752.00/9–551: Despatch
The Chargé in Spain ( Jones ) to the Department of State
No. 229
Subject: Opposition: Spanish Pretender’s Letter of July 10 to General Franco
On July 10, 1951, Don Juan, the Spanish Pretender, addressed a long letter to General Franco in which he criticized the performance of the Franco regime and urged the restoration of the monarchy. This letter was mentioned and commented upon in the Embassy’s Despatch 155 of August 11, 1951 and its text … was transmitted to the Department as an enclosure to Despatch 204 of August 27, 1951.1 The purpose of this despatch is to set forth the circumstances under which the letter was written and to attempt to evaluate more fully its significance and possible consequences.
Background of the Letter
The Pretender’s letter did not come as a surprise. It arose out of a series of circumstances which go back at least as far as January 1951. At that time, emissaries were traveling back and forth between Don Juan and Franco in an effort to achieve an understanding between the two. Franco reportedly proposed that the Pretender publicly renounce his leftist support, declare himself an adherent of the movimiento and subsequent political developments in Spain, and lend his name to the appointment of three monarchists (undoubtedly pro-Franco) to the Cabinet. In return, Franco presumably assured Don Juan that he would be named the Caudillo’s successor. Don Juan would not agree to this, and the interchange apparently broke off when the series of strikes began in Barcelona in March. The Pretender’s advisers urged him not to continue the discussions with Franco while the internal economic situation, and the public manifestations based upon it, seemed to be leading the regime to disaster. It was the hope of the organized opposition within Spain (the C.I.C.—Comite Interior de Coordinatión) that when Don Juan spoke, it would be to condemn the Franco regime and to call for the restoration of the monarchy (see Despatch 1279, April 27).2 Representing as he did the Bourbon dynasty, which traditionally considered the Crown to be above and apart from domestic politics, the Pretender felt he could not take any such action [Page 863] during the period of the strikes without being accused of involvement in internal intrigues. Hence, he abstained from writing to Franco before or immediately after May 22, the date of the last public manifestation against the regime (Embassy Despatch 1440, May 31, 1951).3 The eventual issuance of the letter on July 10 was due principally to pressures brought by the C.I.C, working in conjunction with Don Juan’s advisers in Estoril.
What also may have prompted Don Juan to address Franco personally were the rumors in June of his possible abdication in favor of his eldest son Juan Carlos. The rumors were to the effect that Don Juan would abdicate on or about July 18 and Franco would proclaim Juan Carlos as his successor; the boy (now 13) would mount the throne on his 30th birthday, viz. upon reaching eligible age under the Law of Succession. Franco meanwhile would act as regent. These reports probably originated in the Pardo (Franco’s residence), for they certainly did not come from Don Juan. In one of his Cabinet meetings during this period, Franco is said to have brought up the question of his succession, declaring that Don Juan was unacceptable because of his leftist contacts and that on July 18 he would designate Juan Carlos as his eventual successor. The Generalissimo may have been preoccupied by the necessity of an operation in the not too distant future, or he may have been trying to split his monarchist opposition, or he may have wished merely to impress the United States with his good intentions; perhaps all three thoughts were in his mind. A leading monarchist in Madrid has stated that Franco did not follow through with his plan on July 18 because he concluded it was too strong a measure to take against Don Juan at this time, deciding instead on a change in Cabinet more superficial than real. When the Pretender got wind of the rumors about his abdication, he immediately despatched his private secretary, Ramon Padilla, to see the Chief of Franco’s Civil Household, the Marques de Santillan, and to inform him that he, Don Juan, never having had a difference of opinion with the Spanish people, saw no reason to abdicate and had no intention of doing so.
These rumors, combined with the other considerations mentioned above, may have persuaded Don Juan to clarify his position in a letter to Franco, timed so as to coincide more or less with the celebration on July 18 of the anniversary of the Nationalist Revolution.
