740.5/1–2151
Memorandum of Conversation, by Kenneth A. Byrns of the Office of British Commonwealth and Northern European Affairs1
Subject: Defense of Iceland: Point-by-point discussion of Iceland’s reply to the Standing Group.
| Participants: | The Honorable Edward B. Lawson, American Minister to Iceland |
| BNA—Mr. Raynor | |
| BNA—Mr. Hulley | |
| BNA—Mr. Byrns | |
| Mr. William Mitchell, Special Assistant to the Secretary of the Air Force | |
| Mr. John A. Johnson, Assoc. General Counsel, Air Force | |
| Major Weber, Air Force | |
| Lt. Colonel Lennkoff, JAG Department Army | |
| Commander Smith, JAG Department Navy | |
| Lt. Colonel William Fondren, Army | |
| Captain S.B. Dingwell, Navy | |
| Captain Marvin P. Evenson, JCS–NATO |
At the meeting of January 20, each point of the Icelandic memorandum to the Standing Group (SGM–37–51)2 was considered separately. The lettered paragraphs below follow those of the memorandum:
a. The Icelandic Government states that it is necessary that negotiations concerning the defense of Iceland in accordance with SGM–626–503 and NAOR 32 CC/504 be conducted at the same time.
[Page 482]State and Defense were in agreement that this should be done.
b. Iceland desires the right unilaterally to terminate the Agreement upon “reasonable notice”.
Minister Lawson said this was a most difficult point and that the US could not permit Icelanders unilaterally to terminate the agreement just as they saw fit. Defense suggested that we should attempt to get the Icelanders to agree to permit the bilateral to run for the full period of the North Atlantic Treaty, Mr. Byrns mentioned the difficulties experienced in the Keflavik negotiations of 1946,5 when the US desired to get a long-term agreement, but had to be satisfied with 6 years. State was of the opinion that a period of 20, or even 10 years would be most difficult to get.
It was agreed that the US must first ask for an agreement to run for the full period of NATO, and, if this approach failed, continue to negotiate to obtain as long a period as possible. As the US would have to expend large sums for defense facilities in Iceland, a shortterm agreement, or one which Iceland could unilaterally terminate at will, was not a feasible proposition. The US Congress wanted to be certain that the US was getting something for its money.
It was also suggested that the agreement might run for the life of NATO, subject to earlier termination by agreement of the two parties or when agreed to by some designated NATO organ.
c. (1) Iceland desires to have the right to name the nationality of the forces stationed in Iceland.
Minister Lawson said that he did not believe there would be much difficulty over this point.
. . . . . . . . . . . .
Defense believed that technicians coming to Iceland temporarily should be admitted regardless of nationality.
Defense suggested that a clause might be inserted in the agreement to the effect that the bases would be kept open to other nationalities than the one primarily responsible for the defense of Iceland. If Iceland would not agree to this clause, the words “with the prior approval of Iceland” might be added to it.
Defense said that there was an impression in a previous meeting with State that the Icelanders might object to the presence of colored troops in the US contingents. Mr. Hulley and Mr. Byrns recalled that there were a few Negro soldiers in Iceland during the last war and the Icelandic Government had requested that they be [Page 483] removed, and this was done. Defense pointed out that it was not possible to determine, by an examination of a unit’s records, what races were assigned to it. It was very possible that a unit arriving in Iceland would have Filipinos, Chinese, or Negro soldiers in its ranks.
(2) Iceland wants its nationals to receive training.
It could not be determined from the wording in the Icelandic memorandum whether the Icelanders meant training or actual enlistment in NATO forces. (At present the US does not permit the enlistment of aliens in its armed forces although there is a likelihood that legislation will be approved so that aliens can enter the services, as was the case during World War II.) If training were meant, a program could be set up under MDAP.
Captain Dingwell stated at this point that he understood that MDAP should not be tied in with NATO. According to Captain Dingwell, the Secretaries of State and Defense had exchanged letters agreeing that there would be no quid pro quo maneuvers connected with treaties negotiated within the NAT framework. (A search of RA files has not yet located the letters.)
Minister Lawson said that it was very necessary that the Icelanders should not be excluded. For them to seek training would show their willingness to co-operate in the defense of Iceland. Iceland expects NATO to pay the soldiers’ salaries and all other expenses.
Mr. Byrns pointed out that the Icelanders might be thinking of eventually taking over the defense of Iceland, using their own forces. With their sights fixed on the figure of 2,700 mentioned to them by the Standing Group, the Icelanders might become optimistic, hoping to raise that many troops within several years as this only represented three per cent of the population. …
d. Iceland believes NATO should take special security measures for the protection of the civil population, such as building air raid shelters and roads for evacuation of cities.
