Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, Europe: Political and Economic Developments, Volume IV, Part 1

No. 76

840.411/7–551

Memorandum by the Special Consultant on Migration Affairs ( West ) to the Secretary of State ¹

confidential

[ Washington ,] June 19, 1951.

Subject: Surplus Populations in Western Europe; Proposed U.S. Action.

Summary and Recommendations

The pressure of surplus populations in Western Europe persists in Italy, Germany, Austria, the Netherlands and Greece. Refugees continue to flow in and are being encouraged by the U.S. to do so. The present problem transcends that of the refugees themselves, involving excesses of native populations in important areas. The possibility of assimilating these people in Western Europe, at a tolerable level of living and advantageous level of productivity, is very remote, since even with the rearmament effort, foreseeable employment and resettlement opportunities are not sufficient. Continued emigration on a larger scale than that obtaining since the war should be encouraged as one means of relieving this pressure. An order of magnitude of approximately 3½ million emigrants from Europe over a period of 5 years is the minimum movement required. Efforts should be made to accomplish such a movement.

The International Refugee Organization (IRO) has been the principal agency dealing with one important phase of this matter, seeking opportunities for resettlement, providing transport and organizing movements of refugees. Its activities terminate by the end of 1951. The USA has given great assistance to this work not only by means of its contribution to the IRO but also thru operation of the Displaced Persons Act. Admission to the U.S. under the terms of this Act will end by June 30, 1952. Thus two enterprises which have made a very great contribution to resettlement are about to come to an end, with nothing in sight to fill the void. International interest in and stimulation of emigration from Western Europe will have to be continued if the desired results are to be obtained.

There are, however, limits within which emigration will have to take place. Admission of immigrants is now on a selective rather than a mass basis. The rate of economic development in countries potentially able to receive immigrants is the real governing factor in the magnitude of migration which can be expected. Such development is being stimulated from many sources and, if full advantage is taken of the services and investment funds now available, an increasing demand for productive manpower will occur. Additional measures to accelerate economic expansion will have to be dealt with separately from this paper since the Executive Office has at hand proposals on this score. (Report to the President by the International Development Advisory Board, March 1951.)²

The particular interest of the U.S. is substantial due to the economic burden and social and political tensions put upon certain countries by these surplus populations who have scant hope of bettering their lot where presently located. We are expending great efforts and vast sums of money to strengthen these countries. Even a most dispassionate view reveals that the continued burden of these nonproductive people presents serious handicaps to the successful fruition of these efforts and expenditures. It should be noted also that the existence of such handicaps constitutes a weakness behind the military posture to be developed in Western Europe. Continued efforts on the part of the U.S., cooperating with other interested countries, to overcome these handicaps by assisting emigration and resettlement in areas where opportunities for productive work exist, will certainly serve to strengthen these countries and should, accordingly, be considered a vital part of our Foreign Aid Program.

It appears that for the present three steps can be taken to encourage maximum emigration from Western Europe. These steps are embodied in the following recommendations:

1. An international agency should be created (or preferably, one now in existence strengthened) to serve as an instrument of international cooperation in promoting emigration from Western Europe.

2. The U.S. should, as part of its Foreign Aid Program, provide funds to be used in support of such an international agency, or in other appropriate ways.

(a) It is estimated that a U.S. contribution of $40 million per year (in part reimbursable) might be employed effectively and prudently when satisfactory plans are developed.

3. We should request legislation which would provide means (e.g. by continuation of the techniques and certain qualifications of the Displaced Persons Act) to permit a continued annual reception by the U.S. in excess of that permitted under our basic immigration laws from Western European countries where population pressures continue to be most acute.

4. If the above recommendations are considered appropriate, plans should be shaped to:

(a) Earmark $10 million of the Foreign Aid funds to hold together the shipping unit developed by the International Refugee Organization after that organization terminates, provided arrangements can be made for international cooperation to make additional funds available. (ECA now has such a proposal under consideration.) This should be regarded as an interim and temporary measure pending the activation of a more substantial effort to promote emigration from Western Europe.

