741.5–MSP/12–2951: Telegram
The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Gifford) to the Secretary of State
2909. Eyes only Acheson and Harriman. Ref your 3098 and 3099.1 After Bissell–Batt telecon yesterday2 Batt had arranged early meeting today with Chancellor to discuss details of expected message. Your 3098 not having been received, he was only able to inform Chancellor of broad outlines of proposed program, two important elements of which, however, were clear: That our statement re aid should coincide with release annual British figures on gold and dollar reserves; further, that such public statement could not be made before January 4 or 5. Chancellor left to attend Cabinet meeting, saying that he would have to inform Prime Minister of delay in release as above indicated.
Later this morning your 3098 and 3099 received, but before 3098 was completely decoded, message was received saying that Prime Minister desired immediately to speak to me and would interrupt Cabinet meeting for that purpose. Upon my arrival with Batt, Prime Minister, Eden, and Butler met us, with Prime Minister at outset taking strong position of disagreement latest Washington proposals. Summing up an hour’s conversation in which I presented substance of 3098, these are his views, most of them expressed with greatest urgency:
- 1.
- If the statement re aid cannot be issued Monday 31 latest, it should await some substantially later period.
- 2.
- He will not agree that our aid statement and their balance of payments position should be released at the same time, or specifically tied together.
- 3.
- He does not want the balance of payments statement issued earlier than its normal date, the 8th or 9th, and certainly under no condition to be thrown in his face as he docks.
- 4.
- Since he does not intend to be put in position of arriving as “penniless beggar”, he is insistent that no statement of ours should contribute to that impression with American public.
- 5.
- Since it was our judgement that statement could hardly be made on Monday in light of existing circumstances, only conclusion was that nothing should be said on the economic aid question until well after Prime Minister’s return, after Commonwealth meeting and probably after reconvening of Parliament. At that time in normal course of events, a broader and more complete outline of [Page 999] Britain’s circumstances, financial and otherwise, as well as steps presently taken and further proposed would in all probability have been made here.
Prime Minister’s position with regard to aid most positively stated. British are determined to make their maximum contribution in the light of the joint NATO effort. Any financial aid as well as direct military end-item aid which should properly come to them from the United States to the end that they are able to make greatest possible defense effort would be most welcome and important. Repeated references to partnership relation as result of which they will look to us for proper sharing of steel and other materials which they do not have for this larger effort, and for which they expect to pay.
At request of Prime Minister I have telephoned message from him to Harriman (text of which next following message3). Harriman stated definitely that it would be impossible to make announcement on December 31 and in the light of Churchill’s attitude agreed with me that it would be preferable to announce aid allocation late January. I have just conveyed Harriman’s reply to Churchill by telephone, and after some discussion we have agreed that matter should be deferred as above indicated.
- Telegram 3099 is not printed, but see footnote 7 to telegram 3098, supra.↩
- No record of this telecon has been found in Department of State files.↩
- Telegram 2910, December 29, not printed. (741.13/12–2951) In it Churchill made the same points to Harriman that he made to Gifford and Batt as reported in this telegram.↩