Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, Europe: Political and Economic Developments, Volume IV, Part 1

No. 429

611.41/3–1451: Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Gifford) to the Secretary of State ¹

secret

London, March 14, 1951—7 p.m.

4928. 1. Purpose this telegram is to bring up to date analysis British attitudes toward US outlined Embtel 4022, January 20.²

2. In general critical attitudes described in reftel remain and a pronounced shift of opinion in our favor has not yet set in. Widespread concern over international situation illustrated by fact that during recent 4 week period Labor party headquarters received 86 resolutions on foreign policy from local Labor parties whereas normally only about 12 are received each month. Volume resolutions being submitted continues at about this rate. However, unfavorable attitudes seem less intense though paradoxically more widespread. Latter explicable in terms of time lag between man in the street opinion on the one hand and “informed” and governmental opinion on the other.

3. Fact that intensity of criticism US has fallen off somewhat is due mainly to certain external developments. These include:

(a) Of greatest importance has been favorable change military situation Korea accompanied by lessening apprehension re nature US objectives in FE. Latter development has sprung in part from belief greater restraint being shown by MacArthur and Washington with respect to such questions as sanctions against China, Formosa, and the 38th Parallel and in part from confidence General Ridgway has inspired here. Fear that US action in FE might precipitate general war has accordingly decreased. Lessening public interest illustrated by recent marked falling-off in “peace with China council” meetings.

(b) General Eisenhower’s statement on German rearmament³ reduced temperatures among serious critics in Labor party on this issue, who had impression that US had been using steamroller to flatten out opposition to its point of view. This reaction was given further impetus by Attlee’s statement to effect various conditions (Embtel 4412 February 13⁴) must be fulfilled before Germans allowed to make contribution to Western defense.

(d) Straight-forward character of last Western note to Soviets reproposed 4-power meeting⁵ and agreement between US, UK, and France over tactics to be employed have helped remove doubts re US willingness to talk with Russians. Press reports from current Paris meeting have tended to confirm this opinion.⁶

(d) Finally, more and more British believe “great debate” in America is fizzing out and trend of debate seems to disprove contention that Taft–Hoover are the voice of America.

4. Salutary effect these developments has been partially offset by some adverse factors.

(a) Choice of American as Supreme Commander Atlantic touched British pride at one of its most sensitive spots, the Royal Navy, and set off a violent all-party flare-up. Criticism first aimed at Attlee for failing look after British interests but is now turning into irritation and to some extent resentment at US, giving substance those arguing US dominating NATO and West’s defense effort. This feeling still continues.

(b) Primary blame for raw material shortages has been placed on US and this has had an adverse effect especially in governmental and business communities in view of growing and critical impact of shortages on production. For example, after describing serious effects sulphur shortage, Harold Wilson, President BOT, told House of Commons that shortage British requirements was only 3 percent of total US consumption, and that US was holding substantial stockpile. Belief is generally held that US anxious obtain international allocation raw materials outside its control but will unilaterally allocate those materials it controls and in doing so will see that US needs are fully met first.

(c) Of more general nature is suspicion in some British quarters that, while isolationism in US may now be dead duck, the American policy of containment will not remain defensive. Some British fear US will not be willing sustain rearmament burden indefinitely and that, once our arms stockpile built up, there will be strong pressure use this new strength to attempt to dictate a “settlement” with Soviets on our terms which would bring a violent reaction from them. There is also fear by some that armament races “in the nature of things” always lead to war. This fear reflected in warm reception given Bevin’s speech during defense debate in which he emphasized purpose British rearmament was to maintain the peace and through renewed strength to obtain peaceful relaxation of world tensions.

