Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, Europe: Political and Economic Developments, Volume IV, Part 1

No. 131

740.5/4–2751: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Belgium ¹

secret

Washington, May 4, 1951—7 p.m.

1466. Toisa.

1. Fol msg concurred in by ISAC agencies deals with negots re adequacy Belg def effort.

2. Van Zeeland’s statement to Amb (Embtel 1728²) that not possible for Belg to do more on national basis than it is now doing goes to fundamental issue. It wld seem to us that this issue, i.e., size of Belg contribution to collective def effort, wld persist irrespective of nomenclature used to describe it. Unable to understand why it wld be any easier for Belg to increase contribution if labelled as part of collective financing plan. To say it wld be implies Belg recognition of inadequacy present contribution; contrary implies Belg proposes maintain present relative position its def effort as among NATO nations.

3. Believe it important to distinguish between two related but separate problems which are being confused by Belgs. First problem is to obtain a Belg def effort which is more adequate in terms relationship to Belg resources and comparison with other NATO countries. Second problem is to utilize Belg prod capacity for prod of mil equip needed by armed forces of Belg and other NATO countries. First problem exists and wld exist even though there were no unemployed Belg prod capacity. It is purely Belg problem solvable only by Belg. Second problem exists in other countries in Eur as well as Belg and solution requires combination of natl and internatl action. Use of prod capacities of Eur cannot be solved by any magic formula or plan; in final analysis requires money which can only come from appropriations made by NATO countries.

4. With respect to first problem we simply cannot accept Belg thesis that her present effort represents maximum she can do. Embtel 1060³ reported Belg Govt proposes 17.5 billion franc expenditure for def for 1951. Alleged increase therein of 4.9 billion francs appears to be primarily transfer from civil to mil accounts and not real increase. Belg def budget computed without these para-mil items (i.e., about $278 million) represents about 4.3% estimated GNP and by this criterion only Den, Portugal, and Lux are doing less. Belg econ position one of best in Eur. Belg has relatively good dol position and bal of payments surplus with other Eur countries. Per capita income one of highest. Nr of Belg citizens whose earnings needed to support each man under arms less than any nation except Portugal. Only 3.6 per 300 of population are on active service. Fr for example has 5.4 per 300. Belg manpower obviously available for greatest troop strength. Belg production and procurement program for period 1951 through 1954 represents expenditures of only $570 millions (DPB(51)30⁴).

5. What our view amounts to in essence is that in our judgment, and we believe by any objective comparison, Belg is not now carrying a fair share of the burden of the NATO def effort. We fully recognize that a final and definitive judgment as to what is a fair share of Belg and other NATO countries must await conclusions of present NATO exercise and be a multilateral judgment. We cannot, however, ignore fact that by any criteria we can conceive as being applicable that judgment will affirm our view. We recognize that for some time burden-sharing comes down to division of US aid among NATO countries. In absence of final multilateral judgment and agreement on shares which each country shld bear, US as grantor must allocate aid on basis its judgment as to need. This obviously involves US judgment as to extent to which grantee nations utilizing own resources in comparison with ourselves and others. US cannot and will not provide aid in order to relieve Eurs of effort which they are clearly capable of making. While our primary objective is to obtain equipped and trained forces in being at the earliest possible moment, we believe a truly effective collective def force must be founded upon a wholehearted cooperative collective effort in which each NATO country consistent with its obligation under the NAT contributes what it best can. We cannot substitute for Eur effort; we are eager to supplement it.

6. As result of informal discussions on mil level Belgs have apparently assumed that US wld supply end-items in such amt and kind that present Belg mil budget wld meet remaining costs Belg MTDP commitments. No firm end-item program beyond FY 51 exists. Preliminary review here indicates proposed 1952 end-item program contains large quantities of equip which cld be produced in Belg or procured in Eur. Belgs shld be informed that after full review Belg requirements and Belg capabilities to produce or procure, appropriate adjustments in end-item program will be made. These adjustments will probably require elimination from Belg program and diversion elsewhere of items which Belg can produce or procure within same time sched. Preliminary analysis here Belg capability and requirements indicates Belg cannot fulfill present MTDP commitment by June 1954 without substantially increasing presently planned program each year for next three years.

7. Moreover, country time phased programs which appear in NATO plans (DC–28)⁵ represent unilateral estimates on each country’s part based on own judgment as to maximum amount possible contribution. These estimates do not represent NATO allocation of tasks and therefore no NATO member is entitled to claim NATO obligations fully discharged simply because it is executing its voluntary commitment.

