarily of military character involving security of UN forces and protection against risk of Chinese Communists building up supplies, reinforcements and like. I said assuming that agreement on all of conditions set forth for cease-fire could be achieved in principle, each step in implementation of various points would have to be taken on basis of military judgment, bearing in mind necessity of guarantees necessary to protect UN forces. I added that I thought process might be considered as one of stages rather than of differentiation between temporary and permanent cease-fire.

Padilla observed he felt all details and implementation of conditions should be worked out before an order for cessation of hostilities was given. If UN were required to order cessation of hostilities prematurely, onus would be put on UN if hostilities broke out again. Padilla felt eight conditions might be divided into categories. Certain of them must be decided once and for all before any cease-fire order were given; more time might be allowed to work others out. He referred to point seven (c)³ as an example of a point that might take more time.

Padilla then went on to indicate that in his view fourth point of cease-fire conditions (supervision of cease-fire by UN commission) would be one of most difficult for Chinese Communists to accept since UN commission would be able to [go] anywhere technically in North Korea. Grafstrom observed that if it be considered the UN was one party in fighting some provision should be made for participation of other party in supervision of cease-fire. I explained that we had pointed out to cease-fire group our view that commission should be UN body, but that observer groups might well include Chinese Communist members. I agreed with Padilla that this would mean that representatives of both parties could observe implementation cease-fire on both sides cease-fire line.

Moving on from cease-fire question Grafstrom opened new subject as follows. He said chances of getting Chinese Communists accept cease-fire depended upon prospects of discussion thereafter. This involved two questions: (a) agenda for conference, and (b) conference itself. Taking last question first, the question of composition arose. He queried concerning seven-power group. I responded that it seemed to us forum and participants should be related to problems and not considered on artificial basis. We considered seven powers an artificial setup. I indicated that merely by way of example we would expect Indian participation if Tibet were discussed, French participation if Indochina were discussed, ROK certainly in case of Korea, nationalist China in case of Formosa; conceivably UN might be best forum for discussion Formosan question. I agreed with comment by Grafstrom to effect that if there were to be any discussions we felt arrangements should be flexible.

I took advantage of this line of questioning to clarify any misunderstanding there might be, paraphrasing in effect last part of numbered paragraph 3 of Deptel 762, March 5. I made very clear that we considered Korean question as quite separate from other FE questions.

Padilla then raised question of our attitude toward five principles of January 11. I said we were without instructions and would have to refer this question to Department. I indicated our willingness to discuss outstanding questions along lines first part of numbered paragraph 3 Deptel 762. I emphasized that question of cease-fire arrangements should not be related in our view with question of conference on political questions.

Grafstrom said he felt it would be mistake not to take five principles as basis for settlement. He said he felt that if there were a reply indicating Chinese Communists willing to establish contact GOC should in first instance deal with Chinese Communists on question of ceasefire and only thereafter on question of agenda for possible conference. He observed he felt position was very sound that cease-fire arrangements must be completed before conference.

Padilla, who seemed to share this view, raised question of situation in UN with regard to five principles. There were two possible approaches. Either five principles represented standing offer by UN as statement of UN position or alternatively they no longer had any standing since they had been rejected by Chinese Communists. He also raised question in this connection of status of GOC in relation to point five of five principles which provides that as soon as agreement is reached on cease-fire GA should set up “an appropriate body”, with view to achievement of settlement of FE problems, while Feb. 1 resolution talked about achievement of UN objectives in Korea.

I reiterated that we were attached to general principle of discussion of outstanding issues (as provided indeed by charter); however, achievement of permanent cease-fire without political conditions attached was prior consideration. In other words Chinese Communists had key to their own jail in their pocket.

Our discussion terminated at this point. Grafstrom and Padilla indicated that they wished to have further discussion with us on two points: (a) assumption that five principles remained as basis for settlement, and (b) what should be done if no reply is received from Chinese Communists or if reply is a rebuff. I said we would of course report their desire for further discussion of these points to Department. I added that we were, of course, at their disposal, but we felt for obvious reasons it was most desirable to avoid any publicity or speculation. We felt, therefore, that our discussion today as well as any further discussions we might have should be considered as informal and off-the-record and of such nature that we all might readily deny there had been any consultation with GOC as such. To this Grafstrom and Padilla readily agreed.

Gross

1. See Foreign Relations, 1950, vol. vii, pp. 1549 ff. Lt. Gen. Willis D. Crittenberger was U.S. Army Representative on the U.S. Delegation to the U.N. Security Council’s Military Staff Committee.
2. A question mark penciled in the margin of the source text indicated that presumably something is missing or garbled in this sentence.
3. As set forth in U.N. document A/C.1/643, the eight conditions for the ceasefire were lettered from a to h; presumably, the word “seven” is incorrect here and reference is actually to point c, the third of the eight conditions.