357.AD/2–1751: Telegram
The Secretary of State to the United States Mission at the United Nations
priority
719. Regular briefing of Ambassadors of countries with military forces in Korea took place Fri afternoon (Feb. 16). After brief exposition of military situation by Defense Reps, Rusk addressed group on general Korea situation with specific reference to question of crossing 38th parallel. Rusk made fol points:
1. UN faces 5 possible courses of action in Korea:
- a.
- It might re-enforce UN effort and attempt to achieve unification of Kor by force. Re-enforcements by US and other UN members for this purpose not in fact available and even if they were available, there wld be serious question as to whether to commit them. Furthermore, even if UN members were prepared to undertake such an effort, the enemy has sufficient power and apparently the intention to use it to prevent UN forces from achieving such goal.
- b.
- The UN could withdraw from Kor, with or without a pretext such as giving Chinese mass intervention as reason. In US view, this wld leave the aggressor victorious and mean failure for the UN in its mission of suppressing aggression. It wld jeopardize security of [Page 179] Japan. It wld mean abandonment of South Kor people and of South Kor forces who have fought valiantly. Such retreat and show of weakness by UN members would have serious repercussions on position of freedom-loving peoples throughout the world.
- c.
- It might be possible to liquidate situation in Kor by extending hostilities to China. US, however, and we are sure other peoples, wish to localize the fighting to Kor if at all possible. Despite extreme provocation, Unified Command has acted with great restraint to conform to this policy.
- d.
- A fourth possibility is a military stalemate, indefinitely protracted, in approximately present positions. This possibility has serious disadvantages. It would constitute a continued and expensive drain on material and manpower. We need our own forces elsewhere. Also, in order to maintain stalemate and prevent enemy from massing forces to drive us into sea, UN large-scale air attacks would have to continue. In face of continued massive air attacks, enemy would probably be forced to try to wind up the Korean situation, perhaps by an all-out attempt to drive UN forces out. Nevertheless, a stalemate for a time is not improbable.
- e.
- Another possibility based on the recognition by both sides that neither will drive the other out of Kor involves expectation that at some point a possibility of negotiation and peaceful settlement might open up. There is no indication at present that enemy has such a peaceful settlement in mind, but a modus vivendi with a supervised cease-fire might be a way for terminating Korean war. Presumably, GOC has such a possibility in mind.
2. UN and its Members are obligated to aid Republic of Kor in resisting aggression. Neither UN nor its Members are obligated to seek to bring about by force unification of Kor along lines GA resolutions. At one time, it appeared possible that in the process of defeating aggressor and ensuring that there will be no recurrence of the aggression, UN force might also achieve UN political objectives of unification of Kor. Chinese Communist intervention has now rendered that impossible. The question of crossing the 38th parallel must, therefore, be considered in the light of the UN mission of defending the ROK against aggression, and of the alternative courses open to us as set forth above.
3. Present disposition of UN forces is basically defensive. It is, however, an aggressive defense. Aggressive character of defense has saved and will save UN forces by not leaving the enemy full initiative and by upsetting any planned attacks. The war should be viewed as a war of maneuver by opposing forces, not as a matter of positions on terrain.
4. Enemy must not be given any information about our intentions if we can help it. It would be extremely serious for the safety of our forces if the enemy felt assured of an inviolable sanctuary in North Kor like that which he enjoys in Manchuria. The Unified Command, [Page 180] therefore, must continue to have authority for air action in Kor wherever the situation calls for it; our sea forces also must be able to operate as needed. The Unified Command must also be free on the ground to conduct raids, make thrusts, and take patrol actions, as our aggressive defense might require. Thus, the thrust to Wonsan or ROK patrols across the 38th parallel are only incidental to our aggressive defense operations. We can see no possible political objections to such operations.
5. The military question of necessary operations across 38th parallel must not be confused with political decision whether UN forces should seek to gain control of all of Kor and unify it by force. We do not anticipate major moves by UN forces for the purpose of seizing territory. At present a major movement by the mass of UN forces into North Kor is not probable. When question of whether to cross the 38th parallel in mass force becomes a more immediate problem, there will be time to consider that question, and we will of course consult with other Nations participating in Korean fighting. At present, it is premature to discuss that question. We do not know what the enemy’s attitude will be at that time, or what his military situation will be, and other factors which will have to be considered by us and by the other countries.
In reply to a question by Ambassador Makin (Australia) about MacArthur’s authority, Rusk read from transcript of President’s press conference,1 and indicated his interpretation of the President’s statement to be that President did not wish to give enemy information as to our intentions, nor give the enemy or the UN Commander the impression that the President considers the 38th parallel an inviolable frontier. On the political question of efforts to conquer North Korea by force, the President did not intend to comment and so indicated.
Ambassador Bonnet2 summed up his understanding of Rusk’s statement, indicating agreement. He stated his understanding as a conclusion that there would be no mass crossing of the 38th parallel without agreement of the other countries. Later, however, Rusk dissipated this impression, making it clear that US could not agree that each Member represented could have a veto over UC action. He said UC has a responsibility and it is not always possible to get unanimous agreement of a large number of States, especially when you are in the middle of a war and must act. He did promise, however, that there would be opportunity for consultations and that efforts would be made to achieve as much agreement as possible. We have already received views of some members represented and hope that if any others desire to do so they will make their views known.
[Page 181]Ambassador Berendsen (New Zealand) approved Rusk’s statement. He noted that there was no question that there was authority under the UN Resolutions to cross 38th parallel, and that in October there had not been a dissenting voice on this subject. It is not, therefore, a question of what the resolutions provide, but a change in the military situation; i.e., Chinese Communist intervention. He was completely satisfied with Rusk’s exposition.
When asked about the place of consultations, Rusk indicated that while we have no fixed views, it would seem preferable that for the present at least, consultations should be in Washington either bilaterally or, if it is desired, at briefing meetings. He indicated that he would prepare a brief informal memorandum summarizing what he had said at this meeting, and would try and have it available by next Tuesday’s briefing session so that the Ambassadors could transmit it to their Governments.
Above summary is for your information only. Department will send you copy of Rusk memorandum for use in consultation with Dels of participating countries.3 Department will also send briefer statement for use with other Dels.