Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, Europe: Political and Economic Developments, Volume IV, Part 1

No. 16

ECA message files, FRC 53A278, Paris: Telegram

The Deputy United States Special Representative in Europe ( Wood) to the Administrator for Economic Cooperation ( Foster)¹

secret

Paris, August 7, 1951—9 p.m.

Repto 3875. Washington for Foster, Bissell and Porter; pass Dept for Perkins and Cabot. Limit distribution. Ref: (a) Repto 3411 to Wash, rptd London Repto 710, Heidelberg Repto 36, (b) Repto 3622 sent eyes only Wash for Foster and Katz.²

1. On evening August 5, Stikker told me he had discussed problem described reftels informally with ministers at Strasbourg. Marjolin called on August 6 to fill in details.

2. According to their report, ministers at Strasbourg generally accepted analysis of problem and need for European leaders bring about constructive orientation European thinking concerning defense program. In session, it was agreed effort shld be made prepare a positive statement to be issued by appropriate ministerial group. Such statement wld affirm imperative need for rearmament, econ strength of Europe, great potential for increase in European production and productivity, and capacity Europe to handle rearmament without serious impairment current standard of living. Statement wld go on point out that after initial period capital build-up in armament, increased productive capacity Europe wld be turned to renewed progress in standard of living. The tone wld be positive emphasis on Europe’s strength and potential, and on European capacity both to build up its defenses and go forward to a promising future.

3. It was also agreed that secretariat OEEC on informal basis shld undertake prepare draft such statement. Marjolin plans constitute informal working group OEEC officials and secretariat for this purpose. Their work will be based upon draft described in reftel (b), a copy of which previously sent ECA/W.³ Hope it wld be issue at meeting of ministers toward end of Aug.

4. There was considerable discussion at Strasbourg as to channel thru which statement might be issued. Choice was among NATO, OEEC, Council of Europe, and ad hoc group of ministers. According Stikker and Marjolin, general inclination at Strasbourg was toward proclamation by European group either OEEC, Council of Europe or ad hoc group ministers. Principal reason this preference appears to have been feeling that desirable emphasis this an initiative by European leadership. It also appears to have been some feeling that such reaffirmation by body like OEEC might carry more weight with ordinary Europeans than NATO precisely because OEEC in past identified with econ recovery.

5. Marjolin requested my views on draft describing reftel (b). I commented to fol effect:

(a) Statement affirmed need rearmament to protect peace and freedom of West and fact that rearmament consistent with long-range recovery and statement might well add that rearmament actually necessary to lasting recovery as only antidote to fear which fundamentally impedes European recovery.

(b) I again raised question which Wood have [had] previously raised with Marjolin concerning desirability identifying Soviet aggression as cause of fear and need for rearmament, and

(c) I suggested form and style rather pedestrian. Marjolin accepted the suggestion in (a) and also readily agreed need improve form of statement so as to give it greater tightness, firmness and color. As to suggestion in (b) he doubted practicability of statement was to be issued thru OEEC or other European group of similar scope. After some discussion, I suggested possibility two statements. First statement might be by European group along lines described above. Second might be statement by NATO council of Ministers, endorsing previous proclamation and more fully developing underlying political facts and implications. Marjolin thought this might well meet ready acceptance among European ministers.

6. Marjolin asked whether a US observer could be provided to sit with working group in preparation of statement. Stikker and he both felt clear indication US support necessary to success.

7. Wood and I will of course continue give general encouragement this initiative. In view possible pace of developments, however, situation may be anticipated in which more definite expression of US views may be expected or even specifically requested. Unless you feel it inadvisable, we wld plan make an observer available to sit with working group. In addition, we request views concerning: (a) form and content of statement, and (b) preference concerning channel thru which statement wld be issued, with particular reference possibility two statements as indicated para 5 above.

Wood

1. Repeated to London for Spofford and Batt, Heidelberg for Handy, and the Embassy in France for Bruce, Schuyler, and MacArthur.
2. Not found in ECA message files. Telegram Repto 3411 from Katz to Foster, July 16, reported on the recent efforts of OEEC Council Chairman Dirk U. Stikker to end the “apathy and uneasiness” which “seemed to persist in many quarters in Europe.” Katz reported on a recent dinner at Paris arranged by Stikker with various European statesmen and Katz in attendance in which after much discussion it was agreed that the defense buildup and the increasing economic strength of Europe went together and were mutually necessary and that Stikker should enlist the aid of Robert Marjolin in attempting to develop a proposed course of action. (ECA message files FRC 53A278, Paris) For text of this telegram, see vol. iii, Part 1, p. 219.
3. Not found in Department of State or ECA message files.