740A.00/6–2851: Despatch
The Chargé in Ireland (Huston) to the Secretary of State
No. 852
In consequence of arrangements made by the Irish Department of External Affairs for the newly-elected1 Prime Minister (Taoiseach) to receive the chiefs of the diplomatic missions in Dublin, I was received by Mr. de Valera on June 25th, at which time he took occasion to defend himself on certain issues concerning which he obviously felt he had been made the object of criticism in the United States. The fact that he retained me for approximately 55 minutes, whereas three of my colleagues who preceded me had averaged about 10 to 12 minutes, seemed to indicate an anxiety on his part to curry sympathetic understanding in American quarters.
The New Government
Mr. de Valera said that the position of his Government was, of course, “not too comfortable” in view of the narrow margin by which it came to power with the help of the five Independents. He felt, however, that his Government could carry on indefinitely with the support of the Independents, as they naturally would not be eager to incur the risk and expense of “going to the country” in a new election. He realized, however, that his Government would not be able to survive in case it came up against a solid opposition on a matter of serious import in which the Independents might have deep-seated convictions contrary to Fianna Fail policies or objectives. He concluded this subject by saying that admittedly his Government was embarking under “not very satisfactory circumstances”, but he felt that it might nonetheless have a good, long life.
Policies of New Government
In response to my reference to his statements on foreign policy in his recent press conference (despatch no. 841 of June 252), Mr. de Valera spoke deprecatingly of the form and content of the press reports of his remarks, saying that they scarcely constituted a satisfactory exposition of the policies of the new Government inasmuch as his remarks had been drawn out bit by bit by scattered and unrelated questions from different members of the press. Although he had no particular extension of these questions to make [Page 525] at the moment, he went on, he wished to mention one point, namely, that it need not be considered that there must necessarily be a gap in the defense of the Western World as a result of the Irish position. He was aware that the view was held in many quarters that Ireland’s unpreparedness for defense—he did not mention the North Atlantic Pact—constituted a serious weakness in the defenses of the democratic world. This need not be, he said; the Irish are good fighters, as they have shown, and they can maintain their own defenses if only they can be given arms. I remarked that, as he probably knew, present American production of arms was taken up by the immediate needs of the United States and its commitments to those countries which have joined together in a common effort to build an effective defense of the free world.
Charges of Dictatorship
“I know that many people say that I am a dictator or that my Government will be a dictatorship”, Mr. de Valera went on, “but I am not a dictator—not at all—far from it. You yourself saw my election by democratic processes in the Dail the other day, and you will find that our elections are fairly conducted and that we are in every way a democratic state.” By several additional remarks he indicated that he had been a little amused but also rather seriously nettled by charges of dictatorial tendencies on his part, although in his own mind his positive and perhaps authoritarian proclivities were a result of his long affiliation with and determined leadership of the Irish struggle for independence.
Irish Attitude During World War II
Mr. de Valera then referred feelingly to the accusations that he and his Government had been hostile to the United States and the other allies, or indeed pro-German, during World War II; he knew that he had been criticized for harboring German and Japanese spies and diplomatic representatives and for otherwise being lenient or tolerant with the enemies of the democratic world. “But Ireland is not, and I am not, either Fascist or Nazi. We are a democratic people and state. It is wrong to think that we were in any way hostile to your country or to the Allied cause. We were neutral, it is true, but we did not favor or assist the Axis.” He continued by saying that the German Minister had been allowed to continue here and that there were also three Japanese, but every one of them had been carefully watched every moment of the day and night and consequently it was utterly impossible for them to do any harm. It was because the German Minister had been so correct and unoffending, he said, that he decided that he would pay a call upon him at the time Hitler’s death became known. He had been much criticized for this, he knew, and he had realized before he did [Page 526] it that criticism would be strong, but the German Minister had behaved himself so properly that “I was damned if I was going to treat him any differently from other representatives on whom I had called in similar circumstances (referring to Mr. Roosevelt’s death), especially as Hitler was dead and there was no possibility of my reinforcing an already lost cause.”
The Prime Minister took occasion in the course of these remarks to refer especially to the United States representative in Ireland during the war, who, he said, had been emphatically and consistently hostile to Ireland. He did not know why this man had been so hostile, so unfriendly; he wondered if it had not been for some personal reasons, but he was afraid that it had reflected a certain amount of animosity toward Ireland which existed during that period in the Department of State (see despatch no. 837 dated 21 June3 giving President O’Kelly’s remarks on this same subject). In any case, he concluded, this and other factors had sometimes made Ireland’s relations with the United States difficult.
Partition
As I was taking leave, Mr. de Valera said he would like to mention to me confidentially a thing which was not generally known. Whereas the official attitude of the United States Government with respect to Partition had always been that it could not intervene, actually at one time—I believe he said in 1939—Mr. Roosevelt had secretly done so. Although outwardly maintaining the official United States’ position, he said, Mr. Roosevelt had at one point tried to assist by letting the British know that he hoped they would do something to bring about a solution to this problem.
Mr. de Valera seemed and claimed to be in good health. His great difficulty, he said, was in reading; he could see things at a distance fairly well, but he was greatly handicapped in reading and often did not even recognize people near to him.