665.001/7–2051
Memorandum of Conversation, by Joseph N. Greene of the Office of Western European Affairs
Subject: Italian Peace Treaty
| Participants: | Mr. J. G. Boyd—British Embassy |
| Mr. J. N. Greene, Jr.—WE |
Mr. Boyd came in to give me the following statement of the preliminary views of the British Foreign Office on the question of revision of the Italian Peace Treaty:
“It is important that the policy of the British, French and United States Governments on the question of Trieste and the revision of the Peace Treaty should be closely coordinated and Mr. Morrison hopes shortly to send to the British Embassy in Washington detailed comments on the American proposals for Treaty Revision contained in the State Department’s Aide-Mémoire of June 22nd. In the meantime the British Embassy, Washington has been instructed to inform the State Department that, while Mr. Morrison recognizes that there are strong arguments in favour of Treaty Revision, there are also very weighty arguments against it. In particular, there is the effect which any plan for Treaty Revision is likely to have on Yugoslavia and Mr. Morrison considers it most important that full consideration be given to this aspect of the case before any decision is taken.
“Mr. Morrison’s preliminary view is that it would be premature to attempt any revision of the Italian Peace Treaty, and that the Italian desire to have the stigma of the Peace Treaty removed and the desire to ensure that the Italian Government can play their full part in N.A.T.O. should be met by a declaration by the three Governments which would indicate that in their relations with Italy they intend henceforth to be guided by the spirit of the Atlantic Alliance, and that they recognize in principle that Italy should enjoy the legitimate right of self defense.
“Mr. Morrison thinks that quite apart from the question of the exact wording, the three powers will have to consider very carefully whether even a declaration of this sort will not have to be counterbalanced, so far as Yugoslavia is concerned by some attempt on the part of the three powers to ensure that a real effort is now made by the Italians and the Yugoslavs to settle the question of Trieste, and possibly by a declaration by Italy to the effect that once that question had been settled no territorial issues will remain outstanding between Italy and Yugoslavia.
“Mr. Morrison’s views on these difficult questions will be communicated to the British Embassy as soon as possible for discussion with the State Department, but he is anxious to ensure that in the meanwhile no action is taken by any one of the three Governments without the closest consultation together on the question of the future of Trieste and the revision of the Italian Peace Treaty.”
Mr. Boyd also said that the Italian Ambassador at London had called on the Foreign Secretary on July 13 to request revision of the Peace Treaty. Mr. Morrison had replied that he was in principle sympathetic, but would have to concert with the United States and French Governments. The Italian Ambassador observed he thought that the initiative should be taken by HMG in this matter, and Mr. Morrison commented that the problem is to find the best way of achieving the objective. He pointed out that there is a real difficulty in connection with the satellite treaties and our efforts to [Page 633] charge violations of those treaties. He was inclined to feel that it might be better, rather than to revise the Italian Treaty, to make some sort of declaration which would help Italian public opinion. He said revision might come someday but that now did not seem to be a good time. He mentioned that the Yugoslav position is relevant and said that it is important that the Italian Government and HMG be on good terms with the Yugoslav Government. The Ambassador left, after saying that the matter would be treated most secretly and reiterating his view that HMG should take some initiative.
In this connection, Mr. Boyd commented that the Foreign Office had learned that the Italian Foreign Office had actually issued a communiqué saying that instructions had been sent to the Italian representatives in London, Paris and Washington to request revision of the Treaty. I told Mr. Boyd that, although I did not believe Mr. Luciolli had said anything similar to the Secretary of State, he had, before his interview with the Secretary, urged on me that the United States Government take the initiative so that, as he put it, the French or British Governments would not get out ahead of us. I said that I had seen what Mr. Luciolli told me were his instructions about seeing the Secretary, and they were very brief; perhaps it was just a coincidence of bright ideas that the Italian representatives both in London and Washington urged the respective governments to get going first.
With reference to the last paragraph of the Foreign Office’s statement of its views, Mr. Boyd said that he was sure it should not be taken as criticism of the Department for releasing to the public the nature of the Secretary’s reply to Mr. Luciolli’s representations here. He said that the same statement had gone to the British Embassy in Paris and he assumed it was directed at the Italian Ambassadors’ idea of taking the initiative.