795.00/2–1151
Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Rusk)1
Outline of Action Regarding Korea
1. the principal alternatives
A. To reinforce U.S. and U.N. forces sufficiently to unify all of Korea by force
This alternative must be rejected for the following reasons: (1) the U.S. and the U.N. do not have the necessary additional force (2) even if adequate force were available, it should not be deployed to Korea, (3) the Moscow–Peiping axis can always reinforce enemy effort sufficiently to prevent a full UN success in Korea.
B. To withdraw promptly, either with or without a pretext
This alternative must be rejected for the following reasons: (1) the world-wide political effect of a demonstration of U.S. irresolution would be disastrous; (2) a major aggression by communism would result in a clear communist victory; (3) the position of the West in Japan would be badly undermined; (4) the sacrifices made thus far to meet the Korean aggression would have come to naught; (5) an abandonment of our Korean allies would be unacceptable as a matter of national honor and morality; (6) great confusion, anger and disillusionment would result in the United States; (7) withdrawal from Korea would require additional action against China, the nature, extent and results of which can not be clearly seen.
C. To resolve the Korean affair by bringing down the Peiping regime through action against China
This alternative must be rejected for the following reasons: (1) a general war against China must be avoided in the face of the world threat posed by the Soviet Union; (2) there is no assurance of bringing down the Peiping regime without a major commitment of U.S. [Page 166] forces to the China mainland; (3) if we make a major commitment of U.S. forces to the China mainland, there is no assurance that we can avoid general war at a time and under conditions of great disadvantage to us; (4) the U.S. would be politically isolated in any such effort.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
D. To maintain indefinitely a military stalemate in Korea
This alternative must be avoided, if possible, because (1) it would require an indefinite commitment of U.S. forces now in Korea, forces which are urgently required for other missions, (2) it would involve further human and material sacrifice without a clearly defined purpose, (3) it would produce a constantly increasing tension which could explode into general war, (4) it would be difficult to keep the support of the American people for the effort required.
E. To accept a cease-fire along the lines of the December, 1950 proposals and a modus vivendi in Korea providing for a phased withdrawal of all foreign troops from Korea
Of the several alternatives, this course is best suited to the U.S. and U.N. interest under present circumstance. The following factors should be kept in mind:
- (1)
- The cease-fire. We could not accept a cease-fire which permits the military position to be shifted to our disadvantage under the cover of a truce. The JCS requirements set forth in December, 1950 should be maintained. We could not accept a de facto cease-fire by ground forces and a suspension of U.N. air action against the enemy; the enemy could build up an overwhelming superiority with impunity. Although there is no indication that the enemy would accept such a cease-fire, the idea should be pursued further by diplomacy and through the U.N. Good Offices Committee.
- (2)
- Settlement in Korea. If a satisfactory cease-fire is obtained, negotiations on the future of Korea would doubtless ensue. Although the U.S. and the U.N. should maintain the policy of unifying an independent and democratic Korea, it must be recognized that, realistically, the lines established by the cease-fire would be frozen and would produce in fact a return to the status quo ante June 25, 1950. An agreed modus vivendi for Korea inevitably involves the risk of future violation by the communists. This risk is world-wide and will exist so long as there is a non-communist Korea. We can not commit large U.S. forces permanently to Korea because of this risk, nor, on the other hand, surrender Korea to communism because of it. Any such modus vivendi will require a strong economic and military assistance program for the Republic of Korea if it is to have a chance to survive.
- (3)
- Talks on other Far Eastern questions. If there is a cease-fire and modus vivendi regarding Korea, further discussions of Far [Page 167] Eastern questions, with Peiping included, will be unavoidable. We must be very clear that we do not continue the fighting in Korea merely to avoid difficult or embarrassing negotiations. Obviously, in any such negotiations, we should support U.S. interests vigorously and insist upon the inclusion of those governments having a legitimate interest in the subjects to be discussed.
2. military action
a. In the event of an agreed cease-fire U.N. military action should conform to the agreed course of action.
b. If there is no agreed cease-fire, (1) U.N. forces should concentrate upon inflicting maximum punishment upon the enemy with minimum loss to ourselves, (2) there would be advantage in securing the territory of the ROK, but serious risks or costs should not be undertaken merely to secure terrain, (3) air and naval action against enemy forces and military targets in North Korea should be maximized, (4) ROK forces should be built into the best possible fighting force as rapidly as possible, with adequate training and replacement features to insure ROK army effectiveness over a prolonged period.
c. The 38th parallel.
In the absence of an agreed cease-fire, the 38th parallel will provide acute political problems. The enemy should not be afforded a sanctuary behind the 38th parallel similar to that behind the Yalu River. On the other hand, UN forces should not embark upon an effort to drive enemy forces out of all Korea.
Upon reaching the 38th parallel, UN forces should pause for a period of rest, should strengthen the defensive positions occupied by ROK forces prior to June 25, 1950, and should clean up guerillas south of the parallel. During this period, diplomatic and intelligence facilities should be employed to determine enemy intentions regarding a cease-fire and settement of the Korean problem.
If the enemy appears to be reinforcing his forward elements at the 38th parallel or redisposing his forces for renewed attacks on UN forces, the UN commander should be free to take such action as is required for the security of his forces, without regard to the 38th parallel.
The contents of this paper should be discussed immediately with the other principal governments involved in Korea and their agreement obtained. Further, a public statement should be prepared for prompt use by the President to explain the military necessity requiring ground operations across the 38th parallel, if that situation in fact arises.