Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, Europe: Political and Economic Developments, Volume IV, Part 1

No. 417

611.41/1–351

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State¹

top secret

[Washington,] January 3, 1951.

Subject: Military Talks Between the US and the UK

Participants:	Sir Oliver Franks, British Ambassador
	Mr. Dean Acheson, Secretary of State
	Mr. George W. Perkins, Assistant Secretary of State

Sir Oliver stated that he wished to take up the question of the matter of military talks between the US and the UK which had been discussed in the meetings between Prime Minister Attlee and President Truman.² He said that he had information from London which indicated they were interested in this problem for two reasons.

First, they felt that the talks which had been held previously with Ambassador Jessup and Sir Oliver present had been useful and they wanted, if possible, to put these talks on a more or less regular basis.

Secondly, they were concerned to know about our war plans in connection with the use of the airfields in England which had been made available to the US forces.³

He asked whether it would be possible for me to take the matter up with General Marshall. I assured Sir Oliver that I would be glad to do this.

Footnote by Mr. Perkins

After the meeting on raw materials Sir Oliver came up to my room and talked a little bit further about the matter of the military talks. He told me that the UK felt more or less formal meetings, with political representatives present, were extremely useful and very desirable and that they felt that the previous meetings had been very beneficial. He indicated that he did not feel that it was necessary that a fixed schedule of meetings should be established, but that it should be the right of either side to call a meeting at reasonable intervals of time. He also indicated that in all probability they were harking back, in part at least, to the old days of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, and, even though they recognized that no such set-up could now be made because of NATO, they did feel that because of their determination to increase their contribution to defense they were perhaps entitled to, and certainly would be greatly helped by, having such periodic meetings.

However, his real reason for bringing up the matter at this time was the second point on which apparently the British Government feels at a complete loss for information and does not believe that they should be in this position in case of an emergency.⁴

1. Drafted by Perkins.
2. For documentation on the meetings between President Truman and Prime Minister Attlee at Washington, December 4–8, 1950, see Foreign Relations, 1950, vol. iii, pp. 1698 ff.
3. For further documentation on the use of airfields in the United Kingdom by U.S. forces, see vol. i, pp. 802 ff.
4. On January 4 Secretary Acheson discussed British liaison with the Joint Chiefs of Staff again with Ambassador Franks, stating that Secretary of Defense Marshall was disturbed that the French had heard something about Anglo-American military talks and because of this “did not at present wish to go into the matter of setting up any machinery for talks.” The Secretary of State indicated that the subject might be reopened. (Memorandum of conversation, January 4, 611.41/1–451)