665.001/8–1451
The Department of State to the British Embassy 1
Memorandum
The Department of State has given full consideration to the proposals advanced in the memorandum of the British Embassy of August 14, 19512 concerning revision of the Italian Peace Treaty and is gratified to note the considerable area of agreement in the views of the two governments: that Italy should be placed on a footing of full confidence and equality as a North Atlantic Treaty ally; that the stigma contained in the Preamble of the Italian Treaty should be removed; that maintenance of a democratic government in Italy is of paramount importance to the Western Allies; that it will no longer be enough to ignore any infractions of the military clauses of the Peace Treaty with Italy; and that the forthcoming [Page 650] Peace Treaty with Japan and development of the discussions with the German Federal Republic for a defense contribution and for a modification of the occupation regime have strengthened Italy’s claim to see the end of the regime under which her relations with the Western countries were placed by the Peace Treaty concluded after the war.
The British Government’s proposal for a declaration to be made either jointly or separately by the British, French and United States Governments does not, however, appear sufficient to accomplish the foregoing objectives, since it does not provide the de facto revision necessary to achieve them. It would leave our relations unchanged as far as the substance of the Treaty is concerned and in the long run would give rise to strong criticism and disappointment because of its inadequacy. Moreover, the Department of State considers that the issuance of such a tripartite declaration would place the Western powers in the untenable legal position of assuming responsibility for the initiative in the violation of the Treaty by the Italian Government.
The urgent need to complete the agreed plans for mutual defense requires that positive action be taken to permit Italy to exceed the military limitations of the Treaty. The Department of State does not consider that a declaration which in effect would not constitute revision would provide Italy a sound basis on which to ignore the military clauses of the Treaty. In reality it would not relieve our governments from legal responsibility. In addition, the demands in Italy for removal of the restrictions of the Treaty, which stand in marked contrast to the terms of the Japanese settlement, make it necessary to secure de facto revision of the Treaty itself.
With regard to the British Government’s concern over the Yugoslav reaction to revision of the Treaty, the Department of State considers that such revision should be so handled as to bring about, if possible, a settlement of the Trieste question. Marshal Tito has stated that he would not oppose revision, if the Trieste question and Italian reparations received prior settlement. Both the British and the United States Governments are seeking actively to promote Italo-Yugoslav negotiations toward an agreed solution. The Yugoslav conditional opposition to revision does not seem insurmountable when viewed in this light, and certainly should not be allowed to paralyze our action. The three Governments can impress on Yugoslavia the fact that the external threat facing it is the same as that facing Italy and that a strong Italy allied in a common defense against Soviet aggression would be greatly to Yugoslavia’s advantage. At the same time, we can stress to Italy that support of its desires to revise the Peace Treaty could be seriously jeopardized by the lack of prior settlement of the Trieste [Page 651] issue. If Yugoslav-Italian agreement can be reached, the Department would welcome the British suggestion of a statement by Italy assuring the Yugoslav Government that there are no territorial issues outstanding between Italy and Yugoslavia. The Department would propose that in addition a similar statement be sought from the Yugoslav Government, in order that the Western Powers would not be charged with showing favoritism towards either side. It is clear that it would be advantageous to have these declarations and a Trieste settlement, if reached, announced simultaneously with the revision of the Peace Treaty.
The Department of State does not share the British concern over the Soviet reactions to removal of the limitations on Italian armaments at this time. Soviet propaganda has already accused the West of violating the Treaty, and will continue to do so no matter what action is taken, or even in the absence of any action. The satellites have, with Soviet connivance, already violated their peace treaties and there would appear to be no advantage in further delaying action on revision. The Department considers that a propaganda advantage would be gained by making use of the satellite violations to support action on the Italian Treaty.
In its aide-mémoire of June 22, 19513 the Department requested agreement on procedures to secure to Italy an opportunity to carry out its obligations under the North Atlantic Treaty. Those procedures envisaged an approach by Italy to NATO signatories of the Peace Treaty, agreement among them to support Italy’s action and approach by Italy to non-NATO signatories. Since those proposals were made, events have moved with increasing rapidity due to the discussions of the Japanese and German settlements, and the declarations of the Italian Government that it considers action should be taken to permit it to carry out its NATO obligations and to be freed from the punitive spirit of the Treaty. In view of these circumstances, the Department considers that a more expeditious procedure should be followed and suggests therefore that without delay the Italian Government address previously agreed communications to all the signatories of the Treaty calling on them to recognize that the spirit of the Peace Treaty no longer reflects the position occupied by Italy and asking for release from certain provisions of that Treaty.
The Italian note would express:
(1) a readiness to negotiate bilateral agreements with any country in order to base relations with Italy on the spirit of the North Atlantic Treaty rather than that of the Peace Treaty;
[Page 652](2) a desire to revise the military clauses (Articles 46–70) which limit Italy’s ability to defend itself;
(3) a desire to revise certain political clauses and the Preamble, which are no longer needed since the democracy they were designed to assure is no longer in question.
This step by Italy should be preceded by adequate diplomatic preparation, with French, United Kingdom and United States’ support, to assure immediate friendly responses, at least from Italy’s Allies and from as many other signatories as possible. The replies should endorse the position expressed in the Italian Note. Since the Notes themselves can constitute the revision on a bilateral basis, the negotiation of a further document, may not in all cases be necessary.
It is believed these exchanges with Italy should be published simultaneously insofar as the Governments of France, the United Kingdom, and the United States are concerned, and that efforts should be made to induce as many other friendly nations as possible to take simultaneous action. By this method the widest possible endorsement of Italy’s action would be secured.
It is considered imperative that all action be completed before the German settlement is signed. If the German and Japanese settlements are concluded without parallel action on the Italian Treaty, our interests will be adversely affected and later action rendered more difficult.
It is suggested further that NATO signatories of the Italian Treaty should simultaneously with their replies to Italy formally and publicly communicate to the USSR copies of their replies, urging the USSR to follow suit.
As a further method of securing public endorsement, the Department suggests that the public actions enumerated above be completed before the General Assembly convenes in Paris on November 6. Since it would be desirable to have the United Nations note with satisfaction the de facto revision of the Treaty, a statement of agreement by the friendly signatories including the settlement of the Trieste question should be brought before the General Assembly under Article 14 of the Charter of the United Nations.
- Drafted by Colladay and Byington of WE and cleared with Bonbright, Coe of BNA, Wainhouse and Mangano of UNA, Furman of L, and Reinhardt of EE. It was noted in the margins of the source text that a copy of this memorandum was handed to representatives of the British and French Embassies on September 1.↩
- Document 295.↩
- Attached to Document 282.↩