(b) Cooperate with the International Labor Organization (ILO) in developing its comprehensive proposal to serve as an instrument of international cooperation in promoting and assisting emigration from Western Europe. The substance of this proposal has to do with technical assistance and aid in transport, and not with capital investment.

(c) Get legislation drafted for submission to the Congress providing for the continuation of techniques embodied in the Displaced Persons Act to provide for the annual reception of approximately 60,000 from Germany and Austria, 75,000 from Italy (including Trieste), 15,000 from the Netherlands, 10,000 from Greece, and 10,000 political refugees over and above the quotas permitted under our basic immigration laws.

Discussion

I. Nature and Magnitude of the Problem.

In a joint declaration issued at London, May 13, 1950,³ the Secretary of State, together with the British and French Foreign Ministers, observed that overpopulation in certain Western European countries “is one of the most important elements in the difficulties and disequilibrium of the world”. Experts designated by them met in Paris, July 24–August 11, 1950, for systematic exploration of the problem and avenues of approach to its solution. Their conclusions as to the “nature and order of magnitude of the problem of European overpopulation” were as follows:

• “1. The estimates of overpopulation put before us by the countries having surpluses are based upon the scale of present and projected economic activity in their areas, and the extent of the opportunities afforded there for the reasonable support and useful activity of the population.
• “2. It is impossible to assess with complete accuracy the extent of the total surplus, having regard to the statistical difficulties, the different methods used by the various countries in assessing their surplus, and the variables involved. For example, the possibility of increasing employment through internal economic expansion varies from country to country.
• “3. From the estimates submitted, there appears to be a present overpopulation, not absorbable by present or projected economic activity, of about 1.6 millions in Western Germany and from 2.5 to 4 millions in Italy, including workers and families. There are also important but smaller surpluses in the Netherlands, Austria, Greece, Malta and the US/UK Zone of Trieste. As indicated above, there are many uncertainties in these figures—those for Western Germany may be too low, particularly in view of the continuing influx of refugees from the East, while the higher total given for Italy may be excessive. However, on the basis of such information as is available to us, we have been obliged to accept these estimates as representing the overall magnitude of the problem.
• “4. Looking to the future the magnitude of the overpopulation problem cannot be expected to be reduced substantially by the effect of the now projected economic development of emigration countries, for the annual increase of population will more than cover the additional need for manpower that economic development will entail. We are not in a position to appraise whether an increase in internal transfers of population, beyond that at present contemplated, in any area of surplus such as Germany might bring some contribution to the reduction of this surplus.
• “5. Further, it has not been practicable for the experts of countries of surplus, nor for us, to appraise the extent of the direct and indirect effect of possible new factors in the situation, such as the projected increase in defense expenditures in Western Europe, envisaged since the opening of the conference. We are bound to recognize that they might be important in certain areas. Nevertheless the fact that the surplus largely arises from an excess of agricultural workers over the opportunities for employment on the land, together with difficulties of internal mobility of labor, impose serious limitation upon the effects of such new factors within the areas of surplus population themselves. We have necessarily concerned ourselves with the present and future contribution to the reduction of this overpopulation by migration to other areas.
• “6. Surpluses have accumulated for different reasons in different areas. In Western Germany, for example, there has occurred a net addition to the population of some 8 to 9 million persons, almost entirely of German ethnic origin, who either fled or were removed or expelled from their native areas. In Italy the excess results from a high rate of population growth and the damming up of normal emigration. In other areas, it is due primarily to an increase in population without a corresponding expansion of internal economic activity.
• “7. Particularly in Western Germany and Italy the problem appears to a large extent to be a non-recurrent one since with the dispersal of the accumulated surpluses, it should be possible to absorb the natural increase in population either through expansion of domestic employment or emigration at a manageable rate.”

