No. 219

711.56340B/4–2251: Telegram

The Minister in Iceland (Lawson) to the Secretary of State

top secret   priority

215. Inform Mitchell Defense. ReDeptel 201, April 20.1 Fol are FonMin views which I feel reasonable:

1. Arrival troops believed unlikely precipitate strikes earlier May 18 which end of legally required 30 days notice termination contracts.

2. Govt will make every effort prevent strikes and hopes divide non-Commie from Commie labor by offering Social Democrat labor some concessions. There seems even chance Govt will succeed with non-Commie unions and obtain weight Federation of Labor unions against widespread strikes. But there little belief Commie dominated unions will desist unless it appears politically detrimental CP.

This not fundamentally workers strike program. Situation dominated by elements polit speculation and influences, therefore labor’s attitude, even if determinable at this time wld not be accurately indicative workers feelings. But fact they willing place power strike in hands Commie labor leaders shows seriousness both Commie and non-Commie workers.

Not possible assess public feeling this time but there reason believe it will not be against strikers in early days strikes as govt is shouldering blame for high cost living.

If strikes start they will spread and situation will be serious. Expected be long rather than short duration.

Presence of troops may well be influence for good among non-Commie workers who realize loss through strikes of benefits normally expected in form remunerative work from such troops.

3. Not possible sign agreement and keep secret, whether Althing action necessary or not, nor wld it be practicable or desirable. In any event June too late as Soviet fishing fleet usually arrives middle May which long been considered latest troop arrival date but now coincides with strike date. Arrival troops Keflavik early May, say three–seven (ReLegtel 214, April 20)2 seems best program this time.

4. Destroyers no substitute. Presence troops in Iceland as part actually operating defense program essential to anticipated psychological and political as well as security-wise benefits.

5. Coincidental arrival troops to avoid public disturbances only one of several reasons. Term “security force” used in previous messages used chiefly in sense of security against outside forces, possible sabotage and against some possible public disturbance but not primarily against latter. The principal reasons were to justify to public by visual evidence of troops that govt’s defense program is [Page 504] essential; that world conditions depended such action; that this is a serious tangible program with troops actually in Iceland to meet possible Soviet aggressive action, which in absence any Iceland military is absolutely necessary; that a fait accompli wld discourage opposition, rob the Commies of substantial effectiveness in organized opposition, and wld stimulate public acceptance of agreement and the public belief it necessary, thus giving more support to govt’s action than wld be the case if no troops were here at time.

6. Consideration has been given propaganda value to Soviets in pointing up two govts fear Iceland public reaction. But, this far outweighed, it believes, by values stated above. Regardless date arrival troops Commies may be expected exploit every angle govt’s deliberate policy keep negots secret and govt’s implied fear public reaction, although govt’s whole procedure designed prevent Commie active dramatic organized effort arouse public opposition unfairly and create illegal public disturbances. We must contemplate constant Commie use strikes, propaganda and all means embarrass govt and hinder defense operations but once troops are here such actions will be more difficult and command less support.

FonMin told me there wld be Cabinet meeting 23rd to determine whether Althing action necessary; alternatively whether legally required refer agreement to Althing committee (upon which Commie member sits) immediately before signing; and consider latest date in early May troops should start arriving.3

I thought it necessary assure FonMin views requested Deptel 201 not be construed as opposition his plans but rather our desire be certain he given appropriate consideration such important factors. Although he did not say so I believe he will inform Cabinet tomorrow of the points raised and his replies.

Lawson
  1. Supra.
  2. In telegram 214, Lawson reported that the Foreign Minister was very anxious for U.S. troops to arrive in Iceland by May 3. (740B.5/4–2051)
  3. Telegram 204 to Reykjavik, April 24, informed Lawson the Department of State had recommended to the Department of Defense that it try to have the initial troop unit arrive at Keflavik by the Foreign Minister’s target date and gave him permission to pass the information on to the Icelandic Government. (711.56340B/4–2251)

    Telegram 227 to Reykjavik, May 1, told Lawson the Department of Defense estimated that if they received notice to move by May 2 or 3 the troops could arrive within 24 to 36 hours. (740B.5/5–151) In telegram 232 from Reykjavik, May 2, Lawson replied that the Foreign Minister had assured him he would sign the agreement on May 5 and he wanted the troops to arrive on May 7. (740B.5/5–251) That information was relayed to General Burns of the Department of Defense in a letter from Deputy Under Secretary of State Matthews on May 3. (740B.5/5–251)

    In telegram 239 from Reykjavik, May 5, Lawson informed the Department of State that Iceland had ratified the agreement, and in telegram 242 from Reykjavik, May 7, he reported that the U.S. troops had arrived at Keflavik on May 7. (740B.5/5–251)