Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, Europe: Political and Economic Developments, Volume IV, Part 1

No. 275

Office of International Security Affairs files, lot 52–26, ECA—Rome

The United States Deputy Representative on the North Atlantic Council (Spofford) to the Secretary of State ¹

secret
No. 20

London, May 11, 1951.

Subject: Mr Spofford’s Rome Conference

Herewith is a summary of the report of my discussions in Rome, together with several related talks I have had with Rossi Longhi both before and after the trip.

The delay in transmitting it has been in part due to my desire to check my notes with those taken by the Italians, which Rossi Longhi has furnished me here.

Prior to the Rome visit I had two talks with Rossi Longhi in which I told him the purpose of my visit and stated U.S. concern that the Italian effort be strengthened and speeded up, following closely the lines laid down in Deptel 4305 to Rome on March 27th,² and Deptel 4212 to Rome on March 21st.³ I related this position to my visit.

In preliminary conferences with Dunn we agreed that since I was in Rome as guest of the Italian government I should consider myself there in my international rather than in my U.S. capacity, and that accordingly he and Dayton would not accompany me to the conferences, which were arranged with De Gasperi, Sforza, Pella, Pacciardi, and a courtesy call on General Marras.

I had a conference of over an hour with De Gasperi with no one present. As I had been led to expect from earlier talks with Rossi Longhi and Pella, De Gasperi opened up by explaining his parliamentary situation and the status of the 250 million lira program. While the Chamber, in which he had a majority, had adopted the program, the Senate, in which there was a large element that did not follow his foreign or domestic policies, was making progress slow. He detailed the parliamentary maneuvers which he thought had thus far been successful and stated categorically that the bill would be adopted by the Senate. He went on to say that after its adoption he would know better how far and how fast the next slice could be undertaken, but he felt that an additional substantial effort would be possible this year. He was unable to make a public statement to this effect since the Senate would react badly and perhaps fatally to any such pronouncement at this time.

He then switched to the Peace Treaty, stating that Italy was pleased with the revisionist sentiment which was appearing in the U.S. This appeared for the most part to be directed only to the military clauses, which he thought to be a mistake. The Treaty had a moral and psychological significance for the Italians which the mere lifting of the military clauses would not solve and might even aggravate. It was a matter of national status. The elimination of economic, territorial and other clauses presented no substantive problem, since they were all executed or involved only minor questions at this time. He fully recognized that it would be a mistake to raise the whole question now since we were having enough trouble with the Russians in Paris without adding further complications. Also he granted that the Treaty was not a limiting factor on their present effort and would not become one for some time, but that it was necessary to prepare the ground and to bring our minds into harmony on the proper solution.

Again, without my having an opportunity to comment, he switched to the matter of the reorganization of NATO and the Canadian plan.⁴ He did not fully understand the scheme, but what he knew of it seemed constructive and in the right direction. He particularly liked the idea of having ministers competent in particular fields attend Council meetings where they could meet and take immediate decisions. Foreign Ministers were likely to be overcautious in the economic field because of their lack of familiarity with it. I contributed some facts at this point on reorganization and background of the Canadian and other current proposals.

I then had an opportunity to refer to my earlier talks with Pella and told him of our concern both as to the scale of the effort and as to the speed with which it could be accomplished, emphasizing the latter. I made my usual point as to the advantages of all-out effort for the short range future from every standpoint, emphasizing public appeal of intensive effort for a limited period as against long drawn out and apparently indefinite commitment to austerity. He responded, I thought, favorably to this line but observed that while we Americans talked speed and accomplished miracles of speed in the production field he thought we suffered from the same bureaucratic delays that they did in at least some respects and referred to some difficulties they had had with what I took to be AMP projects. I confessed that this was a slow business but that we were making every effort to streamline our procedure. He said he was not satisfied with the Italian organization for industrial mobilization and had been trying to find an Italian counterpart for Wilson. He had pretty much come to the conclusion, however, that that pattern did not fit the Italians. There were no industrialists competent for the job who would be persona grata to the Italian government and would not cause parliamentary troubles. Also Italian bureaucracy would not accept an outsider in a top spot in the way in which American administration apparently responded to our industrial leadership. I told him something of our Congressional problem, stating that it was important for those who like myself might have a part in the legislative proceedings to get the best estimates not only as to the facts now existing but as to measures contemplated.

Finally De Gasperi said he thought Italy had made substantial progress, and would make more, that we should not lose sight of the fact that Italy’s biggest surplus was babies, that he hoped Italian capacity for work, its manpower and industrial skills could be used to the common advantage.

