Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, Europe: Political and Economic Developments, Volume IV, Part 1

751.00/9–251: Telegram

No. 179

The Ambassador in France (Bruce) to the Secretary of State ¹

secret

Paris, September 2, 1951—5 p.m.

1408. Dept pass Harriman.

1. This tel presents Emb’s analysis French polit situation and French attitudes toward present major internatl polit problems. EDF, Indochina, Ital treaty revision, Morocco, the Saar, contractual arrangements with Germany are mentioned if at all only incidentally as they have been covered in previous tels. Observations on French econ situation contained in later tel.

Since this is lengthy summary report suggest Secy’s personal attention be called particularly to parts A and C.²

A. French Public Opinion and US Foreign Policy.

2. On eve Washington, Ottawa mtgs,³ non-Communist French public opinion accepts basic soundness US foreign policy, is more hopeful its ultimate success than at any time past few years. French attitude has evolved from scepticism to definite hopefulness and tempered confidence in long range outlook. Neutralism commands no govt or parliamentary support. Firmer attitude toward Communists has been apparent this year in govt’s actions although far short of what desirable.

First, confidence has grown that US in inspiring and sharing Eur defense activated primarily by intention deter potential aggression. Statements Eisenhower insisting NATO program designed first to ensure peace, second to constitute an effective def but never for offensive purposes, have had calming influence. Contributory to additional optimism re security prospects have been implementation Atlantic Pact through US end-item deliveries, recent despatch US divisions Eur, and especially presence SHAPE with Eisenhower possessing unlimited prestige as SACEUR.

Confidence developing that defense evolving to make successful resistance possible east of Rhine instead of gloomy previous fear evacuation across France fol by problematical liberation destroyed Eur civilization.

Second, French greatly impressed by immed US response to North Korean attack, by unwavering support operations there despite early mil reverses, by demonstration it possible rally UN assistance for collective security, by our conduct of Palais Rose and Kaesong negots.

Third, French gratified and stimulated by US support French initiatives relation creating Eur community—Schuman Plan and EDF—particularly since they involve Allied policy toward Ger always France’s cardinal concern and source chief Franco–US disagreements in recent years.

Fourth, French encouraged by belief US appreciation their efforts and problems Indochina clearer than heretofore as evidenced by increasing US aid, invitation to De Lattre⁴ for American visit, inclusion Assoc States San Francisco mtg,⁵ and US mil understanding high strategic importance Indochina in world struggle against communism.

Fifth, disposition by US Govt of Mac Arthur case⁶ diminished French fears of rash adventures in Far East. Assertion supremacy civilian control over our foreign policy struck responsive chord.

3. Nevertheless some feeling persists that US may at times proceed in internatl affairs unilaterally, impetuously, and dangerously. While there is no disposition to question our position of primacy in free world leadership, critics cavil that we have unnecessarily and publicly adopted positions involving interests our Allies without real prior consultation or due consideration their views (viz. Ger def contribution last year, Spanish matter this year).

In considerable degree sentiment exists that since France and other West Eur countries wld be first victims of Sov aggression they shld be given more weight in West polit councils than their mil strength alone yet justifies. Moreover, suspicion is ineradicable that the UK enjoys a position of special partnership with the US which, although a natural and inevitable relationship, may at times result in decisions adverse to French interests being taken without due regard to their views. This is especially true in respect of Middle East affairs, where although no mil contribution by them is involved the French feel that any decisions taken will inevitably have repercussions in the sphere of their Mohammedan territories.

Overriding obsession in France is necessity avoid war on Eur soil. French thoroughly in agreement with us that Eur rearmament on massive scale essential to this end. However, remain fearful that our country always victorious and never occupied conscious of its immense strength may take unwarranted risks that might precipitate war. American press reports keep them uneasy. Strident appeals by certain columnists that if Kaesong negots break down we shld bomb and possibly invade China agitate public thought here, where influence of journalistic pundits on formulation our natl policies is vastly exaggerated.

