665.001/5–2851: Telegram
The Ambassador in Italy (Dunn) to the Secretary of State
5376. As reported in Embtel No. 5309 of May 231 believe that action re Ital treaty cannot long be delayed. While we continue to think that action on our part is not essential in connection with this phase of election campaign, particularly now that Ital Govt has established a clear record of pressing the issue, there is no doubt that the cumulative effect of continued discussion and other developments will before long reach a point where failure to take action will be so conspicuous as to place in doubt the sincerity of Western and especially US policy toward Italy. We have in mind such developments as further progress on the Japanese and Ger treaties, and further progress in Ital rearmament. The former will tend to place Italy invidious position and the latter, in the absence of action on our part re the treaty, may arouse the latent suspicion prevalent here that we do not seriously count upon Italy playing an important role in Western defense with a consequent diminution of Ital willingness to make the necessary sacrifices for rearmament. We have therefore been giving some thought as to possible methods of procedure and hope that the following suggestions may be useful in the Dept’s consideration of the problem:
From the standpoint of the Ital Govt and Ital domestic politics it wld be extremely useful if first formal initiative came from Ital Govt. This important not only to offset one of principal criticisms of govt from the right i.e., that it is not sufficiently vigorous in defending Ital interests vis-à-vis the US, but also to offset the charge that action re the treaty wld be taken only because of our selfish interest in Ital rearmament and Ital “cannon fodder”.
Such initiative might take the form of a communication addressed by the Ital Govt to all signatories of the treaty and to the [Page 615] NATO Council. It wld recite developments since the conclusion of the treaty such as the exclusion of Italy from the UN by Sov veto, failure of the UN to develop adequate measures for collective security upon which, at the time the treaty was signed, it was envisaged that Italy cld rely, Ital membership in NATO, violation of mil clauses of satellite peace treaties and gen state of tension and insecurity in the world as evidenced by Commie aggression in Korea and elsewhere. Communication wld conclude by stating that in these circumstances Italy does not believe that the Ital peace treaty corresponds to the existing situation, considers that steps shld be taken to replace it, and, in any event that she does not believe she shld be prevented from taking the steps necessary to insure her security and prevent her from becoming the object of aggression.
The NATO Council (or Council of Deputies) wld address communication to United Nations Secy Gen and to NATO Govts signatory to treaty which wld enclose copy of Ital communication, state that it confirmed promises set forth in Ital note, that it finds Italy hampered in fulfilling her NATO obligations by provisions of the treaty and wld recommend recognition of fact that Italy shld not in present circumstances be bound by the mil clauses of the treaty. NATO member govts in public statements or in communications to Ital Govt wld state they recognize justice of Ital position, state they wld be prepared to agree to a revision of the treaty, state that their relations with Italy are governed by the spirit of the North Atlantic Pact, state that they individually considered that the right of every country to self defense against menace of aggression applied in present circumstances to Italy not withstanding the provisions of the treaty, and conclude by expressing readiness to negotiate at suitable time a document which for purposes of bilateral relations with Italy wld replace the peace treaty.
Wording of all communications and statements wld be carefully drafted so as to avoid actual legal denunciation of the treaty by Italy or ourselves which cld give USSR opportunity to take matter to world court. Diplomatic preparations for these actions might be made occasion for pressure on both Ital and Yugo Govts for bilateral Trieste settlement or at least de facto revision of zones of occupation along lines of eventual settlement. It wld certainly be easier for Ital Govt to agree to Trieste settlement if coupled with some major international action of this nature in Italy’s favor.
A useful preparatory step might be a proposal in the UN or the CFM to have an international commission sent to the satellite states to investigate compliance with the mil clauses of the satellite peace treaties. Veto of such resolution by the USSR wld be helpful [Page 616] in dealing with any subsequent action by USSR to enforce Ital treaty.
Wld be advantageous to have all steps carefully prepared thru diplomatic channels in order that statements of policy by NATO members wld follow quickly upon receipt of Ital communication and before USSR or satellites cld take delaying action in UN Security Council. For this reason Italy might withhold communications to signatories until NATO Council ready to act. Wld also be advantageous if matter cld be handled in UN Assembly rather than Council in order to secure passage of a resolution supporting or at least recognizing justice of Ital position. Soviet recourse to Art 87 possible but shld present no difficulties.
Believe after preliminary sounding of Brit Govt we shld approach Brit, Fr and Ital Govts almost simultaneously stressing to Itals importance of obtaining Yugoslav concurrence in these plans and urging a Trieste settlement as part of the package.
- Supra.↩