Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, Europe: Political and Economic Developments, Volume IV, Part 1

No. 92

750G.022/3–551: Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom ( Gifford ) to the Secretary of State ¹

secret

London , March 5, 1951—6 p.m.

4766. Contents Deptel 4013, March 3 (repeated 3884, Trieste 502, Belgrade 885),² passed to Foreign Office today. Foreign Office grateful for Department’s account Secretary’s talk with Tarchiani, substance of which Foreign Office is in complete agreement. Italian Ambassador here had apparently given somewhat different version emphasizing reaffirmation of March 20 to exclusion all else. Italian Ambassador had sought in vain to persuade Strang to make statement comparable to that he attributed to Secretary.

Foreign Office concurs with substance of views second part first numbered paragraph reftel except for last half last sentence.³ Italian and Yugoslav Ambassadors here had another in series of informal meetings on March 3 at which, according to Italians some progress made on subject Trieste. It was first time participants got down to examining maps. Yugoslav Ambassador took line similar to that of Mates in Belgrade’s 1207 to Department (repeated Rome 78, Trieste 52).⁴ Foreign Office thinks Yugoslavs definitely anxious to reach early settlement with Italians and believes that Italians here encouraged by latest talk to think that such may be possible. Foreign Office therefore prompting both sides to pursue discussions and if by any chance general agreement reached before Four Power talks to allow US-UK to examine and comment on agreement before it is formalized. Foreign Office believes Italians may fear that Western Powers in face persistent Soviet efforts tie Trieste to Austrian treaty and in interests obtaining latter, will revert to peace treaty provisions for Trieste settlement; such fear may spur Italians to attempt reach direct settlement prior Big Four meeting.

Re numbered paragraph four [three],⁵ Foreign Office assumes Italians will take described line but thinks Cominform and not anti-Cominform Commies will campaign on FT independence platform. However, Foreign Office hopes avoid possible consequences suggested in reference paragraph by prompting Italo-Yugoslav settlement.

Gifford

1. Repeated to Rome, Trieste, and Belgrade.
2. Telegram 4013 summarized the views of Secretary Acheson concerning Trieste as he expressed them to Italian Ambassador Tarchiani in a conversation held on January 15. (750G.00/3–251) For a memorandum of Acheson’s conversation with Tarchiani, see Document 245.
3. The half-sentence under reference reads: “nor is Dept prepared prompt either Ital or Yugo govts enter discussions under present circumstances.”
4. Telegram 1207 summarized a conversation between Mates and Allen during which Mates stated that the position of the Yugoslav Government was one of willingness to negotiate with the Italians on the basis, in principle, of Zone A to Italy and Zone B to Yugoslavia with minor modifications along ethnic lines. (750G.00/3–251)
5. Paragraph 3 described the Department of State concern that Italians would campaign for continued Italian sovereignty over Trieste while pro-Tito Communists in Italy would campaign for Trieste’s independence, leaving the AMG “caught in the middle.”