Such apprehensions are most evident connection Far Eastern questions, but also affect French reaction to US policies Eur affairs. French fears that US motto might be “damn the torpedoes, full speed ahead” frequently crop out in discussions of tempo our projects resolve issues concerning German Fed Republic, Berlin, Spain, and even admission Greece and Turkey to NATO. Their initial reluctance to such membership for Greece and Turkey dictated by opposition to NATO becoming merely anti-Sov mil alliance and consequent increased difficulty enlarging its economic and polit scope.

4. French somewhat dismayed also by our changes of pace by constant revision upward of rearmament estimates without accompanying provision for meeting increased burdens. They consider program wld be more realizable if instead of exhortations to raise sights we cld reach agreement on the most econ joint use of our resources devoted to rearmament, such as a multilateral system for equitable sharing of def costs.

Such developments as the Kem amendment⁷ and the restriction on cheese imports appearing inconsistent with stated Amer foreign policy bewilder and irritate public opinion here.

5. Though little suspicion now remains that US wishes supplant France as ruling power in latter’s overseas territories many Frenchmen still believe we wish to penetrate and dominate these possessions econ, especially Morocco. Even more marked is conviction that we encourage and even foment local nationalist movements without real knowledge of conditions or probable consequences. For example the alleged close relationship between a few US officials and members of the Istiqlal Party, the alleged subsidies paid by CIA reps to Moroccan agitators are believed by the majority of Frenchmen and thought to reflect official US Govt policy.

B. Stability of Pleven Govt.

6. French reps at Washington and later talks are members of coalition govt that does not appear be in immed danger but is nevertheless subj to all weaknesses that have made cabinet crises so frequent in brief life of Fourth Republic.

Pleven Govt faces constant double opposition of Communists and Gaullists in Assembly, who together hold slightly over one-third of seats. There remain four major groups of roughly equal size (Socialists, MRP, Radicals, and Independents-Peasants) that want no fundamental changes in constitution of Fourth Republic and those institutions of parliamentary demo which make govt responsible to legislature. But no three of these together have sufficient number of votes to maintain a govt in office if on some critical issue Fourth joins CP and Gaullists in opposition.

Temptation of such desertion is great for two reasons. First, left wing of centrist bloc is constantly being outbid on matters of importance to it by legislative proposals made by Communist opposition, and right wing similarly outbid by Gaullists. Restraints on coalition members imposed by participation in responsibility for governing give them a sense of frustration. This feeling is of course particularly acute when elections are in offing, as they are once again with respect Oct elections departmental gen councils. Second, two wings of centrist bloc have mutually exclusive doctrinal position on important issues such as aid to church schools and econ and social policy.

Pleven Govt is, like its predecessors, particularly plagued by fact its component parties come from both sides of great divide in econ policy. Its right wing believes in rugged individualism tempered by private agreements among producers; its left wing wants an increased measure of state control and break-up of many private price-fixing agreements. At time when inflationary situation calls for prompt remedial action, balance of power has shifted to right wing, whose policies are inevitably slower-acting than wld be measures of state control.

Even though all governmental parties and Gaullists too are united behind fundamental concepts Atlantic alliance policy and need strengthen France’s mil forces, this difference over econ policy makes acceptance additional rearmament burden particularly difficult, since any lowering of living standard will be unacceptable to workers unless burdens more equitably shared; yet this equitable sharing is precisely what shift to right in party strengths in new Assembly makes less likely than before.

7. Pleven Govt may well last until early 1952, but only because of circumstances external to it, not because of its own bold and successful measures or of harmony among coalition partners. From early Sept until Oct 23, Parliament will be in recess. In recent years several cabinets have fallen as result disagreements among ministers without need of adverse Assembly vote, but none has so fallen when Assembly was not in session. Very fact of negots in Washington, Ottawa, and Rome makes such collapse unlikely.

