“take diplomatic action as appropriate to assure that the Treaty
limitations do not prevent Italy from meeting its joint defense
obligations.”
Preliminary informal conversations have been held with the British
Embassy as early as last fall. Diplomatic action has since February
been suspended, however, because of the possibility that premature
unauthorized publicity might jeopardize the negotiations in Paris to
formulate an agenda for a meeting of the Foreign Ministers of the
US, UK, France, and USSR. Tripartite agreement to use in an agenda
the word “fulfillment” in connection with the peace treaties has
lent additional importance to the desirability of postponing further
consultation on the problem posed by the Italian Peace Treaty.
The Italian Government is now publicly calling for removal of the
moral stigma of the limitations and obligations imposed by that
[Page 621]
Treaty. The Italian
Government is greatly concerned that progress toward a Japanese
Peace Treaty, which will be more favorable than the Italian Peace
Treaty, especially as regards rearmament and reparations clauses,
and progress toward normalization of the western allies’ relations
with Germany places Italy in an invidious position, with consequent
adverse effect on Italian public opinion.
Sentiment in Congress has been steadily mounting and there is every
prospect of a strenuous campaign to require executive action to
revise the Treaty without further delay. In the Watkins Resolution,
the U.S. Senate has already expressed the view that the United
States should seek to eliminate all provisions of the Italian Peace
Treaty which limit Italy’s contribution to the defense of Western
Europe.
The Embassy at Rome has pointed out in its telegram no. 5376 of May
28,2 attached,
that the cumulative effect of such developments “will before long
reach a point where failure to take action will be so conspicuous as
to place in doubt the sincerity of Western and especially of United
States policy toward Italy.”
Continued delay by us on the ground that we must not weaken our
negotiating position vis-à-vis the Soviet Union risks contributing
to the conclusion in Italy and elsewhere in Western Europe that the
Soviet Union can by intimidation block United States and allied
policy.
The reasons for postponing diplomatic action with Great Britain and
France leading to a consideration of this question are now
outweighed by critical developments in Congress and in our relations
with the Italian Government.
1. We should undertake without delay further preliminary informal
confidential discussions with the British and French Governments.
Attached is an aide-mémoire which if you
approve can be handed to the British Embassy here as a basis for
such discussions. A similar memorandum would be handed to the French
Embassy.3
2. Thereafter, the Italian Embassy should be informed that we are
having preliminary discussions on this subject with the British and
French and that we intend to consult fully with them as soon as we
are in a position to offer suggestions for their consideration. We
can continue to emphasize that we do not intend to make any public
statements regarding revision of the Treaty as long as such
statements may jeopardize current conversations with the Soviet
Union.4
[Attachment]
The Department of
State to the British
Embassy
5
top secret
Aide-Mémoire
The proposals advanced by the Foreign Office in the memorandum of
the British Embassy dated February 27, 1951,6 concerning the military
provisions of the Italian Peace Treaty have been carefully
considered. The Department of State and the Foreign Office agree
that there is undeniably a need for Italy to take certain steps
in the future beyond the limitations of the Peace Treaty to
carry out its obligations under the North Atlantic Treaty. The
questions upon which further agreement is necessary involved the
substance, procedure, and timing of appropriate diplomatic
action to support Italy in taking those steps.
In the latter respect, the situation has been drastically altered
since receipt of the above-mentioned memorandum. Italy has now
publicly called for removal of the moral stigma of the
limitations and obligations imposed by that Treaty. In the
Department of State’s view, the cumulative effect of continued
discussion and other developments will soon be such that the
failure of Italy’s allies to respond will be so conspicuous as
to place in doubt the sincerity of their policies toward
Italy.
Among the other developments which affect the action henceforth
to be taken, the Department has in mind:
1) Publicity surrounding discussion of a Treaty of Peace with
Japan, especially with reference to rearmament of Japan, and
[Page 623]
progress toward
normalization of the western allies’ relations with Germany,
tend to place Italy in an invidious position. Unless affirmative
diplomatic action is taken, the Italian contribution to the
defense of Western Europe may be adversely affected.
2) Considerable progress is being made toward Italian rearmament.
In addition to the strictly legal importance of this progress to
the question of the Peace Treaty limitations, the psychological
importance of action to encourage further progress and the
necessary sacrifices must figure largely in our
calculations.
3) The public discussion in Italy of this question has been
paralleled in the United States by discussion in the Congress of
the United States, where the Senate has formally expressed the
view that the United States should seek to eliminate all
provisions of the Italian Peace Treaty which limit Italy’s
contribution to the defense of Western Europe.
The Department considers that agreement to ignore Italian
violations of the military provisions of the Peace Treaty would
fail to meet satisfactorily the situation confronting Italy and
her allies. While it is recognized that affirmative action to
revise the Treaty presents legal problems, these can be
minimized by avoiding denunciation of the Peace Treaty by Italy
or by Italy’s allies and by so acting as to place the Soviet
Union in the politically disadvantageous position of obstructing
correction of injustices to Italy.
The military provisions of the Italian Peace Treaty were drafted
on the assumption that the United Nations in which Italy would
be accepted as a full member, would assure lasting peace. The
Soviet Union has effectively destroyed the basis for this
assumption. Communist aggression in Korea and increasing world
tension resulting from Soviet policies supporting military,
economic, and political aggression have increased the urgency of
prompt and effective action to permit Italy to participate to
the fullest extent of its capabilities in the common defense of
the North Atlantic Community.