The Foreign Ministers’ meeting at New York in September 1950⁴ agreed to appoint special representatives on migration who would, among other duties, give prompt study to the question of transport of migrants. The U.S. Representative was appointed in December, 1950, the French Representative in January, 1951, and the British Representative in March, 1951. The U.S. Representative has consulted with his colleagues, has examined the overpopulation problem on the ground in the countries of emigration, and has consulted with interested government officials, international organizations, and voluntary agencies.

Continued analysis of the problem by U.S. Government and international agencies, confirms the validity of the estimate reached at Paris. Particular note should be made of a special problem, not separately dealt with by the experts meeting, arising from the continuing influx of non-German political refugees from Eastern Europe at the rate of 12–15,000 per year. This movement is directly or indirectly encouraged by the U.S. through the Voice of America and other media.

During the past year the need for stimulation of emigration from Western Europe as one means of relieving the situation has become increasingly evident. In Italy, for example, the rational employment of those now under-employed in industrial establishments will provide the manpower needed to produce to the full capacity of productive facilities. As to Germany, a recent study (The Sonne Report) has indicated the possibility of integrating the great bulk of the refugees into German life; but due in part to the continued in-flow of people from the east, from 1 to 1½ million people in Germany should have the opportunity to emigrate. In Italy, Greece, Germany, the Netherlands and Austria there are large numbers of people who are agricultural (as distinguished from industrial) and for whom no foreseeable opportunity exists for employment where they are now located. In these countries the natural increase in population is about 900,000 per year.

The improving economy offers some possibilities of resettlement within Western Europe. For example, France might, under certain conditions, be able to take in substantial numbers, estimated in some quarters at as high as 100,000 per year for several years. However, after taking into account all the possibilities of integration within their own countries, or resettlement within other parts of Europe, there remains the necessity of overseas emigration.

II. Estimates of Required Emigration.

The 1949 flow from the areas of surplus to all destinations, including Europe, was roughly 622,000, of whom about 322,000 were DP’s, for whom resettlement was arranged by IRO. The 1950 flow (for which less reliable figures are available), was roughly 400,000, of whom approximately 185,000 were resettled overseas by the IRO. The IRO, by the time of its termination at the close of 1951, will have resettled about 1,100,000 refugees during three years of actual operations—an average of 367,000 per year (both overseas and European destinations).

Overseas spontaneous emigration has averaged about 200,000 annually since the end of the war, reaching a peak of 300,000 in 1949 and declining since. Certain European and overseas governments have in the past year been negotiating bilateral agreements to establish schemes for recruitment and transport of selected migrants. Significant among these are the agreements reached or in progress between Australia and Canada on the one hand and Italy, Germany and Netherlands on the other. Other overseas governments have to some extent liberalized admission requirements for spontaneous immigration. A total overseas annual movement of about 150,000 is the maximum that may be anticipated under such bilateral arrangements from the areas where overpopulation is most acute.

The U.S. Displaced Persons Act has provided for the intake of about 400,000 DP’s and German ethnic refugees in the period from 1948 to June 30, 1952. With the expiration of this legislation, U.S. immigration will be based upon the quota system, under which about 50,000 from the overpopulated areas of Western Europe would be admitted annually.

It is to be noted that two substantial contributors to the present flow of emigration from Western Europe, namely the IRO and the DP Act of the U.S., will cease activities within the next year.

