793.00/1–2551
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Rusk)
Subject: U.S. Resolution Concerning Chinese Aggression
| Participants: | Mr. Hubert Graves–British Embassy |
| Dean Rusk–Assistant Secretary of State | |
| George Perkins–Assistant Secretary of State | |
| Philip Jessup–Ambassador-at-Large |
Mr. Graves called at Mr. Perkin’s house tonight to tell us about Jebb’s latest instructions on the U.S. resolution concerning Chinese [Page 132] aggression. He said these instructions reached Jebb following his latest speech this afternoon.
Mr. Graves said that the Cabinet has fully considered the position in the Political Committee and has taken most seriously into account the considerations put to the Cabinet by Ambassador Franks. Graves interpolated that Franks had sent a “fine telegram” in which the American point of view had been most ably set forth.
The British Cabinet’s conclusion was that Jebb should vote against the U.S. resolution unless paragraph 2 is suitably amended and paragraph 8 is deleted.
Paragraph 2 of the U.S. resolution now states, in effect, that Communist China has rejected all UN efforts to reach a peaceful settlement of the Korean problem. The British Cabinet believes that amendments must be made based on the latest Chinese proposals which appear in fact to accept some of the UN proposals. The British Cabinet would accept an amendment along the lines that “the CPG have not yet accepted all UN proposals” or “noting the disappointing response of the CPG, etc.”. If such an amendment were made, Jebb could then vote for paragraph 2.
The British Cabinet is most strongly opposed to paragraph 8, which calls for the Collective Measures Committee. Jebb cannot vote for the U.S. resolution if this paragraph remains in it.
Mr. Graves concluded that the latest instruction was in his judgment London’s final word on the matter and represents the very great difficulty in which the United Kingdom finds itself. He felt certain, and the Ambassador wanted him to emphasize, that the Cabinet had the full benefit of Mr. Acheson’s views and that the present position was not based upon any difference in understanding as between London and Washington.
Jebb had assumed that he must vote against the Asian-Arab resolution and the new instruction did not change that assumption although it did not specifically mention it.
There was nothing in the message from London containing any reaction to the split within the Commonwealth which the United Kingdom position would produce.
I told Mr. Graves that we were greatly disappointed by this position, that we would consider what might be done with respect to some change in paragraph 2, but that there was no hope that we could agree to a deletion of paragraph 8. I said that if this present instruction referred to the position in the Political Committee, we hoped that the instruction could be amended for the situation in the plenary session. I said that we would hope that if the plenary session sustained paragraph [Page 133] 8 by a two-thirds vote, the United Kingdom would then be able to vote for the resolution as a whole. That would be in accordance with the normal processes of parliamentary democracy. I also said that we would very much hope that the United Kingdom would not find itself more or less alone with the Soviet bloc in opposition to our resolution since that would create a most difficult situation indeed. It was my impression that those who were not in favor of our resolution might readily abstain rather than join the Soviets in voting against.
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I took the opportunity of Mr. Graves’ visit to say that we seriously differed with the view expressed by Mr. Attlee in his speech to the House of Commons1 that Korea is an Asian problem of special interest to Asian countries. I said we could not accept the proposition that merely because the Koreans were not white that Mr. Nehru thereby could assert some special interest in the matter. Korea was of very great interest to the United States, vitally affects the position in the Pacific, and the aggression there is a world-wide problem. Mr. Graves said that he would pass my comment along to London in a separate telegram.