[Page 864]Timing of the Letter
Except for the idea, which was a clever one, of making the letter a sort of “regalito” (little gift) to Franco just as he was about to celebrate the glorious accomplishment of his regime, the timing of the letter was, in general, very bad. In the first place, through the rumors on Don Juan’s abdication, the regime had succeeded in causing a greater split among the monarchists, between those adhering to Don Juan and those (the more conservative) who prefer to skip over Don Juan because of his alleged “liberalism”. Secondly, by July 10 the turn which American policy had taken toward Spain had already begun to re-enforce the regime and was in a few days to re-enforce it immeasurably more through the arrival of the Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee (on July 12) and the arrival of Admiral Sherman (on July 16). These events were played up in the Spanish press and radio for all they were worth. Franco could afford, at least for the time being, to stuff Don Juan’s letter into his pocket and ignore what the Pretender had to say. And this, evidently, is exactly what he did.
If Don Juan’s letter had been sent after July 10, the timing would have been still worse, for the international situation and particularly the course of United States-Spanish relations were running in the regime’s favor. The fact is that, for maximum effectiveness from the opposition’s point of view, the letter came too late. It would have had greater impact in June—that is, after the last public manifestation of May 22 and well in advance of the visit of the American Senators. The opposition was either too slow in drafting the letter, or miscalculated the speed with which the United States would implement its policy of economic and military aid to the Spanish Government.
Significance
Because it came too late, Don Juan’s letter to Franco lacked the effectiveness which it might have had at an earlier date. Nevertheless, it is an important document, if for no other reason than that it indicates the Pretender has bestirred himself. It is important because of the manner in which it was presented, the language and reasoning employed, and the implied warning of what might occur if the letter is ignored.
The letter was despatched by Don Juan from Estoril, Portugal on July 10 and was received by Franco on July 12. Very few copies were made of the text, and publicity was avoided. Even its existence was a well-kept secret between July 10 and about August 4 when it was shown to the New York Times correspondent Sam Pope Brewer, then in Portugal. At no time were copies of the text sent to foreign chanceries or inside Spain—not even to Don Juan’s [Page 865] spokesmen in Madrid. On the surface, it was a personal communication of an outstanding Spanish citizen to the Chief of State on matters of mutual interest. Franco could not accuse Don Juan of a cheap propaganda gesture.
The wording of the letter is modest, polite, dignified, and reasonable. It engages in a little flattery and assumes Franco is sincere and patriotic. Franco cannot complain that it is a bitter and distorted tirade, or an ultimatum.
While not brusque, the letter is lucid and firm in tone. Don Juan makes it clear that he is not renouncing his rights to the throne and that he is not in accord with the regime’s handling of the economic crisis, administrative corruption, and Spain’s international isolation. He maintains that modifications are necessary in the form of the restoration of the monarchy and should not be postponed any longer.
Don Juan reveals himself to be a good bit smarter than he was in his manifesto of 1945. He uses arguments which are more appealing than those of six years ago. He favors outside aid (coupled with internal reforms), and advocates private enterprise. While expressing concern for the lot of the middle and laboring classes, and while calling attention to the split between large sectors of public opinion and government bodies, he does not make the mistake which he made in his manifesto of 1945, when he advocated immediate free elections and suggested the separation of Church and State. These latter made him vulnerable to the charge that he was “muy rojo” (very red). In this instance he avoids such a charge by keeping silent about the Spanish Church and free elections and by using countervailing arguments. Don Juan assures Franco of his identification with the National Movement, “to the service of which he twice volunteered”.* This is clever, for one of Franco’s talking points has been that Don Juan does not qualify under the Law of Succession because he does not adhere to the principles of the National Movement.† To dispel further the notion that he is “rojo” because of his ties with the Left, Don Juan says: “I have carefully avoided identifying the Crown with any partisan movement [Page 866] and for this reason I may solemnly declare that my hands are free from any bonds or pacts for the future.”
