795.00/1–2751: Telegram
The Ambassador in India (Henderson) to the Secretary of State
niact
1837. 1. Am seeing Bajpai noon today and leaving document with him in form memorandum containing summary of statements made [Page 138] by me to him. This summary contains substance of Depcirtel 395, January 171 and Deptel 1131, January 232 without, however, referring to the alternative contained in Depcirtel 395 to point 1 of proposed resolution of UN. In the latter part of the memorandum, however, I have elaborated on the possible effect of American opinion upon failure of UN to pass resolution condemning the action of Communist China in Korea. Latter part of this memorandum reads as follows:
“Ambassador added his government realized other governments also had problem meeting their public opinion. It hoped other governments would have in mind failure UN recognize present action Communist China in Korea for what it was and face squarely might create wave isolationism in US so powerful it might affect some of basic foreign policies of US. American public would fail understand why UN should hesitate condemn forces which had attacked those of UN and had killed thousands of UN soldiers, including those of US, which were in Korea in response to call from UN. Regardless of any explanations might be made, large section of American people would interpret such failure on part of UN as placing of soldiers of US, and of other countries who entered Korea halt aggression at request of UN, on same level as those forces which entered Korea in order support aggressor and attack UN forces opposing aggressor.
“Feelings of injustice which such failure on part of UN would create would not be assauged by arguments Peiping regime had had grievances against US because various policies of US in FE were not to its liking. American people had come believe aggression gave rise war; failure collectively condemn aggression, and if necessary take other steps oppose it, would encourage aggressive tendencies and eventually lead to future world wars. Many of them might take view if aggression against forces of UN were to be overlooked by UN merely because aggressor might feel itself to have a grievance against one or other members of UN attempts discourage aggression in future by collective action would indeed be futile, with consequent increased danger world peace.
“Ambassador concluded by stating although he had endeavored faithfully set forth what he understood be his government’s views, and describe some problems facing his government, nevertheless he would like make clear his government did not pretend it had found any panacea for situation in FE. His government was anxious consult with other members of UN and loyally work with them in finding ways and means for preventing spread hostilities and for bringing to an end Korean conflict, without at same time weakening UN to such extent as to endanger its efficacy in maintenance world peace.”
2. I hope Department will approve this section my statement. Any suggestions for supplementary conversation would be appreciated.
- Not printed. Circular telegram 395 was virtually identical with circular telegram 387, January 15, p. 83; it was sent principally to the Embassies in the Arab and Asian countries (795.00/1–1751).↩
- Not printed. It urged the Ambassador to take up with Bajpai, in the absence of Nehru, the points set forth in circular telegram 395 (795.00/1–2151).↩