Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, Korea and China, Volume VII, Part 1

795.00/2–251

Memorandum of Conversation, by Messrs. Barbour and Hackler of the Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs

secret

[Washington,] February 2, 1951.

Subject: Briefing: of Ambassadors on Korea¹

Participants:	Australia	—Ambassador Makin and Mr. McNichol, Second Secretary
	Belgium	—Ambassador Silvercruys
	Canada	—Ambassador Wrong
	France	—Mr. Millet, Counselor
	Great Britain	—Mr. Graves, Counselor
	Greece	—Ambassador Politis
	India	—(absent)
	Luxembourg	—(absent)
	Netherlands	—Dr. de Beus, Minister Plenipotentiary
	New Zealand	—Mr. Laking, Counselor
	Philippines	—Ambassador Elizalde
	Thailand	—Mr. Kridakon, First Secretary
	Turkey	—Mr. Esenbel, Counselor
	Union of South Africa	—Mr. Jarvie, Counselor
	United States	—FE–Mr. Rusk
		UNA–Mr. Hickerson
		EUR–Mr. Allen
		FE–Mr. Hackler
		FE–Mr. Barbour
		Captain Maertens–Army
		Captain Fischgrund–Army

Captain Fischgrund opened the briefing with a description of enemy centers of resistance as they had appeared during the past week. He pointed out that in the western sectors resistance had been light to non-existent as on the Seoul-Suwon highway and only moderately heavy in the east. He closed the G–2 portion of the briefing by reviewing enemy activities in rear areas and stating that there had been continued improvement in the situation.

Captain Maertens, G–3, reported that there had been a general UN advance of up to two miles in all front areas during the past twenty four hours. In response to a question by Ambassador Wrong, Captain Maertens stated that in spite of the general advance, the action remained a “reconnaissance in force” or at least one with “limited objective”.

After the military briefing, Mr. Rusk reminded the group that during the next week, meetings would be held on Tuesday and Friday,² as previously agreed.

Mr. Rusk said that he would have prepared a memorandum on the UN prisoner of war situation and that he hoped to discuss this problem with the group shortly. He added that the International Red Cross had been completely unsuccessful in its attempts to obtain permission from the Chinese Communit and North Korean Government to perform the usual Red Cross services for UN POW’s but that the International Red Cross desired that no action be taken by members of the UN since to do so might jeopardize and complicate any future concessions on the part of these two governments. The Red Cross was, however, working with the UN forces on behalf of Communist prisoners of war. He stated that reports had been received that American prisoners are being held at various places in Manchuria and North Korea.

Mr. Rusk then brought up the press speculations about UN forces crossing the 38th parallel. He said there was no immediate problem since substantial enemy forces stood between us and the parallel, and our military commanders anticipated slow progress toward the parallel. While there were no indications that the enemy had given up his original intention to drive the UN forces into the sea, the fact remained that he was believed to be unable to do so. At the same time UN forces were not strong enough to reliberate all of North Korea, and it was not likely that there would be any serious ground action north of the 38th parallel. In December, the United States had favored a proposal for a cease-fire on the basis of the 38th parallel, and we still hold that view with no change in our original position.

A basic difficulty with a de facto cease-fire, Mr. Rusk pointed out, was the disparity in size and type of opposing forces: the enemy’s large ground forces could be easily reinforced while our relatively small ground forces could not, and our superior air and naval forces would be ineffective during a cease-fire. Thus anything other than a negotiated cease-fire during which there would be no reinforcement on either side would, at its close, undoubtedly find the enemy in a much better position than the UN forces.

Mr. Hickerson emphasized that the cease-fire proposal outlined by Ambassador Gross on December 15, 1950, provided that there should be no reinforcement or resupplying on either side.³

In response to a question by Ambassador Elizalde, Mr. Rusk stated that we must assume that supplies, equipment and reinforcements or replacements are continuing to flow from Manchuria and cited intelligence reports to this effect. In reply to Mr. de Beus he added that it was his belief that some of the Chinese Communist units formerly in action had been replaced by fresh troops from Manchuria.

When Ambasador Makin inquired as to the effect of a cease-fire accepted by the enemy which would deny the UN access to the 38th parallel, Mr. Rusk stated that such conditions would be unacceptable to the South Koreans and, he believed, to the UN. Mr. Rusk agreed with Ambassador Politis that a stalemate had in fact been reached and stated his belief that Communist failure to take the offensive was due to military reverses and was not connected with any political maneuvers.

Mr. Rusk identified the present problem, which was not one for public or press discussion, as that of breaking off the military action during the present stalemate and avoiding permanent military commitments in Korea.

1. This was one of a regular series of briefings for representatives of countries cooperating with the U.N. effort in Korea.
2. February 6 and 9.
3. See Foreign Relations, 1950, vol. vii, pp. 1549 ff.