Once Parliament reconvenes, Pleven will probably be able to maintain his balance on the tightrope precisely because there continues to be a net below. The govt will probably be protected from full consequences of personal jealousies, party ambitions, and genuine dissatisfactions by a double safety device: First, natl self-respect that has on several previous occasions prevented Assembly from overthrowing a cabinet while important internatl negots were in course or UNGA mtg in Paris; and second, disinclination of politicians to take over reins of govt immed before new fiscal year (which begins Jan first) since that wld involve assuming responsibility for passage budget that will set new high in expenditures and deficit and demand new sources of revenue.

8. Particularly difficult moment will nevertheless come immed upon reconvening of Natl Assembly. That date will precede opening GA and beginning of budget debate. During first week or two after Assembly reconvenes there will be, if experience of previous years holds good, little legis ready for public debate, with result that there is open season for attacks on govt’s actions and policies. Foreign affairs debate at that time inevitable, but shld be less dangerous for Pleven, even though Rome NAC mtg may have taken decisions on Ger unpalatable to many Frenchmen, than challenges on econ and social policy. Shld as yet undetermined govt action not have raised national minimum wage as unions demand, not have halted inflation and even brought down some prices, there will be strongest temptation for Socialists to go into outright opposition.

Despite favorable shift in Socialists’ attitude on foreign policy, their disagreements with govt on domestic issues are so deep that Socialists cannot be counted on not to upset applecart. They feel that passage legis in favor church schools (see below) is rightward shift endangering republican institutions. They are horrified that party closest to them in past years, the MRP, is ready to accept alliance on this issue with RPF, and feel that trustworthiness of MRP as partner in favor leftist social policy is thereby impaired. Moreover, they are very cynical as to probability Pleven halting inflation. Quite possible their patience will give out and they will conclude that show of their polit power only way to get their econ policies accepted. This power is ability to bring down govt whenever they wish by voting against it on issue where RPF and Communist opposition is already assured.

9. Whether Pleven Govt lasts into 1952 or not, however, a new relationship among parties has been brought about by results of June elections and subsequent polit developments. Elections made Gaullists strongest group in Assembly and ended situation, which had existed ever since exclusion of Communists from govt in May 1947, in which every govt had to be formed or supported by same combination of parties. A coalition built around Gaullists has become arithmetically possible. It is not, however, polit probable within forseeable future, and it is too early for there to have been clear indication of trend in form of shifts of individual deputies to Gaullist camp (or desertion of it by deputies who think De Gaulle’s insistence on acceptance his full program will keep party in opposition forever). Immed Assembly convened, Gaullists’ presence and program were instrumental in causing MRP to inject into its minimum program proposals for immed aid to church schools.

Insistence on these proposals has been instrumental in keeping Socialists from joining Pleven Govt and has since done much to dislocate old coalition. On school issue there has emerged a new alignment in Assembly whereby slim majority is constituted by three parties of govt (MRP, Peasants, and Independents) in alliance with RPF, against Radicals, Socialists, and Communists.

This “reversal of alliances” is far from constituting basis for new governing coalition. To get one including Gaullists, RPF itself wld have to drop insistence on adoption its whole program as price of sharing responsibility, and both MRP and Radicals wld have to accept splits within their parties in which left wing wld join opposition. Nevertheless, entering wedge whereby Gaullists may split anti-RPF coalition will be exploited by them to full. Doubts and uncertainties have begun to beset “republican” parties as to stability of relations among them and possibility that RPF may tempt various combinations of “government” parties into succession of ad hoc alliances as different polit issues arise. On govt level, new situation promises to require increased vigilance on part PriMin to prevent gradual dislocation of centrist coalition. Among leftist voters, there will be new temptation to ally with Communists to defeat Gaullists, or to fail to unite with others in order defeat Communists.

C. Possible Effects of Coming International Discussions of Governmental Stability and French Opinion.

10. There is not enough opposition regarding foreign affairs among non-Communist French for govt to be split, or overthrown by Assembly, or for public opinion to be turned against US by substance of decisions that French will be called upon to make at San Francisco, Washington, Ottawa, and Rome. Within govt there is unity as regards principal aspects of foreign policy, whose continuity shown by fact France has in effect had only two FonMins, Bidault and Schuman, since liberation. Although there will be individual speeches and editorials objecting to specific points, French are in gen prepared to ratify what their reps agree to. It is true that parliamentary party positions have not been taken on admission Greece and Turkey to NATO, but as of now it does not seem probable that this question wld cause a pro-govt party to shift to opposition as wld be true, for example, of Socialists if question of admitting Spain were put before Assembly.

