795.00/2–2451

The Ambassador in Korea ( Muccio ) to the Officer in Charge of Korean Affairs ( Emmons )

top secret

Dear Arthur: Although the subject may be “academic”, I thought you might be interested in an indication as to how the delegates to the United Nations Commission feel about the 38th Parallel.

The Netherlands and Pakistani delegates have never raised this question with me. I understand, however, that both feel we should not carry the offensive across the parallel.

The Turkish delegate and Filipino alternate have taken no position. [Page 196] In fact, Bueno is so devoted to his extra-curricular activities he has probably given the matter no thought whatsoever.

The Australian, Thai and Chilean delegates take the stand that the 38th Parallel should be ignored. This does not mean that they think UN forces must plow through to the Yalu and Tuman Rivers. It means, however, that for psychological, political and international purposes it would be better to have any temporary lull or arrangement not based on the 38th Parallel. The Koreans have developed a real national psychosis on the question of the 38th. A line of demarcation even partly this side and partly the other side of the parallel would be not quite so difficult to sell to the Koreans.

The Principal Secretary has told me he considers it would be a real diplomatic and political blunder to reestablish in any way, shape or form the 38th Parallel.

I feel now as I did early in February1 in my reply to Dean Rusk that the best we can hope for at this time is to move militarily to the most favorable defensive terrain somewhere between Seoul and Pyongyang which at the same time would give us the most extended enemy supply line possible. We should be able to hold such a line with a considerably reduced UN force by bolstering Korean force.

The Koreans, as must be expected, will all hold out for complete unification. The more rabid—including President Rhee—would never publicly acquiesce to drawing a line anywhere except on the old border at the Yalu. They would undoubtedly scream and joust against any limiting arrangement, even though it were clearly evident that the settlement had been forced by the international situation. With this irreconcilable group, it would be difficult enough to maintain internal order and stability should any line of demarcation be forced. It would be impossible to keep them under control were that line set at the 38th.

Sincerely yours,

John
  1. See telegram 741, February 12, from Pusan, p. 168.