With termination of the DP Act and the IRO, the maximum anticipated flow from surplus countries to overseas destinations to be expected is 350,000 per year. Intra-European movement on present projections will average 50,000 per year. Maximum total projected flow will therefore approximate 400,000 per year, roughly estimated by areas of destination as follows:

		One year		Five years
Intra-European		50,000		250,000
Overseas
Australia	75,000		375,000
Canada	75,000		375,000
U.S.	50,000		250,000
Latin America	100,000		500,000
New Zealand, So. Africa & other areas	50,000		250,000
		350,000		1,750,000
Totals		400,000		2,000,000

An annual flow of 700,000 over the next five years, a total of 3 million, is calculated to be the minimum movement necessary to reduce existing pressures in Europe. The breakdown by countries is as follows:

	One year	Five years
Italy (including Trieste)	400,000	2,000,000
Germany	200,000	1,000,000
Netherlands	40,000	200,000
Greece	35,000	175,000
Austria	25,000	125,000
Totals	700,000	3,500,000

Thus it can be seen that gap between the minimum required and the maximum prospective flow is 300,000 per year or a total of 1½ million over a five year period.

III. Proposals Advanced by International Organizations.

Plans for international cooperation to bring about the maximum amount of emigration, and thus bridge this gap, are being carefully formulated and are being put forward by the ILO, the Council of Europe, and the IRO.

(1) The ILO proposes establishment of a Special Migration Unit (within its organization), the objective of which is an over-all movement of 800,000 per year, including existing spontaneous and bilateral movements. Total cost of the Special Migration Unit is estimated by ILO to be $68,750,000 per year, to which would be added a reimbursable contribution of $62,500,000, payable over a period of four years, to a self-liquidating International Revolving Fund. The ILO uses the figure of 800,000 per year as a goal; the basis of its financial calculation is that, of the 800,000, ⅓ would, of necessity have their transportation expenses supplied to them free, ⅓ could pay their own, and ⅓ could wholly or in part repay advances made.

(2) The Secretariat of the Council of Europe has a plan calling for the overseas emigration of 600,000 per year over a period of eight to nine years. It proposes, for this purpose, establishment of a transport subsidy fund, expending $52 million the first year, and decreasing by roughly $10 million per year until the end of the fifth year, when it would become self financed by means of repayment. In addition, contributions totalling about $15 million per year would be required to finance the costs of the organization, to be contributed by member governments, international organizations, and other parties. A European investment bank with initial capital of $100 million would be established as an integral part of the scheme.

(3) IRO officials have called attention to the great service rendered by the shipping unit which they have developed over a period of years, and have suggested that an annual expenditure of approximately $30 million per year could maintain in operation an international resettlement agency with a fleet of twelve migration vessels (now under charter by IRO) and other services capable of resettling overseas 100,000 migrants annually. ECA now has under study a proposal that it contribute $10 million toward the cost of maintaining, temporarily, such facilities after the termination of the IRO, provided inter-governmental agreement can be reached on financing the remaining $20 million.

IV. U.S. Interest in the Problem.

The U.S. Government has manifested its strong interest in European overpopulation by (1) leadership in formulating the declaration of the three Foreign Ministers (London, May, 1950) and in their adoption of the report of the tripartite experts meeting (New York, September, 1950); (2) participation in ILO conferences and other international discussions of the problem; (3) participation in the work of the IRO; (4) enactment by the Congress of Section 115(e) of the ECA legislation, directing the ECA Administrator to encourage emigration from overpopulated areas in Europe under the authority of which the ECA has extended aid to the ILO and to Italy for their technical assistance programs;⁵ (5) enactment of the DP Act,⁶ which provides for admission to the U.S. of numbers considerably in excess of those permitted by the basic immigration laws, and authorizes U.S. participation in an international conference to seek ways of resettling German ethnic refugees and expellees now in Germany and Austria; (6) the report of the Congressional Sub-Committee (Walter Committee) which investigated the German expellee problem (1950); and (7) the report of the ECA technical assistance commission (Sonne Commission) which studied “The Integration of Refugees into German Life” (1951). U.S. Missions in all of the affected areas have repeatedly emphasized their interest in the problem, and ECA has recognized the dependence of lasting economic recovery upon its solution.

