Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, Europe: Political and Economic Developments, Volume IV, Part 1

No. 129

755.13/4–951

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State¹

secret

[Washington,] April 9, 1951.

Participants:	The Honorable Joseph Pholien, Prime Minister of Belgium
	Baron Silvercruys, Ambassador of Belgium
	The Secretary of State
	Mr. Robert Murphy, Ambassador to Belgium
	Mr. George Perkins, Assistant Secretary of State
	Mr. Robert Winfree—WE

The Prime Minister began our meeting stating that he had just had a very interesting conversation with General Marshall who had told him that Europeans should not be worried about the Congressional resolution limiting American troop participation in Europe to four divisions.² I expressed my agreement with General Marshall, saying that Congress had not passed a law on this but simply a resolution. I said that Congressional feelings on the sending of additional troops to Europe would depend greatly on the progress made by the Europeans themselves in their rearmament and, of course, on the world situation. In general, while it was correct that Europeans should not be preoccupied by this Congressional action, they themselves must make a very strong effort to rearm. Mr. Pholien then asked me if he could repeat General Marshall’s statement to European correspondents who would question him on his return. I said that I thought it would be best not to repeat what General Marshall had told him since it might well create difficulties for General Marshall.

Ambassador Silvercruys interjected that more American troops would be sent to Europe if necessary but that a determining factor would be Europe’s own effort. With this I agreed.

The Belgian Prime Minister then said that his country would be faithful to all of its NATO and Brussels Pact engagements. He asked, however, if it would be possible for us to consult with the other NATO nations before taking really decisive steps such as crossing the 38th parallel or dropping the atom bomb. I replied that he had raised very delicate questions which most certainly should not be discussed at any time with the press. While we desired to consult with our NATO partners on any moves which we might make, if the security of the United States was threatened, the President might have to act promptly without consultation. The Prime Minister replied that the decisions of the United States Government would have a direct influence on the world situation. If the decisions we were called upon to make would decide whether or not there would be war or peace, would we consult with the NATO nations? I said that it was very hard to reply to this question. We might have to make immediate decisions. I pointed out that in the last two wars when Germany had attacked we came into the conflict sometime later, after we had had time to build up our defense production. If war came again, it was likely (possible) that an aggressor would not take the same course and would try to destroy our productive power first. If such were the case, we must act immediately.

I asked the Prime Minister to recall what we had been doing in Korea; that we had made no unilateral decisions but had kept all interested powers fully informed and had discussed every proposed step before we took it. We had actually had restrictions placed upon us by the United Nations. As the Prime Minister knew, we had thought it would be wise to have the President make a public statement regarding our intentions in China, emphasizing that we sought only peace and had no desires of conquest. This statement had been cleared with the interested powers, but, unfortunately, General MacArthur had issued a statement which served only to confuse the situation.³

I then spoke about Germany emphasizing that although we thought Western Germany should be brought into the European community, we had consulted with our NATO partners on every German issue and had actually turned over the leadership on German questions to other European nations. We had no desire to take any step involving Germany without the full understanding and agreement of other European nations.

I added that the same was true of Japan. At the moment there was no predominant power in the Pacific, but there could be no doubt but that Japan could be such a power. We must have the Japanese on the side of the West. In the Far Eastern Commission we were presently discussing a peace treaty with Japan. We desired always to consult with all our allies before taking any steps.

Prime Minister Pholien then inquired if we felt the same way about Tito. I replied that the Tito situation was a little more difficult since we did not know exactly what Tito wanted; however, it did appear now that he wanted to talk with us.

Mr. Pholien then stated that he was going to Bonn on Sunday and might possibly see Adenauer. He asked if he should endeavor to orient Adenauer re European thinking on Western Germany. He added that the German problem was very complex and complicated and that the Belgian Government’s attitude on Germany had not yet crystallized. He also stated that he had heard from a Swiss merchant who had been in Poland that while Poland hates Russia, she hates Germany more. I told the Prime Minister that as far as I knew Adenauer’s attitude was good and that we wanted to help with the Pleven plan⁴ so that Germany would not be again a menace to the peace of Western Europe. So far not much had been accomplished, however, Foreign Minister Schuman was hopeful that meetings to provide for a European Army could be arranged and we were most anxious that such meetings take place. I added that I thought he should tell Adenauer to be reasonable and to endeavor to reach agreement in any conversations which might take place. The Prime Minister reiterated his opinion that this was a very complex problem. I agreed and stated that we were trying to find the least difficult solution. At the present time, unless Russia’s attitude changed, the defense of Europe without Germany would be extremely difficult. With German participation, Europe’s defense would be possible. If the Russian attitude changed, new situations would arise which would have to be met.

