850.33/2–1951: Telegram
The United States High Commissioner for Germany ( McCloy) to the Secretary of State 1
6850. Personal eyes only from McCloy to Secretary and Byroade. On Saturday afternoon I conferred for three hours with the Chancellor, Minister Erhard and Dr. Pferdmenges about Schuman Plan and implementation of law 27.
I explained to Chancellor how far our compromise proposals had come with respect to UNI companies, coal-steel integration and transition period for dissolution of DKV. I pointed out that deep desire to bring about Schuman Plan on part of French and ourselves had led us to propose, and enabled us to induce French to accept, compromises going far beyond what would otherwise be conceivable. I told him that in my opinion these compromise proposals went to limit of possible acceptance by High Commission in view of known attitudes of British and French, even assuming Schuman Plan adoption. I said that our efforts had been to work out compromises which might bridge existing Allied-German gap; that French had gone very far to meet German views; and that uncompromising attitude of Ruhr industrialists seemed to be final obstacle [Page 92] to approval of compromises already agreed to by Minister Erhard as reasonable.
In discussion Chancellor confined himself almost entirely to question of coal-steel integration. Judging by my own knowledge of position of Ruhr industrialists, I was convinced his arguments and reasons had been supplied by them. Chancellor asserted that industrialists told him that any allocation of mines less than they had requested would cause economic and social chaos but did not explain why this was so. Behind all reasons and objections advanced lies, I am convinced, the determination of steel interests to obtain ownership of at least their full capacity requirement of coal. I explained to him that this might well again give Ruhr steel companies power to expand their capacity and production when coal was in short supply and was limiting factor for rest of European steel industry. I stated that French felt this was inconsistent with basic premise of Schuman Plan and that I agreed with their view.
Chancellor said that politically his position vis-à-vis industrial groups had been weakened by acceptance of mitbestimmungsrecht2 and that he feared he might not be able to obtain Bundestag majority for Schuman Plan against SPD and industrialist and trade unions opposition. I pointed out to him that if Schuman Plan failed on account of Ruhr steel efforts to obtain artificially dominant position, Germany would suffer serious set-back in Europe and US.
As result of discussion, Chancellor said he would again examine the question with industrialists and let me know outcome in few days.3
According to my analysis, situation has now been reduced to clear and simple terms. It is not question of one or two concessions here and there regarding size of units or otherwise. Question now is very basic one of whether Ruhr steel plants shall own enough coking coal to supply their full needs in periods of capacity operation. With the amounts we are prepared to approve, they will have sufficient coal for periods of normal activity and enough to attain the alleged benefits of coal-steel integration. Thus their insistence on their full demands supports French and our own fear that purpose is to attain artificially preferred position for German [Page 93] steel which will enable its growth at expense of normal growth of competing European industry.
I want to be sure that Department fully realizes that this basic issue is involved and is on guard against statements by interested groups either here or by representatives in US that difficulty arises from extreme deconcentration policy, or against other attempts to obscure the basic issue in other ways. I request full support of Department in our efforts here to work out constructive solution which will start Schuman Plan on basis fair to all participating countries. Next period will be extremely critical one and any sign of weakness or uncertainty will certainly make sound ultimate solution more improbable.
- Repeated to Paris eyes only for Bruce.↩
- Codetermination legislation demanded by the Social Democratic Party (SPD) giving organized labor a voice in West German industrial policy.↩
- Chancellor Adenauer wrote McCloy on February 20 that he had reflected “a long time” on their conversation of February 17 and had concluded that the signing and implementation of the Schuman Plan would achieve the objectives sought for in Law 27, including the prevention of the development of a future German war potential. Adenauer promised to “very carefully review the whole situation” further and concluded with the observation that further discussion of the “controversial points” at issue would be necessary. (Translation of letter from Adenauer to McCloy, February 20, Bonn Mission files, lot 311, D(51)225/A)↩