665.001/7–251
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Director of the Office of Western European Affairs (Byington)1
Subject: Italian Peace Treaty
| Participants: | Monsieur de Margerie, French Embassy |
| Mr. Homer M. Byington, Jr.—WE | |
| Mr. Howard J. Hilton, Jr.—WE |
Monsieur de Margerie called to inform the Department of the Foreign Office’s preliminary reaction to our Aide-Mémoire of June 22, 1951.2 He said that the Foreign Office did not agree that the question of the revision of the military provisions of the Italian Peace Treaty occupied an important place in Italian public opinion. He said that other questions such as admission into the United Nations, the future of Trieste, and similar issues were of much greater importance to the Italian people than is the question of revision of the military provisions of the Italian Peace Treaty.
He also mentioned that the Foreign Office did not agree that the argument concerning the comparison between the provisions proposed for the Japanese Peace Treaty and the provisions in the Italian Peace Treaty was of great importance. He mentioned that the Japanese Peace Treaty would probably seriously limit Japanese war potential by depriving the Japanese of various islands which were of military importance.
In addition, the Foreign Office felt that there was much that Italy could do within existing limitations of the Italian Peace Treaty to improve the effectiveness of existing forces. He specifically mentioned that the 250 billion lire program for additional military production was about all that the Italian economy could sustain and that production of the items contemplated in that program would not violate the treaty. In any event, it would be possible to ignore minor violations for a period of time. He concluded that there was, therefore, no great urgency necessitating immediate action, and on the contrary it might be advantageous from a broader political view, including relations with the Soviet Union, to delay action until a more appropriate time.
Monsieur de Margerie emphasized, however, that the Foreign Office was in basic agreement with us that ultimately some action [Page 628] would have to be taken to remove the restrictive effect of the military provisions of the Italian Peace Treaty. The Foreign Office therefore agreed to tripartite talks with the British, of an informal character, regarding the problems involved in the revision of the Italian Peace Treaty.
In commenting on the points made by Monsieur de Margerie, I emphasized that we had been informed by the Embassy at Rome that there was great pressure from Italian public opinion for revision of the Italian Peace Treaty. There exists a growing sentiment among nationalist elements that the De Gasperi Government was unable to protect Italy’s international interests and the recent elections had, in fact, seen a trend to the extreme right. It was very important to all of us that the nationalist elements in Italy should continue to support a moderate coalition government. In addition, I referred to the mounting pressure from Congress and the American people that we should take action to remove the limitations contained in the military provisions of the Italian Peace Treaty. I pointed out that if we are agreed on the ultimate necessity of taking action, then it would appear to be to our advantage to act now and to receive the benefit of such action rather than to act later when bitterness and feelings of animosity in Italy and elsewhere would lead to charges that we had been unwillingly pushed into action by pressure.
Regarding the Japanese Peace Treaty, I said that the Italian Government had indicated to us its concern that the Japanese Peace Treaty would be much more liberal than the Italian Peace Treaty; therefore, I did not agree that we should dismiss this possibly well-justified apprehension without further thought.
As to the desirability of further delay because Italy had not yet reached treaty strength, I pointed out that this actually was not correct with respect to the need for Italian military production, planes and other equipment as well as further recruitment to meet the medium term defense plan. We would be shortly face to face with this problem and preparation to meet it was most urgently necessary. Connivance to ignore the treaty provisions did not seem to us adequate to meet Soviet charges or to satisfy Italian and our own public opinion. It was, therefore, most important that the French, British and U.S. Governments agree as soon as possible upon the action which might be taken to achieve our desired objective of removing the restrictive effect of the military provisions of the Italian Peace Treaty.
I asked Monsieur de Margerie if considerations relating to the USSR were the basis for the view that action on the Italian Peace Treaty should be delayed. He replied that this was certainly a factor although it was not necessarily the basic consideration. In [Page 629] commenting on this observation, I expressed the view if we delayed action merely because of possible Soviet protest despite the fact that justification for our action had been created by Soviet policies and maneuvers, we might be open to the suspicion that we can be paralyzed by fear of the Soviet Union.
I mentioned that we had as yet, received no comment from the British but as soon as the British reaction is known I would communicate further with him.
Monsieur de Margerie also mentioned that the Italian Ambassador at Paris had approached the French Foreign Office regarding the revision of the Italian Peace Treaty. The Italian Ambassador was informed that the French Government was sympathetic to the Italian position, but could not discuss it at this time; however, bilateral discussions might take place between the French and Italian representatives to NATO, regarding a possible declaration which might be made by NATO in connection with the Italian Peace Treaty. The declaration, which might form the subject of such conversations, would not be substantive in effect and would not be designed to accomplish the objective proposed in our Aide-Mémoire of June 22, 1951. What the French had in mind was more a declaration recognizing the moral position of Italy and her position of equality among the family of nations.