No. 384

752.5/7–1251: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Spain 1

top secret

28. Eyes only Amb. Sec called in Brit and Fr Ambs separately this afternoon with regard to their recent representations on Spain. He said this had been matter which had given us all great concern and he did not wish to minimize the difficulties in any way. However, our desire to obtain military facilities from Spain has been known to Brit and Fr Govts for many months, and there can be no real difference between military authorities of our three countries over military importance of what we are seeking.

Sec went on to say that following representations made by Sir Oliver Franks and Bonnet earlier this week he, in company with Sec Marshall, General Bradley and Admiral Sherman, had reviewed problem in detail with Pres. After carefully weighing all elements latter had decided that we must proceed and to this end [Page 829] high Defense official will leave for brief visit to Madrid in few days.2

Sec referred to fact that both Fr and Brit representations had been based on political grounds. He fully agreed with soundness of many points they made but pointed out that we also had additional political problem of serious proportions. This problem would be made more acute as result of current Senatorial visit to Madrid. Our military authorities were convinced of desirability of going ahead and to draw back at this time wld merely result in deflecting political criticism to our Brit and Fr allies. In such a situation results on our Foreign Aid program cld well be imagined.

Sec indicated that we want visit to pass off as quietly as possible and that since this is in interest of all of us we shld all try to play it down. There will be no fanfare and publicity as far as we are concerned, although we recognize that secrecy is impossible. Furthermore, we will confine initial discussions to exploratory talks concerning rights to stage aircraft through Spanish fields, overfly Spain, and generally make use of Spanish air facilities, as well as to request anchorage rights for naval vessels. In other words we will, at least at outset, not go into larger questions of development and occupation of bases.

Franks limited himself to stating that he wld report our decision to his Govt. Bonnet said he wld do the same. He had already received second instruction to take matter up personally with Sec and thought his Govt wld react still again.

Embassy Public Affairs Officers shld be adequately briefed. Press rumors shld meet with no comment.

Acheson
  1. Drafted by Bonbright and repeated to London and Paris.
  2. In a memorandum to the Secretary of Defense dated July 11, Admiral Sherman urged that in forthcoming talks with Franco he be permitted to “confine initial discussions of the base program to exploratory discussion of rights to stage aircraft through Spanish fields, overfly Spain, and generally make use of Spanish air facilities, and to anchorage rights for naval vessels.” (611.52/7–1151) On July 12, the Department of State informed the Embassy in Madrid that Admiral Sherman would be leaving Washington by air on July 15 and that “In view of impact this visit in face of recent Brit and Fr representations, most important there shld be as little publicity as possible. No press release will be issued here prior his departure and he intends make no statements to press re his conversations with Span Govt while in Madrid.” (Telegram 44, 752.5/7–951)