665.001/8–1451
The British Embassy to the Department of State 1
Aide-Mémoire
His Majesty’s Government in the United Kingdom recognize that it will no longer be enough for the French, United Kingdom and United States Governments to agree to ignore any infractions of the military clauses of the Peace Treaty with Italy, which may be necessary in order that Italy should be able to play her full part in Western defence. They recognize also the strength of the Italian claim to be placed on a footing of full confidence and equality as a North Atlantic Treaty Organisation ally and realise that the forthcoming Peace Treaty with Japan, and the development of the discussions with the German Federal Government for a defence contribution and for a modification of the occupation regime have strengthened Italy’s claim to see the end of the regime under which her relations with the Western countries were placed by the Peace Treaty concluded after the war. They appreciate in particular the Italian Government’s desire to secure the removal of the “stigma” contained in the preamble of the Peace Treaty and the importance of supporting the democratic parties in Italy. They also recognize the strength of opinion in the United States which is in favour of the revision of the Italian Treaty, particularly in order that Italy may play her full part in the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation.
2. His Majesty’s Government consider the maintenance of a democratic government as exemplified in the De Gasperi coalition to be of great importance to the Western Allies. They are aware of Signor De Gasperi’s problems in maintaining unity between the very divergent elements in this coalition and in particular in obtaining [Page 645] support in certain quarters for a progressive social policy. The pursuit of such a policy will, however, clearly influence the support which the coalition parties in Italy continue to receive from the electorate and without an improvement of conditions in Italy itself concessions from the Western Powers to Italy in the international field will not necessarily suffice to prevent the decline of these parties.
3. It is important that the Western Powers should not be led into ill-judged or hasty action which would cause greater difficulties than it removed. His Majesty’s Government recognize that sooner or later it may well become necessary to review the Italian Treaty but they are convinced that the dangers of so doing at this particular time would outweigh any advantages that we might expect to gain. The removal of the limitations on Italian armaments would enable the Soviet Government to declare the Satellites released from their obligations in this field. The Soviet Government might then be encouraged to increase the threat which the Satellite forces already offer to Yugoslavia. More important is the fact that by such action the Western Powers would lose the diplomatic and propaganda advantages which they at present possess and which enable them to accuse the Satellite governments and their Soviet master of infringing the Peace Treaties.
4. But above all it is necessary to consider the effect which the revision of the Italian Peace Treaty would have on Yugoslavia. The Yugoslav Government have officially informed His Majesty’s Government through their Ambassador in London that they are opposed to revision, and His Majesty’s Representative at Belgrade has reported that the Yugoslav Government consider that the present time is inopportune for revision. Were we to proceed with revision in spite of the objections of the Yugoslav Government the latter might well be tempted to draw the inference that the Western Powers were again coming down on the side of Italy. The Soviet Government would most probably at the same time announce that since the Italian Peace Treaty had been torn up the re-armament of the Satellite States was fully justified and would be proceeded with. The Soviet propaganda machine would not be slow to exploit the discouragement which this situation would cause for the Yugoslavs. Tito’s position might be affected, and, in any event, the three governments would risk losing much of the influence they have recently been at such pains to build up in Belgrade.
5. His Majesty’s Government’s chief objection therefore to revision of the Italian Peace Treaty at present resides in the effect it may be expected to have on the position of Yugoslavia. The main stumbling block to better relations between Italy and Yugoslavia is the question of Trieste. There is little doubt that with their recollections [Page 646] of Italian policy after the 1914–1918 war and of Italian actions during the last war, the Yugoslavs are suspicious of Italian ambitions in the Adriatic. The Italian Government on their side have quite naturally made the fullest use of the Declaration of March 1948. Recent discussions between the two parties with a view to reaching a settlement of the Trieste question have come to nothing. Partly, at any rate, because the Italian Government take their stand upon the 1948 Declaration and regard it as their starting point. So long as they maintain this position no settlement of the Trieste question is likely. It seems essential that the question of revision of the Italian Treaty be so handled as to bring about if possible a settlement of the Trieste question between Italy and Yugoslavia. It would also be worth the possibility of persuading the Italian Government to make some statement which would give the Yugoslav Government an assurance that, apart from the question of Trieste, there were no territorial issues outstanding between Italy and Yugoslavia.
6. If the French and United States Government agree that the time for revision of the Italian Peace Treaty has not yet come, His Majesty’s Government would be ready to agree that something should be done now to help the Italian Government and to meet the feeling in the United States that Italy should be enabled to play her full part in Western defence. For this purpose they would favour a declaration which could be made either separately or jointly by the French, United Kingdom and United States Governments to the effect that their relations with Italy would henceforward be governed by the spirit of the Atlantic Alliance rather than by that of the Peace Treaty. The declaration would also recognize in principle Italy’s inherent right to self-defence and thereby provide an assurance that the Peace Treaty would not be allowed to stand in the way of Italian re-armament without affording an excuse for saying that the Treaty had been abrogated. A tentative draft declaration in this sense is attached as an annex to this aide-mémoire
7. It is probable that even the making of such a declaration if unaccompanied by any assurance about Trieste would have an unfavourable effect in Belgrade and that the Yugoslav Government would ask whether this declaration portends a change of attitude about Trieste. Rather than that the Western Powers should be compelled to give an assurance in reply, it would seem better that the declaration of the three governments be accompanied by an Italian declaration to the effect that Italy intends to settle the Trieste question with Yugoslavia and that the Italian Government should assure the Yugoslav Government in the same declaration, that apart from the question of Trieste, there are no territorial [Page 647] issues outstanding between the two countries. If, however, the French and United States Governments feel that this would be too much to ask of the Italian Government, His Majesty’s Government consider that the latter should at least be moved to convey assurances of the sort described above to the Yugoslav Government through the diplomatic channel before the three Powers issue their declaration.
8. His Majesty’s Government attach great importance to avoiding any action which would upset the Yugoslavs. They are very sympathetic with the Italian case for revision but feel that the matter should not be rushed. There is little chance of bringing about a settlement of the Trieste question unless pressure is brought to bear on the Italian Government and perhaps on both parties. In the view of His Majesty’s Government therefore it is important to avoid any concessions or statements about revision which would weaken the ability of the Western Powers to bring the two parties closer together.
- This aide-mémoire was given to officials of the Department of State on August 14 and they were informed that a copy was also being given to officials of the French Embassy in Washington on the same day. (Memorandum of conversation, August 14, 665.001/8–1451)↩