Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, Europe: Political and Economic Developments, Volume IV, Part 1

No. 357

S/S–NSC files, lot 63D351, NSC 72

Memorandum by the Secretary of Defense (Marshall) to the Executive Secretary of the National Security Council (Lay)¹

top secret

Washington, January 29, 1951.

[NSC 72/3]

Subject: United States Policy Toward Spain

I am forwarding herewith for the information of the Members of the National Security Council the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff with respect to NSC 72/2,² subject as above.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff are convinced that, in the face of the well-known objectives of the Kremlin and the ever increasing military capabilities of the USSR, lack of military collaboration between the signatory nations of NATO and Spain is adversely affecting not only the security position of Europe but also that of the United States.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff, from the security point of view which they believe should be overriding, recommend that the United States policy toward Spain be as follows:

a. That the United States now propose the acceptance of Spain as a member of NATO; and

b. Regardless of whether or not Spain soon becomes a member of NATO, the United States propose to NATO that authority be given for the military agencies of NATO to establish military association with Spain, and the necessary political arrangements be made at the earliest possible moment for United States military planners to enter into conversations with Spanish military planners.

In NSC 72/2 the Department of State takes the position that United States sponsorship at this time of Spanish membership in NATO would endanger our fundamental policy objectives in Western Europe. The fact is, however, our security interests require, as a minimum, early military association between NATO and Spain, immediate military association in the planning field between the United States and Spain, and provision of military assistance by the United States to Spain. Timing is a very important consideration today and for this reason I think our Government’s attitude toward Spain should reflect more of a sense of urgency in securing our objectives with respect to that country.

With the foregoing considerations in mind, there are proposed in the enclosure certain amendments to NSC 72/2.

G.C. Marshall

[Enclosure]

Memorandum by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Bradley) to the Secretary of Defense (Marshall)

top secret

Washington, 23 January 1951.

Subject: United States Policy Toward Spain.

1. In response to the request contained in the memorandum from your office, dated 18 January 1951, the Joint Chiefs of Staff have formulated the following views on NSC 72/2, a report by the Department of State on “United States Policy Toward Spain”.

2. The Joint Chiefs of Staff are fully in accord with the ultimate objective of United States policy toward Spain as set forth in paragraph 8 of the subject paper.

3. The Joint Chiefs of Staff feel that, from the military point of view, definite, dynamic, and far-reaching measures are urgently required if the military power of Spain is to be available in time for the defense of Western Europe.

4. The Joint Chiefs of Staff are convinced that, in the face of the well-known objectives of the Kremlin and the ever increasing military capabilities of the USSR, lack of military collaboration between the signatory nations of North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and Spain is adversely affecting not only the security position of Europe but also that of the United States. In view of the worsening world situation the Joint Chiefs of Staff believe that the time has come for the United States to give the military considerations, with respect to Spain, greater weight.

5. The Joint Chiefs of Staff agree with the thought expressed in subparagraph 7-b of the conclusions to NSC 72/2 in that the true defense of Spain is not at the line of the Pyrenees. On the other hand, the idea of planning to use Spain for the common defense of Europe without collaboration with Spanish military planners is completely unrealistic; in this connection it should be noted that such collaboration is not now permitted.

6. To prepare, without Spanish participation, completed plans for the use of Spain for common defense, thereafter approaching the Spanish Government in connection therewith, as set forth in subparagraph 7–c, is unsound, from the military point of view. Such plans could not possibly be developed effectively without adequate information from and complete collaboration with Spanish military planners.

7. The recommendation contained in subparagraph 7–d, that Spain be permitted to buy military equipment from the United States, would appear to be merely an empty gesture inasmuch as Spain does not have sufficient foreign exchange to purchase needed equipment even if the United States equipment could be made available. Furthermore, Spanish reaction to such a proposal would in all probability be unfavorable in view of the fact that all European NATO members are now being furnished United States equipment without reimbursement under the Military Defense Assistance Program (MDAP).

8. The Joint Chiefs of Staff are fully in accord with the measures set forth in subparagraph 7–e, but would point out that these are not sufficiently inclusive for United States military planning needs. In their opinion Service Attachés in Madrid could not be used for the consultations recommended with regard to Spanish defense plans or in any respect with the integration of Spanish defense plans with United States military plans. The Joint Chiefs of Staff believe that the functions and normal terms of reference of the Service Attachés are such that they would not be able to provide all the information and technical advice which is suggested by the Department of State. In any event, coordination of Spanish defense plans with NATO defense plans can only be accomplished effectively by agencies of NATO establishing military associations with Spain. In addition, the Joint Chiefs of Staff desire coordination, at the earliest practicable date, of Spanish defense plans with United States military plans. To this end they recommend conversations between United States and Spanish military planners.