On German questions there is limit to how far French public and parliamentary opinion will permit any govt to go in extending to Fed Rep concessions it may demand. Since French reps unlikely agree to anything beyond these limits, however, one may anticipate parliamentary misgivings concerning, but not rejection of, tripartite decisions. We do not anticipate, for example, anything like Assembly’s near-refusal to endorse London agreements of June 1948. French are convinced of necessity of incorporating West Germany—partly for very reason of their continuing distrust of Germans’ aims and methods—into integrated West Eur. The average citizen has fairly good idea of implications of matters recently under discussion concerning Germany. Provided there are no surprises—and formal proposal to admit Ger to NATO wld be most unwelcome one to French public—govt shld be able get endorsement for its acts.

11. Manner of arriving at Franco-US agreement on any problem and manner of presenting resultant decision to public will be of capital importance in winning French public support and parliamentary endorsement. French inclination to regard US as youthful headstrong giant noted above. Acceptability of Amer proposals will be twice as great if US leans over backwards to give French fullest opportunity to present their case whenever two govts differ and to continue to give French full public credit whenever—as in case Schuman Plan and proposal for Eur def community—US is backing French initiative.

Advantages of such line will be found at both public and parliamentary level. Immense power of US and of USSR, which contrasts all more with that of France because of absolute as well as relative diminution of latter in recent years, is constant temptation to average Frenchman to take attitude that world struggle lies between two world powers whose actions his own nation cannot influence and not between totalitarian and free worlds, in second of which worlds his country and its citizens can make their influence count. Evidence of French natl influence on global decisions will encourage French citizen to give decisions his sincere support and not accord them mere fatalistic acquiescence.

Careful attention on part US to French public reactions is more important than ever now that within France a strong Gaullist party is making an effort to boost natl morale and galvanize natl will by beating chauvinistic drums. Particular target of Gaullist propaganda is precisely alleged softness of French Govt in dealing with US.

Foreign policy matters are most unlikely to be major cause of shift from present centrist coalition to one including and led by Gaullists. If De Gaulle ever comes to power, it will be by default, because others cannot deal with France’s problems. But Gaullists’ claims of parties’ hopelessness and inability to govern will have stronger appeal both to public and to wavering deputies if they can convince French that nation’s reps are being pushed around by US without regard for either substance of French views or amenities of relations among great powers.

Bruce

1. Repeated to London, Moscow, Rome, and Frankfurt.
2. A penned notation in the margin of page 1 reads: “Copy being sent to the Sec in San Francisco & inserted in ‘Black Book’ for the tripartite talks.”
3. For documentation on the meetings of the Foreign Ministers of the United States, the United Kingdom, and France at Washington, September 10–14, and on the Seventh Session of the North Atlantic Council in Ottawa, September 15–20, see vol. iii, Part 1, pp. 1163 ff., and 616 ff., respectively.
4. For documentation on the visit to Washington in mid-September 1951 of Général d’Armée Jean de Lattre de Tassigny, French High Commissioner in Indochina and Commander of French Union forces in Indochina, see vol. vi, Part 1, pp. 332 ff.
5. Reference is to the San Francisco Conference to draft a Japanese Peace Treaty.
6. For documentation relating to the dismissal of Gen. Douglas MacArthur by President Truman on April 11, 1951, see vol. vii, Part 1, pp. 264 ff.
7. This amendment to the Third Supplemental Appropriation Bill, introduced by Senator James P. Kem on May 9, was unanimously approved by both Houses of Congress on May 21. It denied economic aid to any country which sent arms or military materiel to the Soviet bloc subject to exceptions made by the President on the advice of the National Security Council.