This statement raises the interesting question whether the Pretender is not going so far as to disown his leftist support in the C.I.C. The Secretary of the C.I.C. assured an officer of the Embassy on August 31 that this is not the case. He said that he had consulted with the clandestine trade union representatives in the C.I.C. and, only a few days previously (August 26), with Saenz Rodriguez, Don Juan’s adviser in Estoril, and their interpretation was quite the opposite. They considered these remarks of Don Juan as strictly political, designed to disarm Franco, and did not think they affected in any way the understanding between the Pretender and the C.I.C. They reasoned that Don Juan, as he himself indicates in his letter, has preserved the traditional concept of the Crown as an entity above and apart from domestic politics and intrigues. They pointed out that even in his letter Don Juan said that he was aware of monarchist activity within Spain and gave implied approval to the activities of the C.I.C. Even if the opposition within Spain were uncertain of Don Juan’s meaning, Saenz Rodriguez should know, since he was probably one of the principal drafters of the letter. Saenz Rodriguez is believed to be the author of another document … which further indicates that the Estoril monarchists and Don Juan continue to be identified with the program of the C.I.C. An English translation of this document is enclosed.
Perhaps the most significant aspect of the letter is Don Juan’s implied warning of what might happen if Franco ignores the contents of the letter and takes no positive step soon toward the evolution of his regime. He speaks of “agitation which has broken out in all sections of Spanish life, including the armed services”, and says in his last substantive paragraph: “If History, some day, says that Spain reached one of its greatest crises because an agreement between your Excellency and myself was not reached, or not even seriously attempted, I will have to declare that I gave warning of the danger while there was still time, and that I offered myself to the task wholeheartedly.” What the Pretender seems to be concerned about is what he is convinced is an atmosphere of growing tension, desperation, and resentment against the regime which will make a moderate change-over more and more difficult; this changeover may not be immediate, but it must come someday, and in Don Juan’s opinion Franco should take the necessary steps now so as to minimize the possibility of future violence.
Possible Consequences
Franco will probably continue to do what he has apparently done to date—keep the letter tucked in his pocket, inform no one of its [Page 867] contents, and take no action regarding it. He may figure that, fortified with American economic and military aid, he need make no concessions to his political opposition. On the other hand, he may realize that Don Juan’s letter is not the sort of communication he can completely ignore, that the recent Cabinet change was not a sufficient change in orientation, and that some further step toward an understanding with the Pretender would be advisable.
A lot of people, Spaniards and foreign observers alike, thought that Don Juan lacked the initiative and fortitude to do anything. The mere fact that he sent a letter to Franco—written, moreover, in firm language—suggests that perhaps he can be induced to go further. Up until the present date, to the knowledge of the Embassy, there has been no second letter, as there has been no reply from Franco, newspaper stories to the contrary. Don Juan is on his yacht along the Italian Riviera (at Rapallo according to the latest report), but is expected back in Estoril in a week’s time. The Pretender’s immediate advisers, in conjunction with the C.I.C., then hope to persuade him to send a letter to all the generals and bishops within Spain along the lines of the first letter to Franco. These advisers anticipate that the Caudillo’s prolonged silence will operate against him. Depending upon the effect of the second letter, Don Juan, it is hoped, will thereupon make a public declaration from Estoril which will be circulated within Spain by the opposition. As can be seen, much of this strategy depends upon Don Juan, about whom there are still considerable doubts (see Despatch 1279, April 27, 1951).4 If this strategy, which is described as that of “political strangulation”, unfolds as planned, public manifestations are not likely to be perpetrated by the organized opposition within Spain except as a last resort. Progress in this respect for Don Juan and his supporters may depend a great deal on the outcome of pending negotiations between the United States and the Franco regime. If American economic and military aid does not materialize to the degree expected, there might be a psychological let-down for the regime which may cause the opposition to slough off its discouragement and enable it to utilize some of the popular discontent manifested last spring.
First Secretary of Embassy
- Neither printed↩
- Not printed↩
- Not printed↩
- Don Juan made it clear, however, that he did not agree with the Movement’s subsequent development. [Footnote in the source text.]↩
-
Article 9 of the Law of Succession says: “The Head of State shall … take the oath to the Basic Laws of the Nation and to the principles of the National Movement.”
Article 13: “The Head of State … may propose to the Cortes the exclusion from the Succession of those royal persons who lack the necessary capacity to govern or who, by their notorious swerving from the basic principles of the State, or by their acts, deserve to lose their rights to succession under this Act.” [Footnote in the source text.]
↩ - Not printed↩