9. It would be most advantageous, from the military point of view, if the armed forces of Spain could provide effective elements now toward the defense of Western Europe. The Joint Chiefs of Staff feel that instead of discussing an immediate policy toward Spain as outlined in paragraph 7 of the subject paper with the British and French Governments, the United States should, in the first instance, propose the acceptance of Spain as a member of NATO. In this connection, they would point out that although unanimous consent must be obtained in NATO before Spain can become a member, this consent will never be given unless the United States presses for the acceptance of Spain.

10. In view of all the foregoing, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, from the security point of view which they believe should be overriding, recommend that United States policy toward Spain be as follows:

a. That the United States now propose the acceptance of Spain as a member of NATO; and

b. Regardless of whether or not Spain soon becomes a member of NATO, the United States propose to NATO that authority be given for the military agencies of NATO to establish military association with Spain, and the necessary political arrangements be made at the earliest possible moment for United States military planners to enter into conversations with Spanish military planners.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

Omar N. Bradley

[Subenclosure]

Memorandum Prepared in the Department of Defense

top secret

[Washington, January ?, 1951.]

Recommended Amendments to the Conclusions of NSC 72/2

conclusions

7. The immediate objectives of United States policy toward Spain should be:

a. To develop urgently the military potentialities of Spain’s strategic geographic position for the common defense of the NAT area. All action in this regard should be guided tempered by the political considerations set forth in NSC 72/1.

b. To concentrate planning on the use of Spain for the common defense, not for the defense of the Iberian Peninsula. U.S. officials should emphasize in all discussions that the primary role envisaged for Spain is in support of the common policy of defending, not liberating Western Europe.

c. To approach the Spanish Government, when plans are completed, in order to acquire such facilities as bases for long-range bomber and fighter operations and behind-the-lines staging areas. We should similarly complete plans and approach the Spanish Government for bases for naval operations.

d. To permit the sale of provide military equipment assistance to Spain in so far as this is consistent with the objectives set forth in par. 8 below. All action in this regard should be guided by the principle that the NAT countries have priority for our aid and for materiel under the NAT, MDAP, and ERP. We should release from the Deense Department through the CAA, either direct to the Spaniards or through the U.S. air lines operating in Spain, as much as possible of the air navigational aids and other electronic equipment which the Spanish Government requested last June during the renegotiation of the Civil Air Agreement.

e. The following should also be provided for in the field of military and naval cooperation:

(1) completion of surveys concerning the military requirements and capabilities of Spain;

(2) provision for mutual interchange of information;

(3) consultation regarding Spanish defense plans;

(4) technical advice in problems of Spanish military and naval production and supplies;

(5) consultation and technical advice concerning the improvement of Spanish ports, roads, railroads, telecommunications and airfields.

f. Relations with Spanish officials, inherent in the foregoing recommendations, should be carried out through the Embassy in Madrid and the offices of the service Attachés without special missions or emissaries in close coordination between officials of the Department of State and Defense.

g. To assist the Spaniards to improve their relations with the NAT nations in order to obtain a cooperative attitude toward the objectives of the NAT.

h. This policy should be discussed with the British and French Governments for the purpose of informing them of our decision and, if possible, of agreeing on a common policy; if and when the latter is achieved, the NAT Council of Deputies should be informed and an effort made to establish a common NAT policy along these lines.

8. The ultimate objective of United States policy toward Spain should be:

a. To obtain early Spanish participation in the NAT. While this is not politically practicable at this time, we should prepare the way for discussions with our NAT allies, particularly with the British and French, to achieve this objective.

b. To reach agreement within the NAT on Spanish participation, and thereafter to initiate discussions with the Spanish Government. Contribution of Spanish troops to the integrated Defense forces should be presented as a necessary step to Spanish admission to the NAT and as a basis for the establishment of military assistance under the MDAP . Any MDAP assistance given to Spain should be given under such terms and conditions as to advance and not retard Spanish participation in NATO. The Spanish Government would doubtless prefer a purely bilateral relation with the United States under which Spain received United States aid and the United States received certain rights from Spain without involving Spain in any obligations for the defense of Western Europe. This result should be avoided and aid should be given only if we are satisfied that by so doing we are advancing Spain closer to participation in NATO.

1. Attached to the source text was a cover sheet which indicated that the memorandum by Marshall with its two enclosures was being circulated to the National Security Council as NSC 72/3.
2. Document 353.