8. It is obvious that creation of adequate collective defensive strength in Eur is impossible without US help. US Govt is committed to NAT and to doing its share to achieve desired defensive posture in Eur. At same time US making major contribution to UN effort in Korea and endeavoring strengthen its own mil posture. Domestic and fon demands on US resources very heavy and placing unprecedented peacetime burden on US taxpayers. Natural consequence is to intensify insistence that those who ask us to aid them demonstrate they are doing utmost to help themselves. In this atmosphere we must go to Congress with request for funds to provide aid to NATO partners. Basic situation far from satisfactory. We must admit fact that despite joint judgment that certain size and composition of forces is required for an adequate def (MTDP) forces so far committed by NATO nations (DC–28) are far less than those agreed to be needed. We must admit that combined NATO production plans will not even provide all of equip needed by forces so far committed. We must nevertheless convince Congress that the goals are feasible and will in fact be obtained. This cannot be done on assumption that gaps in forces and equip will be provided solely by US. It is essential that we be able to express and justify confidence that present performance and future action of our allies is and will be such as to warrant belief that target can and will be reached.

9. Plain fact is that in surveying present performance of our NATO allies inadequacy Belg effort sticks out like sore thumb. No amt of rationalization can completely conceal fact that by comparison with other NATO countries and in terms of econ strength and resources Belg effort is much less than she is capable of and on the whole the most inadequate of any NATO country. If this situation continues during Congressional presentation and hearings on aid bill, effect can be quite serious. At worst it may jeopardize entire program; at best it involves risk that arbitrary and damaging legislative conditions on aid will be imposed or that Belg will be singled out for special treatment which is not too remote possibility in view Congressional feelings re Socobelge case. Obviously such effects wld damage both US and Belg interests. We believe it essential that some improvement in Belg picture be obtained. Ideal wld be immed and substantial increase in Belg effort. Any steps in this direction or commitment to take such steps wld be helpful.

10. We appreciate fact you are confronted by steady Belg barrage of excuses. Our considered view is that continued debate about their validity profits us not. We think statement that Belg cannot expend funds effectively without detailed direction from US must be frankly called an excuse and treated as such. Belg knowledge of the problem is no less than our’s. She knows there have not been enough forces committed; that there must be equip produced for both the forces committed and those to be committed; she knows the kind of equip required by them as well as we; she knows better than we what can be produced in Belg and equally well what can be procured in Eur; she knows as much as we about the approved types; she certainly must realize that the gaps in forces and equip cannot be met unless funds are provided. The situation seems to be that the Belgs expect these needs to be met without any further contribution by Belg. We wld like to get to this basic question. Is or is not Belg willing to do more? If Belg is willing to raise her effort to a level more nearly consistent with her capabilities, it seems to us patent that she can readily find ways to expend her funds effectively. There are a considerable nr of items in presently planned end-item programs which Belgs cld produce for themselves or for others (JAMAG 760 M, Apr 14) or procure elsewhere in Eur. DPB has made concrete recommendations (MPSB (50)142 and DPB(51)29).⁶ Even if we assume full delivery all end-items contained in presently planned program and add to it Belg production as planned for the period 1951 through 1954 there will remain, according to our studies, large deficiencies (based on requirements of forces committed under DC–28) in categories of artillery, combat vehicles, ammunition, small arms, and transport vehicles. These are not exhaustive of deficiencies which will exist. The only basis on which Belg can be complacent about her effort is one which assumes the US taxpayer or some other NATO country’s taxpayer will pay her bills. We do not think people as competent and intelligent as Belg can expect us to take seriously idea they cannot find way to use funds if they are provided.

11. We hope that using such of the foregoing as you deem most likely to be effective you will be able to make clear to Belgs that we think their effort inadequate, that we are certain they possess the capability to do more, that we are confident they can effectively spend more, that failure to improve their effort seriously jeopardizes the attainment of NATO objectives and our ability to obtain authority and funds to provide them aid in the future. Objective is to obtain improvement or best possible promise of improvement in near future which can be used in Congressional presentation.⁷

Acheson

1. Copies sent by pouch to London for Spofford, to Paris, and to Heidelberg. Drafted by the Assistant Director of the Office of International Security Affairs, John Bell, and cleared by Kranich (RA), Winfree (WE), Lippincott of ECA, Colonel Van Sycle of Defense, Curtis of Treasury, and Schelling of the Executive Office.
2. Supra.
3. Inaccurate reference. The correct document has not been identified in Department of State files.
4. Not found in Department of State files.
5. A report by the NATO Military Committee concerning Medium-Term Defense Plan Force Requirements, approved and forwarded to the Council Deputies by the NATO Defense Committee on October 28, 1950. For information on the genesis of this report and action taken on it in late 1950, see Foreign Relations, 1950, vol. iii, pp. 415 ff.
6. These documents of the Joint American Military Advisory Group, the Military Production and Supply Board, and the Defense Production Board have not been found in Department of State files.
7. In telegram 5878 from London, May 10, the Deputy Representative on the North Atlantic Council, Spofford, agreed with the thinking in this message, emphasizing that although the ECC agencies in Europe, with the help of the ECA country missions, should guide the Belgian defense financing program with specific suggestions on courses of action, nevertheless the primary responsibility lay squarely on the Belgians and they should realize that U.S. aid was a supplement, not a substitute, for the Belgian effort. (740.5/5–1051)