357.AK/3–551: Telegram
The United States Deputy Representative at the United Nations (Gross) to the Secretary of State
1226. Re GOC; POC; 38th parallel crossing in Korea. I called upon Grafstrom, at my suggestion, to explore present attitude of GOC. I told him of the conversation between Ross and Padilla Nervo (re ourtel No. 1211, February 28). Grafstrom said that although Padilla Nervo had not discussed with him the matter of a meeting with US, Grafstrom felt it might be helpful. Grafstrom made it clear that he himself would be glad to have such a talk, but he did not wish Padilla Nervo to be regarded as an intermediary for GOC. On the contrary, Grafstrom left me with the distinct impression that inasmuch as Entezam was dealing with Peiping through the Swedish Government, Grafstrom himself would be the most appropriate person for discussions [Page 208] with US. He repeated what he had said, several times before that the attitude of the US was decisive so far as the UN was concerned. He said that when he made this comment to Jebb several days ago, the latter had concurred. Grafstrom, therefore, considered it essential for GOC to be apprised at all times of our thinking. According to Grafstrom, GOC thinking is that if Chinese Communists indicate willingness to meet, GOC might fix a preliminary agenda, first item of which would be a “provisional cease-fire”. When pressed on this, Grafstrom commented that GOC hoped that if Chinese Communists came to a conference, attended by US and “other states to be determined”, the first order of business would be an agreement to cease hostilities and to enter into discussions at once looking toward agreement as to conditions on which a permanent cease-fire would be arranged.
Subsequently on March 5, a.m., Grafstrom advised me that GOC members had concluded it would be desirable to meet with US (Entezam would not take part) and I agreed to meet with Padilla Nervo and Grafstrom on Tuesday, March 6 at 10:30 a.m. Urgent instructions or guidance from Department concerning approach to GOC and points to be made would be greatly appreciated, particularly concerning GOC ideas re “tentative agenda” and provisional cease-fire.
With regard to general efforts of GOC to make contact with Peiping, Grafstrom found some significance in failure of Chinese Communists to reply to Entezam note delivered through Swedish Ambassador at Peiping. He recounted chronology of GOC efforts as follows: Entezam note was handed by Swedish Foreign Office to Chinese Ambassador at Stockholm on February 14. On February 15, Swedish Ambassador at Peiping handed identical message to Chinese Foreign Office. On February 21, Grafstrom suggested to his government that Peiping might be jogged through approach to Peiping Foreign Office by Swedish Ambassador at Peiping. On February 26, Swedish Ambassador reported he had conveyed message to Peiping Foreign Office, and received a non-commital reply which led to report to his government that matter did not seem to be “hopeless”. On February 27, Grafstrom again wired Stockholm suggesting another approach, this time to the Chinese Ambassador at Stockholm. Latter was requested for information as to when an answer to Entezam’s message might be expected. Chinese Ambassador at Stockholm agreed to request advice from Peiping but made no other comment.
Grafstrom is of opinion that Peiping’s delay in answering should be regarded as indicating a division of opinion within Chinese Communist Government. In answer to a question, Grafstrom admitted this was purely personal conjecture on his part.
[Page 209]POC .
[Here follows the portion of the telegram dealing with the Peace Observation Commission; for documentation on this body, see volume I, pages 616 ff.]
Korea.
Grafstrom said he had been kept informed concerning Department’s thinking re 38th parallel as discussed in Washington with Swedish Ambassador. Grafstrom expressed personal view that question of crossing 38th parallel was now a “military rather than a political question”. He himself felt if UC believed it militarily advantageous to pursue enemy forces across 38th parallel, it should be free to do so. His reasoning was that earlier fear that carrying offensive to North Korea might bring Chinese Communists into action, was no longer applicable in view of Peiping intervention in Korea. At the same time, as member of GOC, he felt bound to point out that current efforts to establish contact with Peiping might be effected [affected?] by a mass ground offensive across 38th parallel. He understood question was premature at present time.