740.00/11–2951
Memorandum by the Special Consultant on Migration Affairs ( West ) to the Secretary of State 1
Subject: Confidential Report as Chairman of the U.S. Delegation to the Second Conference on Migration called by the International Labor Office, Naples, Italy.
The Naples Conference was called to consider a plan to provide international assistance for emigration from Western European countries. This plan, you will recall, provided for a Migration Council to be established by interested governments. The policies formulated by this Council were to be carried out under the supervision of the International Labor Office. Immediately prior to the departure of the U.S. delegation to Naples Congressional antipathy toward the ILO dealing with this matter of migration at all became so pronounced and was expressed in such definite terms that it was decided that the U.S. delegation could not give support to the proposals to be considered regardless of how they might be amended as a result of critical discussion. We were to oppose any scheme involving the instrumentality of the ILO.
When the U.S. position became known it was apparent that nothing could be accomplished at the conference along the lines originally contemplated. Whereupon the delegates of several vitally interested countries went to work to formulate recommendations intended to circumvent the impasse, to salvage a degree of usefulness from the conference and to provide something which could be regarded as a step forward in respect to international cooperation [Page 192] in dealing with the matter. This was deemed, on their part, preferable to giving up altogether thus permitting the conference to wither away fruitlessly. These efforts resulted in a proposal to recommend the establishment of a Consultative Council on European Migration composed of representatives of interested governments and to function entirely on its own except as to utilization of certain technical services available from UN agencies. The U.S. delegation was instructed to abstain from voting on this proposal and to reserve the position of the U.S. as to any future measures for international action dealing with this problem. The result was that the conference adopted a report containing the recommendations with due note of the abstensions and reservations including those of the U.S. delegation.
With that background in mind, I am taking the liberty of making a few personal observations. The outcome of the Naples Conference was a grievous disappointment. The particularly unhappy aspect of it arises not wholly from our inability to support the ILO proposals. Of more serious significance was our subsequent refusal to cooperate with a substantial group of friendly governments in a proposal which was designed to accommodate their expectations to the known limitations within which the U.S. delegation had to work. To those delegates who came to the conference with the desire to achieve some positive results this proposal seemed to accomplish two things, (a) Resolve the difficulties which made the support of the ILO plan impossible, and (b) Evidence an intention on the part of interested governments to come to grips with the problem on a basis of broad international collaboration. It was our friends who advanced this proposal and our failure to cooperate even to this very moderate extent created an unwholesome reaction. While there appeared to be a general understanding of the position we had to take in respect to the ILO proposals, due, in part, to recognition of the attitude of Congress regarding international organizations having in their membership states dominated by Communist influences, the position taken by us in respect to the suggested Consultative Council of directly interested governments (no Communists) was far less comprehensible. This latter proposal seemed to most delegates a way to provide international collaboration on a much broader basis than hitherto without any commitments involving the type of international organization inveighed against in the reports of Congressional Committees. The fundamental reason why we could not support the ILO proposals in whole or in part seemed to be met and our contrary position indicated a rigidity which could be extenuated only by an intention to restrict our participation to measures of our own design with little regard for what others might consider helpful.
[Page 193]During the conference the members of the U.S. delegation discussed at length with members of other delegations our plan to preserve the transportation facilities of the International Refugee Organization after that organization terminates its activities. It was impossible, at the time, to define with any precision the plan itself, but a substantial agreement was evidenced, although skeptically in some quarters, that it would be useful to preserve these facilities and the conference was prepared to and did go on record recommending that the interested governments give serious consideration to this particular aspect of the problem. So this situation evolved. We were promoting a plan to deal with a particular but important segment of this whole problem and there was a general disposition to support our efforts along that line. On the other hand, our friends were proposing a plan designed to keep the problem as a whole under review by interested governments and we would have nothing to do with it. In view of the fact that there was nothing contradictory in these two approaches, the invidious light in which our position put the U.S. can be readily understood. It is to be hoped that our intransigeance at Naples will not result in repercussions adverse to the success of efforts to be put forth at Brussels and subsequently.
It was important politically, especially to our European colleagues, that some measure with broad support come out of the Naples conference regardless of the fate of the ILO proposals. This was made clear not only by formal statements, but especially by informal discussions which brought into bold relief the growing tensions being caused by these pools of surplus populations. In Italy particularly this matter has great political significance. The situation was not such as it would have been had the conference been dealing with a new and unfamiliar problem. It has been studied and restudied over a period of years, its political implications have been recognized at high levels from which have issued many expressions of deep concern and the measures needed to help provide a solution are fairly well defined. These considerations, together with the character of the representation at Naples, had led to a justifiable expectation that the conference should be able to recommend constructive action even though the high expectations aroused by the publication of the ILO proposals could not be fulfilled. To permit the conference to have its moderate compromise proposal, which provides a means for broader internal collaboration, rendered sterile by reservations on the part of the U.S., represented a distinct failure on our part to recognize important political realities.
In spite of the fact that the ILO (and, by implication, other UN agencies) was thrust aside as an instrument to help in this problem [Page 194] we should not consider that the final word has been spoken in that regard. Without in any way diminishing the importance and usefulness of preserving the shipping facilities, upon which our attention is now focused, it must be stated that the successful consummation of that effort will be effective in dealing with but part of the problem. Unless there is a substantial increase in possibilities of emigration from Western Europe, commercial shipping facilities will soon be able to provide sufficient space. If additional migrants are to be moved, thereby giving a raison d’être for the shipping project, affirmative efforts must be made to ascertain and cultivate all possible opportunities for resettlement, to assist those governments requesting such assistance in improving their various services and administrative practices which have an important bearing on the magnitude of possible resettlement, and to promote in every appropriate way an increasing volume of opportunities.
Several of the specialized and other agencies of the United Nations can render effective aid in increasing opportunities for resettlement if they are encouraged to and supported in doing so. We should endeavor to remove the barrier which has been erected against their participation in our efforts, so that we might use them to the fullest possible extent because, among many cogent reasons, these established international organizations can deal with certain problems far more appropriately and economically than can be done by the US. unilaterally.
- Sent through the Executive Secretariat.↩