In the discussion on this point, Captain Dingwell said this was a matter for some other agency than Defense, as protecting the civil population is of no value to the military services. Mr. Lawson said that the need for security measures was a consequence of military operations. Mr. Hulley stated that we might offer to assist the Icelanders in planning, but not actually construct shelters and roads.
Representatives from Defense said that they understood that MDAP funds could not be used for buildings, runways, assembly lines, and the like.
Mr. Raynor said that State would undertake to determine what could be done with MDAP and ECA funds to provide for civil defense and the stockpiling of consumer goods.
[Page 484]It was agreed that, in drawing up the draft agreements, no mention would be made of this point, but that a “stand-by” paragraph, using general terms, would be prepared for later insertion if the Icelanders were insistent upon it.
e. Iceland desires the right to determine the location of forces.
It was agreed that some general reference to this point could be included in the agreement (such as Article 1 of the long form), but the US would try to avoid mention of specific locations. It was the opinion of both State and Defense that the negotiations should be directed toward obtaining an “open end” agreement that would permit later defense arrangements to be made.
Defense brought up the question of the re-capture of World War II facilities now in the hands of the Icelanders, mentioning the Hvalfjordur tank farm and satellite airfields. No decision was made on this matter.
f. Iceland would like to know US intentions in regard to the 1946 Keflavik Agreement.
State and Defense agreed that the Keflavik Airport Agreement of 1946 should be terminated. Pertinent provisions of that Agreement could be included in the one now being negotiated.6
g. In this paragraph Iceland brought up the question of jurisdiction over troops, hiring of labor, and black-marketing.
The question of jurisdiction over troops was passed over inasmuch as agreement had been reached on this point during the discussions of January 19. Minister Lawson stated that the US should give Iceland general assurances that we would curb blackmarketing. The wording in paragraph 4 of Defense’s short form draft and Article 13 of the long form were considered applicable to the matter.
h. Iceland desires to know who is to furnish the funds for the defense expenditures.
NATO (i.e., the US) will have to pay the bills. Defense suggested that Iceland should state its willingness to pay “within its capabilities”. For one thing, this would be an assurance to Congress that Iceland was willing to do its part.
i. Iceland wants the negotiations to be held in Iceland.
It was agreed that the negotiations would be held in Iceland, and although no definite date could be set, it was the consensus of opinion that the negotiations should start in early February, thus taking advantage of the interest in improving defense which it is [Page 485] hoped General Eisenhower’s visit on January 25 will engender. Minister Lawson is to determine, upon his return to Reykjavik, when the Icelanders will be ready to commence the talks.
In the general discussion that followed, it was agreed that no decision could be made at this time as to the form the agreement would take. The form would have to be decided upon after Minister Lawson has had the opportunity to talk with the Foreign Minister to determine if Althing approval is required and to ascertain what publicity the Icelandic Government felt that it had to give to the agreement. Minister Lawson is to cable this information to State.
- This was the second of two meetings between Departments of State and Defense personnel. At the first meeting on January 19, Lawson informed the group that the Icelandic Government was opposed to a piecemeal agreement and wanted to know all the principal demands to be made on Iceland. The Army, Navy, and Air Force listed their requirements in Iceland, and an agreement was reached to meet again on the following day, January 20. (Memorandum of conversation, (740B.5/1–1951)↩
- This paper was a memorandum from the Standing Group, January 15, concerning security provisions and defense measures for Iceland. It included the reply of the Icelandic Government, January 11, 1950, to previous memoranda of the Standing Group. The Icelandic reply was the same as the italicized portions of this memorandum of January 20. A copy of SGM–37–51 is in the NATO Sub-Registry.↩
- This Standing Group Memorandum of December 29, 1950, set forth a plan for defense measures for Iceland. A copy is enclosed in SGM–45–51, January 17, in the NATO Sub-Registry.↩
- This was the document in which the North Atlantic Ocean Regional Planning Group in November 1950 invited the Governments of the United States and Iceland to reach agreement concerning the fulfillment of certain military operating requirements in Iceland. A copy has not been found in Department of State files, but information on the document is in a letter from the Secretary of Defense to the Secretary of State, February 17, 1952. (711.56340B/2–1752)↩
- Information on the Keflavik negotiations of 1946 is in Foreign Relations, 1946, vol. v, p. 824.↩
- Article VI of the Basic Agreement of May 5, 1951, stated that the Agreement of 1946 would terminate when the new Agreement came into force. The final Agreement is printed in Department of State Bulletin, May 21, 1951, p. 812, or 2 UST (pt. 1), p. 1195.↩