5. Domestic political situation has had at least peripheral effect on development attitudes toward US. Greater differences on foreign policy have become evident between rank-and-file Conservatives and Labor opinion since despatch reftel even though their broad objectives remain fundamentally the same. On China-Korea, for example, Conservatives have tended to voice views somewhat at variance with those of Labor, specifically re seating Chinese in UN, although Conservative views not identical with US position. On Spain, as another example, many Conservatives have indicated they would favor Spanish association in defense arrangements in some form or another. Rank and file Labor opinion would, of course, fiercely resist any such move. This gap between Conservatives and Labor opinion arises in part from conviction but has been widened by domestic political warfare. Conservatives are taking advantage of all opportunities which might win them votes or embarrass government and they are making limited use of foreign policy questions for this purpose. This has thrown Labor on the defensive. Even a few members of government occasionally succumb to temptation of taking a fleeting sideswipe at the US, such as the assertion by Bevan that British rearmament would not be accompanied by kind of hysteria prevalent “elsewhere”. If an election were held in the near future, this gap would widen even more with many Labor candidates, in an election in which Labor was fighting to retain power, attempting to capitalize on distrust of certain American policies and the desire for an “independent” British policy.

6. Government has been concerned about effect on aboutnglo-American relations of adverse public attitudes toward US and has sought to dispel misconceptions. For example, during recent foreign affairs debate PriMin underscored importance US-UK unity. He has been careful to assume full British share of responsibility for appointment North Atlantic Commander and has not produced any American scapegoat by hint or innuendo. Speeches within past 2 weeks by Morrison and Shinwell have highlighted identity US–UK interests and have bluntly refuted charges that Americans were browbeating British.

7. In spite of external developments described paragraph 3 and efforts on part of government, we believe situation here as regards British public attitudes toward US remains tindery. There are certain issues—some dormant at the moment—which can quickly arouse opinion. These include: (a) Formosa, sanctions against China, and question of crossing the 38th Parallel; (b) Our position on 4-power talks and relation of latter to German rearmament; (c) Further command appoints under NATO; and (d) Spain.

8. Attitudes here in these problem areas will of course be determined mainly by substantive policies of US on one hand and British Government on other. But they will also be substantially influenced by means we adopt to arrive at policy coordination with British. British naturally expect differences with US. But they do not understand, and will resent, unilateral moves by US on problems in which they have an interest equal to our own—such as Spain—especially if we do not first make every effort to reach a common policy. British sensitiveness on these points will be increased because feeling between the 2 parties has reached a new high. In present pre-election atmosphere, neither Conservatives nor Labor will “dispassionately and objectively” examine such a problem as North Atlantic Command appointment. On the contrary, frayed tempers will produce even caricatured reactions on some foreign policy problems.

9. British attitudes on basic international issues are of course identical with our own. They will stay that way. But the pressures on the government caused by the above opinions and situation have been sufficiently strong to bring a reaction from the government in terms of the emphasis and shadings of various policies. PriMin’s statement on German rearmament is an example. Furthermore, adverse attitudes toward US and fact that principal appointments to date of top positions in NATO have gone to Americans, have diverted public attention from multilateral concept of NATO which if continued might lessen enthusiasm for the West’s defense program.

10. We can have a peripheral influence on British opinion through information media. In the final analysis, however, significant shifts in British opinion will only be brought about as the result of action on the government level.

Gifford

1. Repeated to Paris, Frankfurt, Brussels, Rome, and The Hague.
2. Document 420.
3. For text of General Eisenhower’s report to Congress on February 1, see Department of State Bulletin, February 12, 1951, pp. 245–251; for further documentation on his tour of the NATO capitals and Germany during January 1951, see vol. iii, Part 1, pp. 392 ff.
4. Not printed; for Prime Minister Attlee’s speech in the House of Commons on February 12 on foreign affairs, see 484 H.C. Deb., 5s, pp. 58 ff.
5. For text of the tripartite note of February 19, see vol. iii, Part 1, p. 1083.
6. For documentation on the Four-Power Exploratory Talks at Paris, March–June 1951, see ibid., pp. 1086 ff.