Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, Europe: Political and Economic Developments, Volume IV, Part 1

No. 89

665.68/1–951

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Director of the Office of Western European Affairs ( Byington )

secret

[Washington,] January 9, 1951.

Subject: Italo-Yugoslav Negotiations—Free Territory of Trieste

Participants:	Mr. Luciolli, Counselor, Italian Embassy
	Mr. Byington, WE

Mr. Luciolli inquired with regard to an item in the periscope of Newsweek which inferred that one of the subjects in which the United States might be disposed to make concessions to the Russians was the issue of Trieste.¹ He said that I undoubtedly was fully aware of his Government’s interest in this matter and inquired what comment I could make on the Newsweek report. He wished to know particularly whether the United States proposed to include Trieste in its preliminary conversations with the British and French prior to a further reply to the Russian note.² He asked me whether the Department could give the Embassy any assurances in this regard because this report would undoubtedly be carried in Italy and, if true, cause the utmost concern to the Foreign Office.

I said that as of the present moment the issue of Trieste had not in any way been discussed with reference to the meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers. I said that it was obviously an issue if conversations progressed further which might be raised by the Soviet Government and I assumed that in due course studies of the question might well be prepared for use in that connection should it arise. I pointed out that as he knew, there was no change in our position up to the present time. I also pointed out that in all discussions concerning Trieste we had meticulously kept the Italian Government informed and I did not expect that we would deviate from this policy. I emphasized, however, that this could not be taken as a commitment on the part of the Department. It was based on my knowledge of our approach to this question drawn on a number of years of experience.

Mr. Luciolli then went on to recount certain recent developments in the relations between the Italian Embassy and the Yugoslav Embassy in Washington. He said that some sort of a campaign was unquestionably underway, although up to the present time it had consisted of a gastronomic and photographic bombardment. The campaign began with a conversation between the Yugoslav military attaché and the Italian military attaché, in which the former emphasized the desirability of Italy and Yugoslavia settling outstanding differences and that the question of Trieste should certainly be resolved. Step number two was the invitation to luncheon by two first secretaries of the Yugoslav Embassy to Mr. Bounous, first Secretary of the Italian Embassy. At the luncheon the first secretaries conversed along the same lines. Step number three, the Italian Ambassador had now been invited to dinner by the Yugoslav Ambassador and they were waiting to see the developments from that. Step number four—Mr. Luciolli, who then expected an invitation to luncheon from his opposite number, had suddenly received a large photograph of himself with the Yugoslav Ambassador and Madame Popovic, with greetings. Mr. Luciolli was going to acknowledge this with a nice note to the Ambassador.

Mr. Luciolli continued that it was the Italian Foreign Office’s view that Italy should under no circumstances discourage any overtures on this subject by the Yugoslavs and that it was in the mutual interest of both countries that a settlement of the Trieste question should be accomplished. Up to now the Foreign Office had been convinced that solution was not possible because the Italians could only consider minor rectifications of Zone A and B along ethnic lines, which would be unacceptable to the Yugoslav Government. He expressed his concern over their recent advances because he was afraid it might lead to an upheaval similar to that which occurred last year when after preliminary conversations, the Yugoslavs had jettisoned the whole project with statements to the press which excluded any further progress and damaged relations between the two countries. He said that relations with Yugoslavia had recently been improving and it would be a mistake at this time to enter into this subject unless there was a real desire on the part of the Yugoslav Government to reach a compromise along the lines desired by the Italians in return for favorable arrangements between the two countries, economic, political, and possibly in the future, military. I refrained from comment except to point out that it would indeed be to the mutual advantage of both countries if they could reach an understanding and that I felt neither party should discourage any advances of the other.

In conclusion, Mr. Luciolli speculated on the possibility that the Yugoslavs had now become agitated also on the basis of the Newsweek report because of fear that we might make concessions to the Russians which would be undesirable to them.

1. The article under reference appeared in Newsweek, January 8, 1951, p. 14.
2. For documentation on the exchange of notes with the Soviet Union and the subsequent negotiations relating to a possible meeting of the Foreign Ministers of the United States, the United Kingdom, France, and the Soviet Union, see vol. iii, Part 1, pp. 1048 ff.