Subject: U.K. Relations
Attached is a memorandum outlining very briefly various points of
difference with the U.K. existing today. I call your attention
especially to the first part of the memorandum listing certain
general considerations which enter into specific problems time and
again and which if taken into account more fully in our day to day
relations would minimize many points of friction and eliminate
others.
[Attachment]
Paper Prepared in the Department of
State2
secret
[Washington,] April 25,
1951.
Important Points of Difference on Policy
Between the United Kingdom and the United States
Fundamentally Anglo-American relations are strong and constant,
but at the present time there are certain outstanding
divergencies between the two countries which create temporary
friction.
The British are aware that the U.S. has since World War II taken
over many of the global responsibilities formerly in the hands
of the British and are glad the U.S. has assumed the leadership
of the free world. The U.K. is fully conscious of the necessity
of partnership with the U.S. and consequently supports the U.S.
position on large issues (with the notable exception of Far
Eastern
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policy) but
below the surface lies a sensitive reaction to the new U.S.
world-wide position.
Although willing to support us on most large issues even when she
has doubts as to the correctness of our positions, Great Britain
feels that on questions when her interests are directly involved
the U.S. should support her. Underlying our differences are
British apprehensions over what the United States might do
unilaterally. They are not convinced that even with the best of
intentions, we will acquire the skill and strength fast enough
to pilot the free world safely through the dangers that beset
it. This lack of conviction stems in part from their belief that
we tend to blow hot and cold, that we sometimes proceed from
anger, that the State Department, because of public and
congressional lack of confidence may be unable to carry out
essential policies. If British overall confidence in the ability
of U.S. leadership to pull them and the rest of the free world
out of its difficulties was complete, the differences between us
over specific issues would be much less. It is partly because of
this doubt about U.S. leadership that they are unwilling to
yield to us in certain areas such as the Far East and why they
often go along with us only part way. When our overall
leadership seems to the British to be good, the specific
differences become less in number and intensity; when the
reverse is true, and when our prestige abroad is low, our
differences increase in number and sharpness. We are in a period
now when the British confidence in the infallibility of our
leadership is low. Until this is reversed we can expect
continuing and sharp differences.
The outstanding questions between the U.S. and the U.K. are
listed below:
i. general problems relating to assistance
to the british defense effort
- A.
-
Raw Materials Allocation: The
U.K. has stressed for some time its reliance on ready
access to raw materials. It is correct to say that this
factor rather than finance is the possible limitation on
the present British defense effort. In order of
magnitude, the critical raw materials from U.S. sources
are sulphur, zinc, cotton and copper. From world sources
wool would be added to this list, allocations thus far
have been disappointing to the British. Their estimates
of requirements for their program are in excess of our
estimates of their reasonable share of world
availabilities.
The Department should make a vigorous effort to educate
the other Government Departments on this question to the
end of meeting U.K. requirements as this is vital to the
success of the present U.K. defense effort, not to
mention any increase which may be needed to meet
deficiencies.
- B.
-
Machine Tools: Machine tools
constitute a similar problem but this seems to be better in
hand than the question of raw materials. The British are
pleased by our recent decision to complete our 1951 AMP commitment by financing
machine tools. Some of the good effect of this, however, was
dissipated by ECA raising
the counterpart fund issue which seems to inject
unnecessarily an irritant into the situation.
- C.
-
U.S. Assistance to British Defense
Program: The U.K. has accepted without serious
protest our decision not to request direct economic
assistance for the U.K. in fiscal’52. However, they have
asked and we have agreed to retain as great a degree of
flexibility as possible in our presentation to Congress to
provide for contingencies.
While the British will receive end-item assistance, our present
thinking is in an amount far below their estimates. This has not
yet been talked out and may be a source of potential
disappointment.
The U.K. is especially concerned over our criterion that economic
assistance should not result in increased gold or dollar
reserves. They are apprehensive that if this is frozen into
policy or legislation it would (a) prejudge the burden-sharing
exercise on which they have placed great hopes and a commitment
from us for a fair hearing and (b) that this criterion just does
not fit the U.K. where complete external balance of accounts,
not merely dollar and gold, is the important factor.
The decision of no direct aid while a logical one has a serious
potential for generating ill-will. This will be especially true
if inadequate supplies of raw materials bring about serious
dislocations in the U.K. economy.
ii. far eastern questions
The British have been fearful that General MacArthur would by some
unilateral or some impetuous local action involve the U.S. in a
major Far Eastern war with Communist China with commitment of
maximum U.S. forces and considerable U.K. and Commonwealth
forces in the Far East. If the elimination of General MacArthur from the Far Eastern
picture is followed by a resolution of the pending debate in
favor of the Administration, the greatest irritant to US–UK
relations with respect to the Far East will have been
removed.