I then mentioned the AP report regarding the cutting off of ECA aid to Belgium. Ambassador Silvercruys said that he had seen a press despatch several days ago from Athens on this subject—that it was a very delicate matter on which ECA was very touchy.⁵ I said that we had just recently transmitted a note to the Embassy in Brussels⁶ for delivery to the Belgian Government stating that the Belgians must release these attached funds or an equal sum would be withheld from their allotment. I added that it was unfortunate that this had burst into the press. The Prime Minister stated that he didn’t know too much about this particular matter. He did know that Greece owed a heavy debt to Belgium and that Greece had received iron and steel from Belgium and had to pay for it. I replied that there was no doubt on our part but that Greece owed a debt to Belgium, however, we had established credits to assist Grecian recovery and Socobel, the Belgian firm, had attached our funds. The Prime Minister stated that Socobel, which was a private firm, had attached these funds before a Brussels court and that the Belgian Government had no influence over this court. I stated that this was not our understanding of the case—that the Belgian Government had been asked to intervene and urge that the attachment be dissolved. However, it was my understanding that the Belgian Government had urged that the attachment be upheld. The Prime Minister again stated that his Government could not intervene in this case since no government could condemn a sovereign foreign state. Ambassador Murphy then stated that he understood that the Belgian Government had intervened in this case because The Hague Court of Arbitration in 1936 had rendered a decision favorable to the Belgians, therefore, the Belgian Government, on the basis of The Hague decision, felt that it should intervene. The Prime Minister said he thought the situation was now clear and when I remarked that it was something that should be straightened out, he agreed. I added that I often had to sign certificates certifying that certain corporations were owned by foreign governments and were therefore exempt from action by our courts.

I suggested that if the Prime Minister were questioned by the press on this matter that he merely state that he had not yet seen the story and could therefore make no comment.

1. Drafted by R.M. Winfree of WE.
2. The reference is to Senate Resolution 99 in support of the President’s authority to send American troops to Europe. For documentation on the debate of this subject in early 1951, see vol. iii, Part 1, pp. 1 ff. The text of Senate Resolution 99 is printed in Department of State Bulletin, April 16, 1951, p. 637.
3. For documentation on the proposed Presidential statement on U.S. aims in Korea, circulated in draft form among the nations providing forces in Korea, and the subsequent statement by MacArthur of March 24, see vol. vii, Part 1, pp. 252 ff.
4. For documentation on the French Prime Minister’s plan for a European Army, proposed in 1950 and discussed at length in 1951, see Foreign Relations, 1950, vol. iii, pp. 1 ff., and ibid., 1951, vol. iii, Part 1, pp. 755 ff.
5. The reference is to the temporary suspension of ECA allocations to Belgium pending satisfactory settlement of an action by which a private Belgian firm, Socobel (or Socobelge, Société Commerciale Belge), obtained an attachment order for the temporary blocking of $7 million consisting of $6 million in Marshall Aid funds and $1 million from the European Payments Union, which had been deposited by the National Bank of Greece in a Belgian bank to pay for steel rails to be supplied by Belgian firms to Greece under ECA auspices. The Assistant Administrator for Program, ECA, Paul Porter, announced in Washington on April 9 that the U.S. Government had informed Belgium of the suspension after conferring with a foreign affairs subcommittee of the U.S. House of Representatives. A member of the subcommittee, Abraham Ribicoff, characterized the general concern felt by his colleagues in his comment: “I do not think Congress is going to sit by and allow the funds we use for rehabilitating these nations to be able to be reached by private creditors for 25 year old debts. This seven million dollars is the straw that may break the camel’s back of the entire ECA.” (Extract from the April 9 hearings of the House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Economics, quoted with similar comments by other members, in telegram Torep 2381 to Paris, April 12, ECA message files, FRC 53A278, Paris. This ECA file contains much of the correspondence on this subject. See also Department of State files 655.82231, 681.82231, 117–ECA, and 881.00R/4–2751.)
6. The note, not found in ECA or Department of State files, was handed to the Belgian Minister of Foreign Commerce, Joseph Meurice, on April 11 by Huntington Gilchrist, head of the ECA Mission in Belgium. It warned the Belgian Government that unless it settled the dispute with the Greek Government or restituted the blocked $7 million by April 30, the U.S. authorities would make good the amount out of ECA allocations to Belgium. Correspondence between Belgium, Greece, and the United States concerning details of a settlement extended into July, but a basic agreement was announced by the ECA in Washington on June 26. For text of the announcement, see Document 135.