From a military viewpoint, the restrictions imposed by certain of
the military clauses of the Peace Treaty are incompatible with
the objectives of NATO. It is
apparent that the successful defense of Western Europe will
require a greater contribution of military manpower by Italy
than is permitted by the terms of the Peace Treaty. Italy, with
the forces at present allowed under the Peace Treaty, could not
defend its northern frontiers in the event of an attack. The
Peace Treaty also places strict limitations upon the type and
quality of weapons and matériel which the Italian armed forces
need for full combat effectiveness. In addition, the Peace
Treaty by preventing Italy from manufacturing or possessing more
war matériel than is needed for its own forces under the Treaty
precludes Italy’s full participation in the rearmament
production effort of the North Atlantic Community.
[Page 624]
Since the Soviet Union has protested the adherence of Italy to
the North Atlantic Treaty, additional protests may be
anticipated in connection with greater Italian participation in
the defense effort. It is the view of the Government of the
United States that an affirmative, forthright approach provides
the best reply to any Soviet protests. An attempt at subterfuge
would provide the Soviet Union with excellent propaganda
material and would place the Governments supporting the Italian
action in the awkward position of defending specific
violations.
Recognizing that it is important to the security of the members
of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization that Italy meet in
full its defense obligations as may be agreed in the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization, notwithstanding the military
limitations of the Italian Peace Treaty, the United States
Government proposes that the Governments of the United Kingdom,
France and the United States agree in principle that public
action is required to assure that the Treaty limitations do not
prevent Italy from meeting its joint defense obligations.
Ample justification for this action is provided by (1) the threat
to the peace of the world and security of Italy resulting from
the Communist aggression in Korea, and threats of Communist
aggression elsewhere, (2) the failure of the Soviet Government
to honor its agreements and obligations including those under
the satellite Peace Treaties, and (3) the rearming of the
satellite states in violation of their peace treaties.
The Department of State also proposes that, in view of the
importance of obtaining the concurrence of the Yugoslav
Government, among other signatories of the Peace Treaty, in
whatever course is to be adopted, the occasion might be taken
further to explore the possibility of achieving Italo-Yugoslav
agreement on a settlement of the Trieste question. Such a
settlement, if achieved, might well be a part and parcel of
action on other clauses of the Treaty.
Once agreement in principle is reached between our three
governments, they would propose to the Italian Government that
the Four Powers formulate an agreed procedure regarding revision
of the Italian Peace Treaty. This procedure might include the
following steps:
1) The Italian Government would approach confidentially all
signatories of the Italian Peace Treaty which are members of
NATO to indicate that it
desired to secure agreement in principle, presumably in the
Council of Deputies, that the Italian Peace Treaty should not
infringe the Italian right of self-defense in the present
situation or Italian participation in collective defense under
the North Atlantic Treaty. The US, UK and France would support
the
[Page 625]
preliminary
Italian approach where desirable and would also support the
Italian position in the ensuing discussion in the Council of
Deputies.
2) Once agreement is reached by the NATO Deputies, the Italian Government would
approach friendly non-NATO
signatories, supported where desirable by the US, UK and France,
to lay the basis for the greatest possible number of favorable
replies to an Italian request that Italy be relieved of the
limitations contained in the military provisions of the Peace
Treaty.
3) After completion of diplomatic preparations, the Italian
Government in its first formal declaration, would address notes
to all signatories and the North Atlantic Council or the Council
of Deputies. This note might present the following line of
argument: It was not the intent of the Treaty of Peace with
Italy to prevent Italy from defending its frontiers. The Peace
Treaty was negotiated on the assumption that membership in the
United Nations by the Allies and Italy and adherence to
principles of international law would guarantee the security of
Italy and other nations. Nevertheless, the Treaty envisaged the
limitations of the military provisions as temporary and provided
for their revision by either of two procedures set forth
therein.
Post-war developments have not fulfilled the assumptions on which
the Italian Peace Treaty is based and in addition have confirmed
the impossibility of revising the military provisions in
accordance with the procedures established in the Peace Treaty.
Instead of peace, the free nations are faced with war already
begun in Korea and with the threat of further Communist
aggression. Furthermore, the military clauses of the Italian,
Bulgarian, Hungarian, and Rumanian Peace Treaties were
negotiated concurrently and were intended to create a balanced
security in Europe. Violations of the military restrictions of
the Bulgarian, Hungarian, and Rumanian Treaties has created an
entirely new situation which constitutes a further threat to the
integrity of Italy and which justifies review of the military
clauses of the Italian Treaty. (A necessary preliminary to this
point will be formal protests by the US, UK, and France to the
three satellite governments at the violations of their
respective treaties.)
Because of these threats to the peace of the world, Italy has
joined with other free nations in the North Atlantic Treaty for
their collective defense. Italy is, therefore, obligated to
assume its full share in the collective defense of the North
Atlantic Community and calls upon the signatories of the Peace
Treaty to release Italy from the limitations of the military
provisions of the Peace Treaty.
4) As soon as a note along these lines is received, it would be
answered immediately by all friendly signatories and the NATO Council or the Deputies,
interposing no objection to the Italian proposal and extending
support for the Italian action. The replies might (1) recognize
the justice of the Italian position and (2) conclude by
expressing readiness to negotiate at a suitable time a document
which would more accurately reflect the spirit of bilateral
relations with Italy than the Peace Treaty.
[Page 626]
The wording of all communications and statements should avoid
denunciation of the Italian Peace Treaty by Italy or countries
supporting the Italian action. If the Soviet Union had recourse
to the provisions of Article 87 of the Peace Treaty, the US, UK,
and France would support the Italian action.
Washington
, June 22, 1951.