I had two talks with Pella. Malagodi, Magistrati and Rossi Longhi were present at each. After preliminary courtesies I opened the first talk with my statement on acceleration, developing my concern as to the Congressional attitude. This, while a little out of line with my international capacity, was expected and not badly received. Pella responded with a statement as to the 250 billion lira program. While it had not yet been adopted he had nevertheless authorized the Defense Department to place contracts in anticipation, which might end them all in jail, but which he thought was a worthwhile risk. Time was, therefore, not being lost. He appreciated the attitude of U.S. Congress, which must be satisfied that every partner is doing its best, which the Italians were determined to do. The economy must nevertheless be safeguarded. An unsound basis for the military effort would be disastrous. I replied that while it was of course the responsibility of finance ministers to guard against risks to the economy, the philosophy which I felt was now becoming more generally accepted among the NAT powers was that until the greater risk of total destruction was successfully met, some risks with the economy would have to be accepted as the lesser of the evils.

At the second meeting I indicated familiarity with the position as to this year’s program and asked his plans for the following year. He said that as to this year’s program the last slice of ECA aid remained to be credited. He thought they were close to agreement; this aid was most important. I said my information was that the matter was progressing satisfactorily and that it should be straightened out soon. He then outlined generally the directions for next year, in which he stated that the Italian and U.S. estimates of the dollar deficit seemed to vary widely but that they were not far apart on the main approach to the problem. Italy must protect its standard of living with its very low per capita consumption, but that if the basic raw materials can be assured he felt that they could move ahead. He was not specific as to how far or when, but gave me general assurances that they could be counted upon to do their full share. I went back to my point as to the advantage of effort now as against two years from now and my speech on the virtues of speed, to which he replied that he might be slow in commitment, but that he yielded to no one in speed of execution.

I then asked him what his plans were for increasing the adequacy of the controls on use of critical material He told me that while the government had sought earlier in the year to obtain full powers for a complete set of economic controls they now were considering the piecemeal approach, and that he expected to increase controls over raw materials and price controls. He would institute rationing if it seemed necessary: and when he was certain it could be effective.

He then brought up the situation of the North and its surplus manpower and capacity, and asked whether there was any possibility of utilizing this for the benefit of other NAT members. I told him of the difficulties which the HPPP had uncovered in this field; that of the several bottlenecks we had broken one, and were working on a plan which would make a contribution to clearing up the others. He was most interested in this and stressed the importance to both economy and morale of the North. He closed by what appeared to be to me a sincere statement, guarded, however, as far as affirmative commitments were concerned, as to his general sympathy with the NAT program.

My talk with Pacciardi was in general terms. He said he thought that they were making progress in training and equipping units; that the end-items they had received were a life-saver; and that he thought they were making good use of them. I confirmed that the MAAG had reported this. He said he was proceeding to contract on the basis of the 250 billion lira program; that he could use more and wished me luck with Pella. Pacciardi said he had one statement he felt he must make and hoped that I would not consider it unfriendly. He said that he felt the disparity of the end-items which were going to France and to Italy was “unacceptable” in view of his own estimate of the relative efforts that were being made to utilize this equipment. I made no comment.

My talk with General Marras was also general in terms. He stated that he had four divisions fully equipped with reserves, which could fight if war broke out tomorrow. He mentioned the arrangements for Mediterranean Command which he had discussed with Admiral Carney, and expressed himself as very satisfied with this arrangement. He hoped Carney’s headquarters would be set up at Naples. He mentioned with evident enthusiasm the plan for joint U.S. naval air-Italian ground force exercises in the North.

My talk with Sforza was in character and in most general terms. In the course of his remarks he said he felt Italy had a moral advantage over France in that France was living on the illusion of a victory in the last war to which she did not contribute, while Italy was proceeding on the fact of a defeat for which she must atone.

I had a long discussion on the plane back with Rossi Longhi, who confirmed my view that Pella was the man who must be convinced before the program could be stepped up. He said he thought De Gasperi was pushing the whole government; Pella was the deterrent. He hoped we would keep the pressure on and felt that the visit had been useful from that point of view.

The principal observations which I might make as a result of my talks and the very helpful conferences with Dunn and his staff are:

1. de Gasperi is certainly in our corner and comes about as near being as strong and effective a leader in control of his political situation (at least in the lower house) as we have in the principal NAT countries at the present time. He has an objectivity and strength which are real assets and warrant confidence and support.

2. Pella may be dragging his heels but I would judge the reasons which prompt him to do so are those which he frankly has given us. I have heard some rumors that he is secretly not in sympathy with the defense effort but I would think the explanation is rather financial conservatism and caution against the background of a tight and basically unstable economic picture.

3. The military side seems to be going well and gives grounds for real encouragement.

Charles M. Spofford

1. Copies sent to Rome and Paris.
2. Not printed.
3. Document 265.
4. For documentation concerning the reorganization of NATO, see vol. iii, Part 1, pp. 460 ff. For the text of the Canadian Plan, see Foreign Relations, 1950, vol. iii, p. 461.