Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, Korea and China, Volume VII, Part 1

795.00/2–2051

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for United Nations Affairs (Sandifer)

secret

[Washington,] February 20, 1951.

Subject:

1. Thirty-eighth Parallel

2. Relations of Good Offices Committee and Ad Hoc Collective Measures Committee

Participants:	Mr. Dean Rusk, FE
	Mr. John C. Ross, USUN
	Mr. Durward V. Sandifer, UNA

Thirty-Eighth Parallel

In the course of an hour’s discussion of the above subjects this morning, the following points were made in particular with reference to the 38th parallel.

Mr. Rusk, after a conversation covering the ground of his statement to the briefing meeting of Ambassadors on Friday, February 16, emphasized the following points:

1. We have made no commitment not to cross the 38th parallel if political and military circumstances and objectives make such action desirable.

2. We have made no collateral commitments to other countries making action with reference to the 38th parallel dependent upon their agreement to or acquiescence in such action. Mr. Rusk made the point in the Friday meeting that while we agreed to consult, we could not agree that any particular country had a veto on action since the United Nations, particularly the Security Council, has imposed a special responsibility on the United States in designating it as the Unified Command.

3. It is our position that no additional formal United Nations action is necessary to authorize action north of the 38th parallel.

Mr. Ross said that they had found two main areas of concern among Delegations in New York. The first is a general uneasiness and distrust concerning the actions of General MacArthur, particularly the feeling that he may take individual action without governmental authority or instructions. Mr. Rusk made the observation that all General MacArthur’s actions up to the present time had been within his instructions but that this does not apply of course to speeches and public statements he has made. The second concern, Mr. Ross said, was that decisions might be taken by the United States and the Unified Command without adequate consultation with other governments.

Mr. Ross raised particularly the problem that they would have in New York in answering the questions raised by the Norwegian Representative as reported by telegram to the Department¹ and the problem of relations with the Good Offices Committee. After some discussion, it was agreed that USUN should discuss frankly with the Norwegian Representative the situation as to consultation, pointing out that with the present fluid situation USUN could not keep fully up to date on day-by-day development. The United States would be glad to receive the views of the Norwegian Government or any other government and if there were special problems for the Norwegian Government in consulting in Washington, we would be glad to arrange for consultation in New York.

As to the Good Offices Committee, Mr. Rusk thought that no initiative should be taken by USUN in discussing the question of the 38th parallel with the Committee. If approached, the Mission might take the following general line:

1. We could make no firm commitments in the present developing situation in Korea.

2. It is important that no information be given to the enemy as to our real intentions.

3. We could not agree to any policy which would result in giving a safe haven in North Korea to the Chinese and North Korean forces similar to the one they enjoy north of the Yalu River.

4. A cease-fire would only be productive as related to promise or prospect of a general settlement.

5. If there are any particular views or questions on a cease-fire, they should be referred to the Department for consideration.

Relations of the Good Offices Committee

Mr. Ross commented that at the first meeting of the Ad Hoc Collective Measures Committee the Egyptian Representative had opened up afresh the whole question of the relationship of these two Committees. He had taken the line that in order not to impair the prospect of successful action by the Good Offices Committee, no action should be taken at present towards carrying on the program of the Ad Hoc Collective Measures Committee. This question would come up in mutual discussion between the bureaus of the two Committees and probably at the next meeting of the Collective Measures Committee.

Mr. Rusk stressed that it was important to remember in this connection that the Ad Hoc Collective Measures Committee had been established as a device to put and keep the question of sanctions for Chinese aggression in a manageable status. It is essential not to let the operations of the Committee develop or deteriorate in such a way as to stultify this purpose. While we are quite willing to go along with a careful and deliberate temper for the Committee, we cannot by any means agree that it be kept in suspense. Mr. Sandifer emphasized the importance of not allowing the work and relationship of the two Committees to develop in such a way as to paralyze the operations of the Collective Measures Committtee. There was a clear understanding during the debates on the Chinese Aggression Resolution that the two Committees should work parallel and not in tandem and this concept must be maintained. Mr. Sandifer said he had expressed these views to Mr. Shann,² newly elected Rapporteur of the Committee, at a cocktail party at the home of Mr. Moodie, Counselor of the Australian Embassy, on Friday evening. Mr. Shann seemed to be fully aware of the importance of the question and said that it would be taken up in the Bureau of the Committee and that he would discuss it further with our Mission in New York.

1. Reference is to telegram 1162, February 15, from New York, which read in part as follows:

   “This afternoon Sunde called upon me at his request to make what he described as an ‘official presentation upon instructions his government’ of their views re 38th parallel. Norwegian Government, although aware that question of UN forces crossing 38th parallel might be regarded as ‘academic’ at present time, nevertheless wishes to advise US Government that it considers that it would not be wise for UN forces to cross north of 38th parallel even if situation might in future make such crossing practical from military point of view. Norwegian Government hopes that it might be possible to ‘stabilize a front’ on or near 38th parallel, and then to seek a cease-fire along lines of UC proposals previously made to cease-fire group.” (795B.5/2–1551)

2. K.C.O. Shann, First Secretary, Australian Mission at the United Nations.