This interest is well justified. We are making great endeavors to strengthen these very countries where overpopulation exists. In Germany, Italy, Austria and Greece substantial parts of our financial aid are devoted directly or indirectly to public support of large numbers of non-productive people. The security aspects of the matter also deserve attention. We are endeavoring to improve the defense capabilities of these countries. Efforts to this end will be severely handicapped, lacking concurrent efforts to enlarge the opportunities of people who now are unproductive and who cannot see any hope of improving their lot. Furthermore, these idle people are extraordinarily susceptible to propaganda designed to undermine our influence upon and help to these countries. Their continued subjugation to the conditions under which they now live constitutes a heavy impediment to economic recovery and social and political stability. Whatever, therefore, can be done to diminish the magnitude of the problem by way of emigration contributes that much to the objectives toward which our Foreign Aid Program is being directed.

Faced with the fact that the U.S. participation in efforts to solve the problem of overpopulation in Western Europe are about to come to an end; assuming that the promotion of emigration from Western Europe is necessary as one means of dealing with this problem, and assuming also that the U.S. continues its deep interest, the question arises as to what the proper course would be for the U.S. to pursue from this point on.

It is suggested that the problem be dealt with along three lines.

(1) International cooperation in dealing with the matter should be developed by means of an agency designed to help in the promotion of and assistance to emigration from Western Europe on the broad basis of surplus populations rather than that of refugees only.

(2) The U.S. should provide for a continued intake of immigrants in excess of the numbers permitted by our basic immigration laws.

(3) More extended efforts should be made to encourage economic development and expansion in underdeveloped countries.

What effective purpose would an international agency serve under present conditions? It would be an instrument to promote emigration, seeking out opportunities, aiding in subsidizing transport costs when needed, providing technical assistance toward Improving procedures to those countries requesting such aid (there are many such requests) and serving as the focal point at which all interested countries could join in pooling their efforts to deal with the problem. The desirability of having a source of such international aid and cooperation as described has been repeatedly emphasized in the various studies made of this matter. For instance the Walter Report, in dealing with the Volksdeutsche problem in Germany, emphasized the desirability of international cooperation. The Australians have indicated that their scale of immigration would be enlarged by international aid. The studies of the ILO and the Council of Europe are based on the premise that the problem posed in Europe can be dealt with effectively only on an international basis.

In addition to technical assistance and coordination, an important task of an international agency would be to operate a fleet of vessels to provide transportation for migrants. The experience of the IRO indicates the necessity of such shipping facilities. At the peak of its operations, the IRO had under charter and in operation a fleet of 35 vessels, 19 of which were U.S. Naval Ships especially converted for this purpose. This fleet of 35 vessels handled a peak shipping of approximately 28,000 people per month, moving a total of about 300,000 during 1949.

The U.S. contribution to the proposed international agency might be projected on the cost of operating these (say 20) U.S. Naval Ships, at approximately $2 million per year per ship. Thus, $40 million could be regarded as what would be involved in U.S. financial support of an international agency. Part of this sum would in all likelihood be reimbursable from migrants, as is now the case in certain instances. This amount cannot be regarded as precise because there would be certain administrative expenses which cannot be determined until budgets can be prepared, nor would it be advisable to tie the U.S. contribution exclusively to the use indicated above.

The proposal to make the ILO the instrument of international cooperation for emigration appears to be most promising. It is unnecessary and undesirable to create an additional organization when there is already one at hand, anxious to undertake the task and including in its active membership all of those countries which have a direct interest in this matter. At the present time, the ILO is not organized to do the job, but it should be possible to so organize it. Since the formulation of their proposal is reaching its final stages, it is suggested that we cooperate with them in development of a plan which would result in an effective organization.