- A.
-
Recognition of Communist China: The
British believe they are right in principle on this matter
and it is likely that only events and not conversation will
eventually resolve the issue. The British public apparently
supports the government’s position.
- B.
-
The Question of Chinese Communist
Representation in the UN: The British have tried to obtain a
seat for the Peking Government in the UN on the grounds that the Peking Government is
the de facto ruler of Continental
China and should be allowed to speak for the Chinese people.
Again, the British feel they are right as a matter of
principle and this probably also can only be settled by
events.
- C.
-
Additional Measures Committee: There
are two fundamental differences on this question (a) timing,
(b) whether sanctions would aid or hinder the reaching of a
peaceful settlement. An agreement should be possible on
economic sanctions as our proposal does not go further than
COCOM action already
undertaken in secret by the British.
- D.
-
Hong Kong: The British have been
cooperating well in restricting shipments of strategic items
but are unwilling to make this fact known. If they could be
persuaded to do so it would remove a very important source
of criticism of them in this country.
- E.
-
Formosa: The present status of
Formosa is not a point of current friction between the U.S.
and the U.K. as Attlee agreed in November that now is not
the time to turn Formosa over to the CPR. If and when a definite settlement comes
up, there is a possibility of serious disagreement
- F.
-
Japanese Peace Treaty: The British
have shown sincere evidence of a desire to cooperate. The
major issue between us is whether the Communists should or
should not be brought into the peace settlement. There have
been indications from London that the U.K. would welcome
compromise suggestions from us on this.
- G.
-
Korea: The difference on economic
sanctions has been mentioned. The British are adamantly
opposed to political sanctions. They believe every effort
should be concentrated on the finding of a negotiated
settlement and it is probable that the British would be
willing to pay a greater price for such a settlement than we
have felt would be justified.
iii. europe
- A.
-
Spain: The U.K. Government rather
bitterly resents our going forward with conversations in
Madrid without fuller consultation with them.
- B.
-
German Rearmament: This has not yet
become a point of difference but there are indications that
the Government and segments of the Labor Party and the
public have had second thoughts on the question. It may well
become troublesome if and when a Ministerial meeting with
the Soviets takes place.
- C.
-
Command Appointments: The
Admiral Fechteler incident became a
point of political issue in the U.K. It is very important
therefore that U.K. sensibilities be taken fully into
account in future command decisions and that the current
proposal of the JCS be
handled with the utmost caution and discretion.
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iv. middle east
- A.
-
Iran: The nationalization of oil by
the Iranian Majlis has created great difficulties for the
British Government and the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company. The
U.S. Government for some months strongly advised the U.K. to
insist that the Company make a satisfactory arrangement with
the Iranians, but this was not done with the result that the
Iranian Parliament voted to nationalize oil. Ambassador
Franks,
supported by Foreign Office officials, informed the
Department of the proposals that the Company intended to put
forward to the Iranian Government. In our discussions, it
was clear that our assessment of the seriousness of the
situation differs. Although this plan was not considered
satisfactory by State Department officials as we felt it did
not go far enough to permit Iranian officials to implement
it under the label of nationalization, it contained some
good points. Hence, while we said we could not actively
support this plan and asked them to consider doing more, we
indicated we would assume a benevolent attitude. This
disappointed Sir Oliver and it is
obvious the British expect more support. We feel it is
vitally important for the British to offer more in their own
interest. Nevertheless, a point will be reached when she
feels she has reached her limit. At that point, within
limits, we feel the U.S. should be prepared to render strong
support as this is a case involving direct U.K. interests.
This has not been cleared by NEA and probably would not be approved by
NEA in this form.
- B.
-
India: The fact that India has
remained within the Commonwealth, despite the very loose
ties that bind it, is a source of strength to the U.K.
Consequently, Whitehall makes every effort to continue and
to strengthen this relationship, and it implements this
effort by placating Mr. Nehru, or
supporting him when possible, on many of his attitudes which
are considered by the U.S. as damaging to the position of
the free world. This fact should be kept in mind in
assessing U.K. Far Eastern policy.
v. negotiating with soviet union
We have had difficulties with the British in the Deputies meeting
in Paris where the British line has been softer than ours.3 This has been partially due to the personality of
Mr. Davies but fundamentally to the strong
feeling on the part of the British Government that public
opinion would not countenance a break-up of the Paris meeting
for which the West was responsible. U.K. public opinion strongly
feels that every avenue of possible negotiation
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with the Soviets must be tried.
This is due in part to a realization on the part of the public
of the exposed position of the British Isles to atomic bombing.
There is no concrete evidence, however, that the British would
be “soft” in a Ministerial meeting itself although there are
intimations that they might be more inclined than we to make
some kind of a deal involving Germany’s demilitarization.