A generous reception of these people into the U.S. has a most important bearing on the whole matter of dealing with the surplus populations of Western Europe. In the first place, the mere contribution to the numbers involved is of consequence. Only about 50,000 permanent immigrants (quota and non-quota) from the areas of surplus, may enter the U.S. annually under the basic immigration laws. It is estimated that 200,000 per year would more nearly represent an adequate intake into the U.S.; during the existing defense emergency it would not only be of help in relieving the European problem, but would also be readily manageable in this country. Secondly, the psychological effect on the peoples of Europe of an increased opportunity for emigration to the U.S. is of incalculable benefit to our purposes in these countries. Thirdly, any effort we might make to encourage other countries to more liberal reception would be seriously compromised if we limit our reception to the numbers provided for by the present quotas. The most influential step the U.S. could take in this matter would be to continue the kind of policy evidenced by the Displaced Persons Act. In considering the possibility of increased admissions to the U.S., particular attention should be paid to those countries where the pressure of surplus population is most acute.

While the need for emigration from Western Europe is fully appreciated, it must be recognized that the real determining factor in the magnitude of possible emigration is the ability of countries of immigration to receive people and provide opportunities for their livelihood. Limited capacity in this respect has led to very selective reception of immigrants as distinguished from mass reception. The basis of this selection varies from country to country, but the general practice is that only those numbers will be received which can be economically and socially assimilated with reasonable certainty. Thus economic expansion, with its consequent creation of employment and settlement opportunities, has a direct bearing on the rate of immigration. Such development requires great capital investment often involving foreign exchange available only by borrowing. The countries of emigration have little or no capital to be put at the disposal of the countries of immigration. While on many occasions the IBRD has indicated its interest in helping finance projects for economic development which would provide opportunities for increased immigration, few projects have been submitted.

It is recognized that the interests of the U.S. would be served by promotion of economic development and expansion in those areas of the world which are susceptible to substantial further development. A vigorous promotion of this policy would have very great collateral effects on the possibility of some of these countries receiving additional immigrants. There are certain countries which recognize this at the present time and are taking steps to increase their manpower. Conspicuous among these are Australia and Canada. Australia, for example, has recognized its need for a larger population, has made arrangements for loans from the IBRD to allow it to expand its economy at a faster rate than that permitted by its own resources, and along with this expansion has adopted an immigration program aimed at absorbing 200,000 per year for the next 10 years. In South America, there exist very substantial opportunities to use immigration as a means to promote economic expansion, not to make up for lack of hands, but to introduce certain skills to great advantage. Generally speaking, the South American Governments are not currently taking advantage of this opportunity. There is increasing evidence that some of these governments are beginning to realize the advantages to their economies that would accrue from a more liberal intake of immigrants. Such help as we can extend to them, as, for instance, through the Joint Commissions, would contribute to the increase in opportunities for immigration.

The report of the Advisory Committee on International Development⁷ deals at length with the problem of economic development in under-developed countries. Some of the recommendations of this report, if put into effect, could have a profound influence on increasing the opportunities for emigration from Western Europe.

1. In a brief covering memorandum of June 28, William J. McWilliams, Deputy Director of the Executive Secretariat, noted that this memorandum was scheduled for consideration and debate at the Under Secretary’s meeting of July 6. Subsequently, this memorandum, the McWilliams memorandum, and an abstract of the paper were circulated in GPA and GER. (Memorandum of July 5, 840.411/7–551)
2. Reference is to the report entitled “Partners in Progress” prepared by the International Development Advisory Board, Nelson Rockefeller, Chairman, in response to a letter from President Truman of November 24, 1950. Further documentation on the report is in Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Harry S. Truman, 1951 (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1965), pp. 180–181.
3. Reference is to the Declaration on Migration, MIN/TRI/P/25, approved by the Foreign Ministers of the United States, the United Kingdom, and France at their fifth meeting, May 13, 1950. (CFM files, lot M–88, box 150, MIN/TRI/P)
4. For documentation on the meetings of the Foreign Ministers of the United States, the United Kingdom, and France, at New York, September 12–19, 1950, see Foreign Relations, 1950, vol. iii, pp. 1108 ff.
5. See the memorandum by Hickerson, Document 79.
6. Displaced Persons Act of 1948, as amended (Public Law 81–555).
7. See footnote 2 above.